Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersca7

9,632 results

1.68s

  • John M. Shank, Jr., and Access International Markets, Ltd. v. William R. Hague, Inc.

    192 F.3d 675 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 20, 1999

    But we qualified this generalization by noting that this expansion is limited by competing policies. As we explained: One of the most firmly established principles of the common law is that competition is not a tort. … In analyzing a novation that substitutes parties, a court must consider whether “the evidence clearly show[s] consent by all the parties.”

    Overruled on other grounds by Anthony Hill v. Daniel M. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 (2013)Cited 74 timesPublished
  • Michael Witzke v. Michelle Femal, Daniel Benzer, Jim Webb

    376 F.3d 744 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 22, 2004

    It is apparent that participants in the program are free to leave during the day but must return by an established curfew. Mr. Witzke’s complaint alleges that Mr. Webb was aware that, upon admittance, Mr. … Further, the RCI qualifies as a prison under the statute.

    Cited 96 timesPublished
  • Conner, Kevin A. v. McBride, Daniel R.

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 20, 2004

    established federal law. … First, Jeanine Jones was qualified as an expert in social work.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Mercado

    66 F. App'x 642 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 22, 2003

    Thus, we cannot say that the court clearly erred by finding that Mercado perjured himself at the plea hearing. 3. … Zaragoza, 123 F.3d 472, 485-86 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that obstruction adjustment is mandatory upon finding of qualifying conduct). The judgment of the district court therefore is AFFIRMED.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Eula Mae Fisher, for Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. The Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

    522 F.2d 493 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 24, 1975

    establish both the amount of wages paid and the time of payment. … By applying the well established standards discussed above, the argument lacks substantiality. III.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Tas Distributing Company, Incorporated v. Cummins Engine Company, Incorporated

    491 F.3d 625 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 14, 2007

    [I]t appears that the epithet certainty is overstrong, and that the standard is a qualified one, of ‘reasonable certainty’ merely, or, in other words, of ‘probability.’ ”). … Moreover, Illinois law, even without reference to the new business rule, clearly requires that damages be proved to a reasonable certainty. E.J. McKernan Co., 191 Ill.Dec. 391 , 623 N.E.2d at 1000 .

    Cited 169 timesPublished
  • Michelle Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 1, 2024

    Nor does it assert that our established Rooker- Feldman precedents have been causing active mischief and harm. … Rather, we are cleaning up our case law and clearly articulating how Exxon is to be applied in our circuit.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Donald Petru v. City of Berwyn

    872 F.2d 1359 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 1, 1989

    Board of Examiners, 866 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (“Thomas clearly has no property entitlement to the promotion”); Bigby v. … Civil Service Commission, 108 Ill.App.2d 258 , 246 N.E.2d 853, 856 (1969) (“Section 10-1-16 gave Butts, and other qualified veterans, the right to preferred positions on eligibility registers if requested, but certainly does

    Cited 39 timesPublished
  • Grove Fresh Distributors, Incorporated v. New England Apple Products Company, Incorporated

    969 F.2d 552 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 22, 1992

    Furthermore, Grove Fresh clearly established its injury, that it lost customers to New England Apple. Finally, there was testimony at trial linking Grove Fresh's injury with New England Apple's false advertising. … Woodward was qualified to testify as an expert, our reading of the record in this trial indicates that the trial judge carefully limited Ms. Woodward’s testimony to rebuttal topics.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • National Labor Relations Board v. Bachelder

    120 F.2d 574 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 13, 1941

    In our opinion the facts above related established a reasonable basis for the conclusions of the Board that Woolling had refused to bargain collectively with the United as the exclusive agent of his employees and that he … This record clearly shows and the Board found that the order of the court did not contemplate a permanent cessation of operation, nor did Woolling so construe the order, as the plant reopened almost immediately.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Johnson, Samuel B. v. Gonzales, Alberto R.

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 28, 2007

    Johnson does not qualify for § 1229(b) relief. During this time of flux, Johnson was before an immigra- tion judge on charges of deportability. … It governs “special motions” for relief and is clearly a response to St. Cyr.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • David P. Sweeney v. James M. Flanagan

    92 F.3d 1187 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 23, 1996

    The allegations against Sweeney were contained in pretrial pleadings, which qualify as privileged communications. … Wisconsin, however, has not discussed whether this absolute immunity from defamation actions extends claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Cited 2 timesUnpublished
  • 13 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1035, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,260 Joe Stewart, Cross-Appellants v. General Motors Corporation, Cross-Appellee

    542 F.2d 445 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 4, 1976

    In reviewing the district court’s decision, we are bound under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) to accept findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Prince v. Packer Mfg. Co., 419 F.2d 34, 36 (7th Cir. 1969). … The statement that discrimination exists for the purposes of establishing liability under Title VII,- however, is as much a conclusion of law as a finding of fact.

    Cited 150 timesPublished
  • 78 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 1019, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,664 Robert H. Tice v. American Airlines, Inc.

    162 F.3d 966 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 26, 1999

    . § 216 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act), in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury verdict that American’s up-or-out policy qualified as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for purposes of the ADEA. … As the EEOC pointed out in its amicus brief in this court, the statute establishing the rights they are seeking to vindicate makes it quite clear that these rights are individual, not group-based The ADEA provides that “[

    Cited 110 timesPublished
  • Hallahan v. Hallahan

    936 F.2d 1496 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 10, 1991

    Post-employment restrictions generally must be qualified as to time and area and be no greater than fairly required to protect the employer. Id. … Also, under Illinois law, 6 lost future profits need not be established by detailed or direct proof, Vendo Co. v.

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • United States v. Leonard Strickland, Ronald B. Carson, Armand D. Moore, Neal Jackson and Otis Wilson

    935 F.2d 822 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 11, 1991

    Defendants do not attempt to suggest that the redactions in this case were not sufficient under this body of cases (which they clearly were), but argue instead that these cases "do not give adequate deference to Bruton." … For this reason and others, we decline defendants’ invitation to reverse well-established and well-reasoned precedent.

    Cited 54 timesPublished
  • Hondo, Inc. v. Sterling

    21 F.3d 775 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 13, 1994

    But we need not rest our holding on res judicata because the statute of limitations clearly prevents this litigation. … Local governments are authorized to establish "economic revitalization areas” within their boundaries. Ind.Code. § 6-1.1-12.l-2(a). .

    Cited 44 timesPublished
  • United States v. Jose Contreras

    937 F.2d 1191 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 19, 1991

    In his first argument, Contreras attempts to do just that: establish that the application of Guidelines § 3C1.1 in this case was clearly erroneous. … He later qualified this statement by suggesting that the principle of proportionality might have some application in capital cases. Id. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2700-2701. The rest of the Court disagreed.

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • Bond v. Utreras

    585 F.3d 1061 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 10, 2009

    This conclusion flows from the established general principle, noted above, that “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed” in order “[t]o qualify as a case … Every circuit to have considered the question of standing in the context of a right-to-receive claim has reached the same conclusion: “[I]n order to maintain a ‘right to listen’ claim, a plaintiff must clearly establish the

    Cited 155 timesPublished
  • Bricklayers Local 21 Of Illinois Apprenticeship And Training Program v. Banner Restoration, Incorporated

    385 F.3d 761 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 22, 2004

    "[O]ne who contends that a finding is clearly erroneous has an exceptionally heavy burden to carry on appeal." Spurgin-Dienst v. United States, 359 F.3d 451, 453 (7th Cir.2004). … , Inc., 298 F.3d 600 , 606 (7th Cir.2002) (indicating in the context of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a multi-employer association that "[s]igning the final agreement that has been negotiated certainly qualifies

    Cited 5 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.