Case law
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Zehentbauer Family Land, LP v. Chesapeake Exploration, L. L.C.
935 F.3d 496 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 15, 2019
Finally, the plaintiffs allege that they are qualified to represent a putative class of similarly situated landowners who have leased their oil and gas rights to the defendants because, among other things, the case would … Because this theory is, in fact, clearly set forth in the complaint, the defendants could have timely filed such a 12(b)(6) motion.
Cited 37 timesPublished369 F.3d 960 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 24, 2004
The court then correctly held that the Band clearly was a "restored tribe" under these definitions. … The State further argues that if such overlap is permitted, the "acknowledged tribe" exception is relegated to mere surplusage, because any lands established as the initial reservation of an acknowledged tribe also qualify
Cited 28 timesPublishedKenneth R. Smoot v. United Transportation Union Csx Transportation, Inc.
246 F.3d 633 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 11, 2001
Elswick informed Plaintiff that he did not qualify for the shares because he was not in active service as a trainman as of November 30, 1991, a required condition, according to Elswick, for distribution of CSX shares under … Absher, 179 F.3d 420 (6th Cir.1999), § 2520(c)(2)(B) establishes a “single-sum” $10,000 statutory award per claimant; (ii) under Nix v.
Cited 58 timesPublishedSummit Petroleum Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
690 F.3d 733 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 7, 2012
Different factors are relevant when the question is how close multiple stationary sources must be to each other to qualify as an aggregated major source. … Summit’s operations are clearly interrelated. Each well supplies sour gas only to Summit’s gas-sweetening plant. The plant does not receive sour gas from any other source.
Cited 10 timesPublished621 F.3d 474 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 15, 2010
He also admitted that Fawaz was not qualified to be an AIM consultant, but that Fawaz deserved the money he was paid. … [T]he witness testified clearly that Mr.
Cited 79 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 10, 2022
In those situations, the statutory provision would clearly cause harm. Ibid. … In Matter of Proffitt, the Board explained that “a judgment of improper and illegal behavior”—in that context, a court judgment awarding a bank to pay damages—plus legal fees could establish a qualifying loss.
Cited 0 timesPublished29 F. App'x 337 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 6, 2002
The court correctly stated the applicable law: once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the defendant must present evidence of a legitimate, non-diseriminatory reason for the adverse action; if the defendant does … We think it is clear that Woodruff, as a post-doctoral research assistant, does not meet the criteria set forth by the Tennessee Supreme Court to qualify as a public official.
Cited 24 timesPublishedFabio Diaz v. John Rojeski, Michael Eagen
911 F.2d 731 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 23, 1990
immunity. … The court ultimately granted Rojeski summary judgment on the false arrest claim, finding that Rojeski was entitled to qualified immunity on the claim because a reasonably competent police officer would have concluded that
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedBrian Yinger v. City of Dearborn
66 F.3d 327 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 19, 1995
It is clearly established that a public employer may not take adverse employment action against an employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech. Williams v. … immunity with respect to Yinger's First Amendment claim.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 21, 2008
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under this analysis, the plaintiff must show that 1) she was a member of the protected class, 2) she was subject to an adverse employment action, 3) she was qualified … Martin did not deny making the slur, clearly and unequivocally, and instead signed the admission statement, Dr.
Cited 0 timesPublishedCMC Telecom, Inc. v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE CO.
637 F.3d 626 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 8, 2011
For purposes of interpreting the Federal Telecommunications Act, local telephone service providers can be divided into two categories: incumbents, the established carriers who long held regional monopolies, and competitors … The factors AT&T uses in writing individualized contracts include services ordered, customer location, and quantity.1 Although this information (at least when identified by customer name) clearly constitutes CPNI, AT&T’s
Cited 0 timesPublished657 F.3d 372 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Sep 16, 2011
Instead, having determined that the state court misinterpreted and misapplied Strickland — a holding that necessitates also finding that the state court’s analysis “involved an unreasonable application of clearly established … The only witness that Campbell put on to this effect was Storey’s mother, who was not qualified to establish Storey’s medical condition.
Cited 153 timesPublished48 F. App'x 933 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 17, 2002
“A sentencing decision based on race qualifies as both a violation of law and an incorrect application of the Guidelines, and therefore can be reviewed by this court.” United States v. … The reference to race by the district court in this case clearly does not come close to being improper. II.
Cited 8 timesPublishedUnited States v. Dylan Marshall
736 F.3d 492 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 21, 2013
Forgac’s observation that Marshall functioned as a juvenile is clearly belied by the reality that Marshall attended college, worked a full-time job, and owned a car and credit card. … Because Marshall is not a juvenile, he does not qualify for the Eighth Amendment protections accorded to juveniles.
Cited 53 timesPublished253 F. App'x 526 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 1, 2007
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we may grant Wolfe’s petition if the state-court rulings were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal … Counsel: “And essentially you’re testifying here under what’s called a grant of immunity. Is that correct?”
Cited 3 timesUnpublishedDwan Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, Inc.
97 F.4th 403 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 29, 2024
HealthSource applied to become a federally qualified health center to “provide[] primary care to people who are either uninsured, underinsured or in need of care in a community.” DE 32-1, Patton Dep., Page ID 607. … By contrast, government substitution doesn’t conclusively establish jurisdiction under the FSHCAA. O’Brien v. United States, 56 F.4th 139, 147 n.6 (1st Cir. 2022).
Cited 41 timesPublished215 F.3d 608 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 12, 2000
through a conjunction with the earlier version of the statute the form motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the burden of suggests that the ultimate purpose of the assessment is to establishing … Rather, the definition of the term ‘tax’ is a clearly constitutes a regulatory fee rather than a tax.
Cited 41 timesPublishedPrevent USA Corp. v. Volkswagen AG
17 F.4th 653 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Nov 8, 2021
Countries that have jurisdiction over the defendant typically qualify. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. … But the reality that the foreign venue makes it more difficult to establish the claim or that the foreign law is less generous to prevailing plaintiffs does not establish unavailability. See, e.g., id. at 249, 255.
Cited 10 timesPublishedL. H. v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Educ.
900 F.3d 779 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 20, 2018
But “this establishes only that the goals . . . were not appropriately calibrated.” Id. … Under such a view, no Montessori school is qualified to teach a student with Down Syndrome.
Cited 33 timesPublished893 F.2d 117 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 2, 1990
The plaintiffs’ memorandum stated that their proofs would establish that Mr. Beard’s former supervisor had developed a personal animosity against the plaintiffs after Mrs. … one point in its opinion, indeed, the Thermtron Court declared that “only remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein — that removal was improvident and *121 without jurisdiction — are immune
Overruled — as noted by a later courtCited 58 timesPublished
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