Case law

Shacks v. Tessmer

9 F. App'x 344 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 8, 2001

The Supreme Court has declared that “a federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” … established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.

United States v. David Casillas

830 F.3d 403 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 21, 2016

The Rule 702 analysis proceeds in three stages: “First, the witness must be qualified by ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’ … to a drug offense was clearly improbable.

Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc.

280 F.3d 619 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 15, 2002

C The first step in qualifying trade dress for protection under § 43(a) is proving distinctiveness. … The Court wrote: The language of the Lanham Act describes [the universe of things that can qualify as a trademark] in the broadest of terms.

Gustav Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA

946 F.3d 855 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 3, 2020

The plaintiff carries the burden of establishing those three elements, and at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element. Id. … The Court has not considered whether an asserted injury qualifies as “concrete” using judicial intuition alone.

Robert E. Williams v. Sandy Pretzer James Zummer

30 F.3d 135 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 21, 1994

Defendants also claimed that they are protected by qualified immunity. … on the ground that defendant Pretzer is entitled to qualified immunity.

Michigan Flyer v. Wayne Cnty. Airport Authority

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 22, 2017

Ct. 2480, 2489–90 (2015) (“If we give the phrase ‘the State that established the Exchange’ its most natural meaning, there would be no ‘qualified individuals’ on Federal Exchanges. … But the Act clearly contemplates that there will be qualified individuals on every Exchange.”).

Southern Ohio Building Systems, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission

649 F.2d 456 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 28, 1981

In the “Discussion” portion of his decision the administrative law judge stated, “The position in which the two employees were working clearly demonstrates that a fall was likely to occur.” … When the Secretary determines the need for a specific standard, he may receive comments from an advisory committee which must include persons qualified by experience and affiliation to present the views of employers and employees

Dyer v. Bowlen

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 30, 2006

Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 799 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The [state] Supreme Court’s decisional rule was contrary to clearly established federal law, therefore de novo review is appropriate.”). … In doing so, the state court subjected Dyer to a more exacting standard—a standard that is contrary to the clearly established law as stated in Morales and Garner. Cf.

Davie v. Mitchell

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 12, 2008

The proper inquiry here is again whether the state court’s disposition of the claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. … For a state court not to anticipate the holdings of subsequent circuit cases dealing with less explicit instructions can hardly amount to an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.

Gary L. Mann and Thelma L. Mann v. American Packaging Corp. And General American Life Insurance Co.

12 F.3d 213 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 15, 1993

The qualified privilege does not protect against liability for defamatory communications that are made "to someone not within the qualified privilege" or "done with actual malice." Stearns v. Ohio Sav. … Conclusion 21 The tort immunity conferred by Ohio Rev.Code section 3999.31(B) bars the Manns' claims against General American.

Poundstone v. Dew Resources, Inc.

75 F. App'x 353 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 3, 2003

Clearly, one of Pyramid’s obligations under the CBA was to make contingent benefit payments to Appellants, which arose when the Reynolds Lease was acquired by Patriot. 5 Through the operation of the Assignment, Patriot clearly … This provision clearly relates to claims that could have been brought at the time of the settlement in June 1990.

James C. Batts v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Austin P. Cantrell

316 F.2d 22 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 17, 1963

The agreement which was entered into between the carrier and the duly authorized representative of its employees actually did provide for the establishment of the arbitration board and its duties, procedures, expenses, and … The language of § 3, First, reads otherwise and should be literally applied in the absence of a clear showing of a contrary or qualified intention of Congress.’

William Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., William Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., William Scott v. Teamsters Local Union 377

496 F.2d 276 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 30, 1974

allowed the jury to resolve these ambiguities, and the jury resolved them in favor of Scott. 3 Thus, the District Court’s instruction to the jury on Questions 2 and 2-A is not reversible error, though it might have been more clearly … Anchor argued that a good-faith refusal of its doctor to certify a driver should amount to just cause, as a matter of law, even if the jury were to conclude that the doctor had made a mistake and that Scott, qualified under

Berry v. Harken

945 F.2d 404 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 24, 1991

945 F.2d 404 NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished … The matter was further referred to a magistrate who recommended that summary judgment be granted for Lochinski on the grounds of qualified immunity, but that Harken's motion for summary judgment be denied.

Melissa Rawe Thomas J. Rawe Kimberly Rawe v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company Cynthia Holtcamp

462 F.3d 521 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 1, 2006

This test, established by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Wittmer v. … Rawe’s previous suit under the UIM policy does not prospectively immunize the defendant from liability for future actionable conduct for bad faith.

Eagles, Ltd. And Eagles Recording Co. v. American Eagle Foundation F/k/a National Foundation to Protect America's Eagles

356 F.3d 724 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 29, 2004

However, in the context of this case, such decisions do not qualify it as an “exceptional” case warranting an award of fees. … Because it relates to the act of infringement, the Hindu Incense standard clearly applies to prevailing plaintiffs.

Lrl Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Authority

55 F.3d 1097 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 6, 1995

The complaint itself states that plaintiffs’ application for participation in the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program was rejected, that is, it failed to meet the qualifying requirements. … The first type includes claims asserting denial of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or by federal statute other than procedural claims under “the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter.”

Meijer, Inc. v. NLRB

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 21, 2006

Our precedents also establish that a § 8(a)(1) violation contains a knowledge requirement. In Air Surrey Corp. v. … The repudiations in the two cases are therefore clearly dissimilar.

Heck Van Tran v. Roland Colson

764 F.3d 594 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 25, 2014

In contrast, here we are presented with determining what is “clearly established federal law” for the purposes of a petition for relief under § 2254. … The state court’s application of Tennessee law with regard to whether Van Tran is intellectually disabled under Atkins was contrary to clearly established federal law.

United States v. Edward Dominguez

359 F.3d 839 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 4, 2004

Michigan clearly could not by statute restrain federal prosecutors from enforcing federal criminal laws as to Michigan convicts. … Carr may not fully accord with the modern view of sovereign immunity, but its general concerns remain valid.