Case law

H F G Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co.

162 F.2d 536 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 23, 1947

Caldwell, et al., 3 Cir., 120 F.2d 90 , at page 93, the court, in a situation similar to the instant one, stated: "It is established that this plaintiff was not a registered shareholder, at the time the action was begun. … Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Procedure is clearly of procedural character. Its function is to endow a shareholder with the right to maintain a suit such as this.

United States v. Charles Woods

301 F.3d 556 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 20, 2002

The defendant bears the burden of establishing the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Id. The district court admitted Davis’ recorded narrative under the present sense impression exception. … However, some of the narrative statements are clearly addressed to the FBI agents listening in via the microphone.

Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

863 F.2d 1346 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 19, 1988

Indiana clearly has an interest in the resolution of this case. … SGLIA established an order for policy beneficiaries.

Eleanor Snyder, of the Estate of Leroy Liljedahl v. Bruton Smith

736 F.2d 409 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 3, 1984

Illinois cases establish that, to qualify as a transaction of business that establishes jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, an act 'by the nonresident defendant must give rise to the plaintiffs cause of action; in other … Turning to the facts of this case, we hold that Smith’s activities in Illinois are sufficient to qualify as a transaction of business that establishes jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.

Pepper, Charise v. Village of Oak Park

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 30, 2005

Alternatively, Pepper argued even if Donaire was entitled to qualified immunity, Oak Park remained liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for allegedly lacking adequate procedures. … The deputies were highly experienced in evictions and knew that well- established Illinois law required the landlord to obtain a court order of eviction in order for the eviction to be lawful. Id. at 1247.

Shannon Wayne Agofsky v. Deanna Baysore

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 26, 2025

Using those tools, we agree with our sister circuits that § 2255(e) establishes a limit on the court’s jurisdiction. … By prohibiting the courts from “entertaining” habeas applications except in qualifying saving-clause cases, Congress established a limit on the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Simmons v. Interstate Commerce Commission

775 F.2d 854 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 22, 1985

ICC, 724 F.2d 668 , 671 (8th Cir.1984), the segment is clearly unprofitable. Petitioners also question the evidentiary burdens the Commission imposed on them. … Both parties agree that under the rule established by City of Cherokee v.

Tara Luevano v. Walmart Stores, Incorporated

722 F.3d 1014 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 16, 2013

The order found that Luevano qualified for IFP status and then screened her complaint pursuant to section 1915(e). … Here, however, the district court determined that Luevano qualified for IFP status, meaning she was financially incapable of paying the filing fee.

TKK USA, Incorporated v. Safety National Casualty Corp

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 21, 2013

Put simply, “the potential for [common law] tort liability exists until the defense is established.” Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ill. 1984). … In Doyle, the Illinois Supreme Court had to determine if the fact that the employee’s potential negligence claim against the employer would be barred by the WCA’s exclusivity provision meant that the employer was immune from

Paul A. Coghlan v. Mitchell Chapman and City of Chicago

962 F.2d 10 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 12, 1992

Its holding that qualified immunity attaches to the actions of the hearing officer is a legal determination which we also examine de novo. Simkunas v. Tardi, 930 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir.1991); Upton v. … ," and that "this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."

United States v. James J. Guadagno

970 F.2d 214 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 8, 1992

As the commentary for the guideline indicates, the Sentencing Commission considered the variability of. arson cases in establishing the guideline[.] … Judge Kanne qualified this statement, however, adding that: Of course, the arson of an urban building which is altogether isolated may not present the same degree of danger to neighboring structures. Id.

Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power

111 F.3d 1312 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 17, 1997

The threshold rule is well established: “There is, of course, ‘no general federal common law.’ ” Texas Indus. v. … The analysis, the ease law establishes, is a two-pronged inquiry.

United States v. Stirsman

212 F.2d 900 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 11, 1954

However, he qualified this iden-ticalness by testifying that the motor number on the coupe returned to him was “entirely different than the original number.” … It was clearly established through testimony of an automobile salesman for Hackett Auto Sales, the owner of the Murphy Auto Sales, and his sales manager, and still another auto dealer, Con-cannon, that in the first week of

Nielsen, Ann L. v. Dickerson, David D.

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 9, 2002

Ill. 1997), finding that company did not qualify as a “debt collector” where, inter alia, it was not involved with follow-up to delinquency letter). … See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318 (“[a] single violation of § 1692e is sufficient to establish civil liability under the FDCPA”). Accordingly, we do not resolve this question.

Moriarty v. Svec

429 F.3d 710 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 21, 2005

Thus, the law of the case has established $165 per hour as the appropriate rate for the services of Moriarty's counsel. … This Court will only reexamine an earlier decision if it is "convinced that [decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Arizona v.

Echemendia v. Gene B. Glick Management Corp.

199 F. App'x 544 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 28, 2006

Judge Cosbey’s factual determination was not clearly erroneous. See Joelner, 378 at 619-20. … (Echemendia did sue HUD but HUD was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds and Echemedia does not challenge that dismissal on appeal).

United States v. Richard M. Mahkimetas

991 F.2d 379 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 13, 1993

Parduhn’s recitals of Patty’s out-of-court statements are of course inadmissible unless they are co-conspirator statements that qualify as nonhearsay under Fed. R.Evid. (“Rule”) 801(d)(2)(E). … No evidence has been presented to that effect, and it is clearly negated by the prospective nature of the statement that Parduhn ascribed to Patty (that on April 26 “she would have a deal set up”).

United States v. Handlin, James F.

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 3, 2004

Clearly, the failure to sever the counts did not serve to unfairly prejudice the defendant. See Rollins, 301 F.3d at 519. … It clearly showed the pecking order within the conspiracy; Hamm and Handlin gave the orders while Bennett, Clapp, and Rogers took the greatest risks.

United States v. Thomas Anderson

259 F.3d 853 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 6, 2001

Anderson deposited a portion of the Wasserbauer funds into a CD account that he established in a friend’s name. In pleading guilty, Mr. … Anderson that the district court clearly erred in determining that his denial of that conduct amounted to perjury. Mr.

T.H.E. Insurance Company v. Trey Olson

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 17, 2022

Zdroik’s contribution is clearly em- braced by the final category of other persons assisting the dis- play, even if he could not be excluded under the first category of hired shooters. … In the insurance context, we have generally observed that “decisions about indemnity should be postponed until the underlying liability has been established.” Lear Corp. v. John- son Elec.