Case law

EEOC v. Village at Hamilton Pointe LLC

102 F.4th 387 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 9, 2024

The standards governing the grant of summary judgment are well established. … The district court correctly concluded that the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from those in Chaney.

United States v. Aaron Moeser

758 F.3d 793 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 10, 2014

Notably, Moeser never argued (to the dis- trict court or to our court) that the bank and the contractors do not qualify as victims of PARC’s scheme. … But it’s clearly not what happened in this case.

Mayoza v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.

871 F.2d 672 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 29, 1989

Regardless of the precise relevance of the appellant’s physical condition, the appellant’s thrust is that his fragile heart condition, as allegedly communicated to his broker, Leo Croley, “clearly indicate^] Mayoza’s intent … We also hold that the theory was much too speculative to qualify for admission to prove motive, plan or absence of mistake under Rule 404(b). IV.

United States v. Brian Keller, Cross-Appellee

376 F.3d 713 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 21, 2004

Keller failed to establish that any of these elements were present when he possessed the weapon on July 4, 2002. Consequently, the Government maintains, the district court erred when it granted the departure. … The difference between the evidence necessary to invoke the affirmative defense and the evidence necessary to qualify for the downward departure is necessarily one of degree.

The EDGEWATER HOSPITAL, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellant

857 F.2d 1123 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 10, 1989

Ill)) reimburses such a provider for authorized health care services given to qualified elderly and disabled patients. … The reimbursement procedures are statutorily established.

Deboer v. Village Of Oak Park

267 F.3d 558 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 20, 2001

If an application clearly violated the Use Policy, senior administrative clerk Jan Jankowski or Village Clerk Sandra Sokol would deny that application immediately. … To qualify for use of the Village Hall facility, the primary purpose of the event must still be a civic one, as the Village has defined the term.

Elvira Garcia-Arce v. William Barr

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 30, 2019

discretion here to review Garcia‐ Arce’s unexhausted Convention Against Torture claim, Gar‐ cia‐Arce would nevertheless not be entitled to relief. 8 Nos. 19‐1453 & 19‐2312 To qualify … Rather, appellate coun‐ sel’s performance is deficient only if she abandoned, without strategic justification, a “claim that was both ‘obvious’ and ‘clearly stronger’ than the claim that [she] actually pre‐ sented.”

Nathan Nissenbaum v. Chad Jennings

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 5, 2025

been adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding, AEDPA bars federal habeas relief unless the state court adju- dication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or in- volved an unreasonable application of, clearly … To qualify as unreasonable under § 2254(d), “the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous,” Wiggins v.

Foster, Diane v. Principal Life Insur

247 F. App'x 836 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 20, 2007

To establish a prima facie case in a failure-to-hire claim, Foster must establish that she was over 40, was qualified for and applied for the job, and that after her rejection Principal considered other applicants. … Foster’s evidence of comparative qualifications does not suggest that she was “clearly better qualified” than Mendicino.

Efrain Sanchez v. City of Chicago

700 F.3d 919 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 2, 2012

Thus, in the Fourth Amendment context, it is not essential that the identity of the individual officer who applied the force be established. … Clearly one inference that Sanchez wanted the jury to draw was that the fight was a fabrication; otherwise, the logic goes, the officers surely would have documented the fight if not arrested one or both of the brothers.

Kalonji Rad Jihad v. Charles E. Wright, Step Huckins, Dawn MacMillan and M. Levenhagen, 1

124 F.3d 204 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 14, 1997

Because Jihad was confined to the dry cell to serve a legitimate penological interest and not for the purpose of punishment, the culpability component of deliberate indifference analysis is clearly lacking. … R. 34(f) 2 The defendants also asserted in the motion to dismiss that they were entitled to qualified immunity 3 Jihad's complaint alleged that he was forced to lived in dry-cell "without soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, comb

Edward Q. Lupia v. Stella D'OrO Biscuit Co., Inc.

586 F.2d 1163 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 15, 1978

As there held, mere recitation of antitrust claims in a complaint does not render that complaint immune from summary disposition, if uncontradicted facts show otherwise. … And Judge Flaum points out that the court in that case actually states that primary line cases are “clearly distinguishable from suits filed by a local purchaser against a manufacturer, where competition between purchasers

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company v. United States of America and Interstate Commerce Commission

585 F.2d 254 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 4, 1978

The instant proceedings clearly were not rule-making proceedings. … Fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings requires notice clearly informing a party of the proposed action and the basis for that action. See Mathews v.

Helen Brooms, Cross-Appellee v. Regal Tube Company, Copperweld Corporation and Charles Gustafson, Cross-Appellants

881 F.2d 412 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 4, 1989

They argue that the second conclusion is an erroneous conclusion based upon the uncontroverted facts established at trial. … As for the latter proposition, the defendants would be required to meet a much more rigorous standard to qualify for attorneys’ fees as “prevailing parties.”

United States v. Millbrook

553 F.3d 1057 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 23, 2009

Such evidence may be admitted, however, if it is offered for other purposes, such as establishing intent, knowledge, motive, or opportunity. … Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a *1065 fact in issue, a witness qualified as

Standard Scale & Supply Co. v. Cropp Concrete MacHinery Co.

6 F.2d 447 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 15, 1925

If the- first ground is sustained, the chancellor, either directly or through the master, might well appoint and qualify a competent and disinterested accountant to cure the defendant's? … Use of an excessive valuation for the purpose of allowing the value of the use in reduction of defendant’s profits is clearly unprejudieial to it.

United States v. Joe Aguilar, Joe Aguilar v. United States

16 F.3d 1226 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 17, 1993

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Aguilar must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced him. Strickland v. … A judge should dismiss the motion without a hearing if the movant clearly is not entitled to relief. Baker v. United States, Nos. 91-1746 and 91-1956, slip op. at 6, n. 3 (7th Cir. Oct. 15, 1993); Liss v.

Teledyne Wisconsin Motor v. Local 283, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers

530 F.2d 727 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 26, 1976

refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; “Labor dispute” is defined in § 13(c) of the Act to include “any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment” and the instant dispute is clearly … To avoid the jurisdictional bar, Teledyne urges that the provisions of § 4(a) are inapplicable in this case and that it qualifies for an exception thereto by virtue of the effect of various recent decisions interpreting that

Gillian Emery v. Frank Gallo

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 20, 2009

Gallo, therefore, was very clearly related to the award of the Sanibel Property. By November 2004, Mr. Gallo had complied with the order by transferring his interest in the Sanibel Property to Ms. Emery; however, Ms. … Since she has not established a prima facie case for slander of title in this bankruptcy action, she certainly cannot establish a right to attorneys’ fees on the basis of this litigation.

Ennenga v. Starns

677 F.3d 766 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 17, 2012

We believe it outlines our in- tentions quite clearly.” Stortz then proceeded to draft the new estate plan in accordance with these instruc- tions. … The district court noted that a motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds qualifies as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Small v.