Case law

Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Robert Naftaly, Township of L'Anse

452 F.3d 514 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 26, 2006

Count I alleged that Plaintiff was entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief because Congress had not clearly authorized state taxation of the real property at issue. … The Court found that while Congress could provide that real property was subject to voluntary alienation but immune from involuntary alienation, Congress’ “intent to do so should be clearly manifested.” Id. at 149 .

Continental Baking Company v. United States of America, American Bakeries Company v. United States of America, Colonial Baking Company of Memphis v. United States

281 F.2d 137 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 18, 1960

The objections and argument were predicated on the letters not qualifying under Title 28 U.S.C. 1732(a). That argument has been considered and found to be lacking in merit. … , is presumed to continue until the contrary is established.

Owens v. Guida

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 9, 2008

A The relevant “clearly established federal law” is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). … A rule of federal law cannot be clearly established when it has been rejected by every court that has been asked to adopt the rule, and a state court does not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it rejects

In re: United Produc v.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 28, 2008

No evidence has been presented that these findings are clearly erroneous. … Debtor has established new business relationships to operate an auction facility, service loans, and to make investments for farmers’ associations.

United States v. Joe W. Fountain (92-1507) Carlton B. McEaddy (92-1866)

2 F.3d 656 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 9, 1993

This finding of “reasonable suspicion” was not clearly erroneous. … R.Evid. 401 a qualifying phrase limiting the introduction of relevant evidence to any fact that is "of consequence to the determination of the action. ...”

Warrior Sports, Incorporated v. NCAA

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 29, 2010

It concluded that the 2006 and 2007 Rule Changes were noncommercial and therefore immune from antitrust challenge. … “To establish that a lawful act was done with malice and without justification, the plaintiff must demonstrate, with specificity, affirmative acts by the[] defendant that corroborate the improper motive of the interference

Joy Eberline v. Douglas J. Holdings, Inc.

982 F.3d 1006 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 17, 2020

And to the extent that Douglas J fears an increase in claims related to segments of an educational relationship, we have established safeguards. … If so, then the student would qualify as an employee for all hours expended in tasks so far beyond the pale of the contemplated internship that it clearly did not serve to further the goals of the

Keshia Clemons v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 22, 2020

Because the parties and the district court discussed the Section 504 claim against Defendants generally, have made no reference to individual liability under Section 504, and have not raised the issue of qualified immunity … Clemons has established a genuine factual dispute as to whether T.W. was “otherwise qualified” for participation in the tennis program.

United States v. Tran

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 5, 2006

The Court emphasized the “qualifying words ‘used in,’” which mandate that “the damaged or destroyed property must itself have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce.” Id. at 854. … In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. United States v.

FDIC v. Amtrust Financial Corporation

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 14, 2012

For this level of hearsay, Shelburne’s statement qualifies for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). … His only fallback is to argue that other, informal criticisms in his file related to things that were minor or so clearly not his fault that a reasonable person could infer that Nestlé was documenting his file with frivolous

The Ohio State Univ. v. Redbubble, Inc.

989 F.3d 435 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 25, 2021

An online marketplace like eBay that clearly indicates to consumers that they are purchasing goods from third-party sellers is not. … below, can establish that no issue of material fact exists over Redbubble’s liability under a more expansive understanding of the Lanham Act.

Etw Corporation v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.

332 F.3d 915 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 8, 2003

Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 , 112 S.Ct. 2753 , 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992)(“[I]t is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a mark for registration … We find only that defendant's use of the mark was a fair use under established trademark law.

Rice v. Commissioner of Social Security

169 F. App'x 452 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 27, 2006

The results clearly indicated that Rice did not qualify for disability insurance. On February 25, 2003, ALJ Antrobus issued his decision that Rice was not disabled. … It is well-established that “issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” United States v.

Mark Insko Gross v. Harold Buchignani, Individually and in His Capacity as Fayette County Jailer

842 F.2d 331 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 22, 1988

842 F.2d 331 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service … Middleton, 555 S.W.2d 613 (Ky.App.1977). 6 Lastly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions in arresting and detaining plaintiff pursuant to a facially valid warrant were objectively reasonable

United States v. William Lawrence Siefert

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 24, 2025

Because of the definitive UDT machine’s complexity, the Clinic had to hire a qualified technician to run and maintain it. … Testimony also established that Ehn strayed from those parameters at nearly every opportunity.

Myers v. Cuyahoga Cnty OH

182 F. App'x 510 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 31, 2006

In order to establish a prima facie of disability discrimination under the ADA for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) she is otherwise qualified for … The possibility of intermittent irritability from her Adjustment Disorder is insufficient to establish the first step of Myers’s prima facie burden. “[T]he word ‘substantial’ clearly . . .

United States v. Victoria Wallace

600 F. App'x 322 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 7, 2015

The judge thus concluded that the text messages were “clearly designed to intimidate a witness.” … This certainly qualifies as “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing” a witness for the purposes of the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Withers, 405 F.

Brown v. Farmer & Ochs Co.

209 F.2d 703 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 4, 1954

If so, plaintiff was barred from suing on the contract in controversy because it was not qualified as a foreign corporation under Michigan laws. … In the case at bar, appellant showed clearly that it was beyond his power to produce the instrument which he desired to offer in evidence.

United States v. Brogdon

503 F.3d 555 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 27, 2007

Here, Brogdon has failed to establish that his sentence was either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. … Moreover, he concedes that he did not qualify for the family heirloom exception under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Clarcor, Inc. v. Madison National Life Insurance

491 F. App'x 547 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 31, 2012

More importantly, the Policy clearly states that Madison will not reimburse Clarcor for liabilities assumed but not covered by the Plan. … Finally, Clarcor asserts that language contained in a Plan claim form establishes that a “leave of absence” does not necessarily result in a loss of coverage under the Plan.