Case law

Joan M. Steffes v. Stepan Company

144 F.3d 1070 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 21, 1998

qualify as a disability. … Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir.1996) (establishing a prima facie case of sex discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that others, similarly situated but not in the protected class, were treated more favorably

Kincaid v. Rusk

670 F.2d 737 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 10, 1982

We also reverse with respect to the finding of qualified immunity for Sheriff Rusk in his denial of access to reading material. We award Kincaid nominal damages of one dollar. I. … We have reviewed the record and conclude that this finding is not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. See Cruz v. Beto, 603 F.2d 1178, 1186 (5th Cir. 1979).

Henry Hudson v. Edward M. Burke and the City of Chicago

913 F.2d 427 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 18, 1990

Prior to trial, the district court granted Chicago’s motion for summary judgment, and granted Burke’s motion for summary judgment on the issues of damages and qualified immunity. Hudson v. … Burke renews his contention that the district court erred by failing to grant him legislative immunity. We affirm. I.

Lawline v. American Bar Association

956 F.2d 1378 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 5, 1992

Mine Workers does not establish laypersons’ right to associate with lawyers in the abstract. … In addition, the United States Trustee and the Assistant United States Trustee are immune from a § 1983 suit because they are federal officers and their actions fall short of establishing a private conspiracy with state officials

United States v. Louis Nash and Ken Nash

29 F.3d 1195 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 21, 1994

Louis has not demonstrated how Judge Mihm’s assessment is clearly erroneous and we find no indication in the record that Judge Mihm was not otherwise qualified to hear Louis’ motion to withdraw and judge it fairly. … From our evaluation of the record, this assessment is not clearly erroneous. The government, therefore, was clearly within its right in not recommending a downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Beischel v. Stone Bank School District

362 F.3d 430 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 29, 2004

The defendants, except for Kathy Rosenheimer, were denied qualified immunity on that claim. … And as it turns out, the dispositive issues in our decision today are issues on the merits rather than on qualified immunity.

Harris v. Davis

874 F.2d 461 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 8, 1989

The majority’s disposition of the case makes it unnecessary for it to reach the question of qualified immunity that is raised in rather perfunctory fashion in the appellees’ brief. … Assuming that the issue is properly before us, I believe that the district court properly held that summary judgment was not appropriate because the claim of qualified immunity turned on a disputed issue of fact.

Benson v. Safford

13 F. App'x 405 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 28, 2001

Benson concedes that the defendants’ actions were sufficiently associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process such that, to the extent immunity should attach, absolute rather than qualified immunity would be appropriate … In support of his contention, he relies on cases establishing that judges who act in the “clear absence of jurisdiction” are not entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., Stump v.

Stanley v. Page

44 F. App'x 13 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 20, 2002

Stanley’s final argument is that the court erred in allowing the defendants to amend their answer to include a qualified immunity defense. … But the district court did not address qualified immunity when it granted summary judgment, and, because we have already determined that Stanley lacked evidence to establish an Eighth Amendment claim, we do not consider this

Gerald Covell v. Harmon Menkis

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 8, 2010

to qualified immunity. … As we conclude that Covell was an at-will employee, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the Defen- dants would be covered under qualified immunity. B.

DuPage Regional Office of Educ v. EDUC

58 F.4th 326 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 23, 2023

It de- cided that the board’s “status” clearly “militate[d] against No. 21-3339 29 immunity”: The board could sue or be sued, was separately incorporated, and was not immune … See Woods, 466 F.3d at 237–38 (“[T]he governmental entity in- voking the Eleventh Amendment bears the burden of demon- strating that it qualifies as an arm of the state entitled to share in its immunity.”).

Roger Fairley and Richard Gackowski v. Evan Fermaint, Noberto Bercasio, and Fred Coffey

471 F.3d 826 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 20, 2006

The role of an appeal under Mitchell and Behrens is to determine whether the legal principles that apply to public officials were clearly established at the time those officials acted; it is not to determine what the officials … It was clearly established long before the events of which plaintiffs complain that state actors may not assault witnesses in federal litigation.

Elnora Camp, as Administrator of the Estate of Anthony Young, Deceased v. George Gregory

67 F.3d 1286 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 4, 1995

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,’ ” he is immune from an action for civil damages. … This is a classic instance in which a public official is entitled to qualified immunity. Greenberg, 922 F.2d at 385 . IV.

Robert Brown v. Illinois Central Railroad Company

254 F.3d 654 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 20, 2001

First, IC notes that in attempting to establish that he is a “qualified individual with a disability,” Brown will have to demonstrate that he is able to perform the “essential functions” of the job at issue, with or without … Unfortunately for Brown, however, bona fide, collectively-bargained seniority systems which establish rights in other employees are "immune” in the sense that they cannot be subverted or superceded by any command of the ADA

United States v. Raymond Henderson

915 F.3d 1127 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 14, 2019

Deck establishes that due-process shackling claims may be effectively reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. That alone forecloses interlocutory review. … CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1 (immunizing members of Congress from liability for their speeches, debates, and other parts of the legislative process), and the Rulemaking Clause, id. art.

United States v. Richard Reed

272 F.3d 950 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 30, 2001

Reed appeals his conviction, contending that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Reed materially breached the immunity agreement and that the admission of his statements was prejudicial. … We hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Reed materially breached his immunity agreement. That holding makes it unnecessary for us to address Reed’s other arguments.

Gerald Daniel Walker v. Earl Joseph Kruse

484 F.2d 802 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 18, 1973

An Illinois court might well hold, as a matter of law, that a criminal conviction cannot support a malpractice claim unless the plaintiff is able to establish, his actual innocence. 1 Illinois also has a firmly established … The reasoning which provides immunity for various public officials, see, e. g., Pierson v.

Dennis L. Olson v. Robert Tyler and O.J. Foster

825 F.2d 1116 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 8, 1987

The Supreme Court has recently lent support to the notion that qualified immunity under section 1983 may be equated with the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in the context of arrest and search warrants. … The Court held that, if an officer seeks a warrant with an application that such an officer could not reasonably believe established probable cause, the officer loses qualified immunity and may be liable for causing an unlawful

Stanley Felton v. Lebbeus Brown

129 F.4th 999 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 25, 2025

“Qualified immunity ‘protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not vi- olate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known … Thus, an official will be protected by qualified immunity “unless the plaintiff shows: ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitu- tional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged

John Doe v. Purdue University

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 28, 2019

But because the defendants have as- serted qualified immunity, John can recover damages from them only if his right to receive procedural due process in the disciplinary proceeding was clearly established. … Qualified immunity is a high standard.