Case law

Christopher Alvin Grubb v. Brig. General William H. Birdsong, Jr., Commanding General, Fort Campbell, Ky.

452 F.2d 516 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Dec 6, 1971

In 1968, the Department of Defense directed the armed services to establish procedure for post-induction discharges of personnel who become conscientious objectors after entering the armed services. … The language of the Court clearly indicates its recognition of the rule that the failure to file a claim of conscientious objection existing prior to receipt of an induction notice results in forfeiture of that claim as of

John C. Shimman, Cross-Appellant v. John Frank, Cross-Appellees

625 F.2d 80 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Oct 1, 1980

The evidence establishes quite clearly that this was because he had been appointed Business Manager of District 2 for the purpose of ending the division among the membership by eliminating the leaders of the dissidents, and … We can only reverse findings of fact if we are convinced that they are clearly erroneous. B.

John J. Mascio v. Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio Richard E. Schumacher

160 F.3d 310 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jan 11, 1999

This conclusion is clearly at odds with the facts presented here and the purpose of the statute. … The statute gave non-registrants thirty days after receiving notice of ineligibility to register and qualify for aid. .

United States v. Tennessee

615 F.3d 646 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 4, 2010

Accepting the allegations in the complaint, the district court held that the EMTs had violated the “decedent’s clearly established constitutional right to receive competent medical care while in custody.” Id. … The State has not put forward a single case or statute that could qualify as the significant change in law required to satisfy its initial burden under Rufo.

Silas T. McAdoo v. Frank Elo, Warden

365 F.3d 487 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 15, 2004

. § 2254 (d), a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the adjudication in the state court proceedings: (1)resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established … Rather, the issue is whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 .

Warman v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co.

839 F.2d 257 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Feb 9, 1988

Anderson’s deposition clearly demonstrate that Dr. Anderson, although diagnosing Warman as having pneumoconiosis, believed that Warman was not totally disabled by the disease. Q.26. Dr. … However, the AU noted that all of the more qualified “B” readers had read Warman’s X-rays as negative for pneumoconiosis.

Bradley v. Austin

841 F.2d 1288 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 21, 1988

The Conference version of DEFRA was identical to the Senate version with one added modification, i.e., "a monthly disregard of $50 of child support received by a family [was] established." … Thus, Congress clearly intended to prohibit the prior practice of excluding siblings with income and resources from the family filing unit in order to allow other family members to qualify for AFDC benefits.

The Tappan Company v. General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Sales Corporation, and Halle Bros. Co., Inc.

380 F.2d 888 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jul 21, 1967

In our opinion, the findings of fact of the District Judge on the issue of infringement are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Rule 52 Fed.R.Civ.P. … Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 , 84 S.Ct. 779 , 11 L.Ed.2d 669 (1964), and on the rules concerning product identification established in this Circuit in West Point Mfg. Co. v.

Hereford v. Warren

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 7, 2008

The district court granted habeas relief after concluding that the state court’s holding represented an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C … That conclusion, however, misapprehends controlling law for AEDPA purposes; the language found in Minsky is not a Supreme Court holding that reflects clearly established federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 381.

Joshua Tackett v. Tony Trierweiler

956 F.3d 358 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 15, 2020

Nor has Tackett cited any authority suggesting that the state trial court’s jury instructions ran counter to clearly established federal law. … Tackett cites no authority regarding what qualifies as a deficient level of performance in this context.

Samuel David Stockman, D.D.S. v. Oakcrest Dental Center, P.C., Louis E. Leonor, D.D.S., Individually

480 F.3d 791 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 16, 2007

The district court refused to enforce the contract because (1) the offer was clearly an offer of reinstatement in exchange for settlement of the entire action, and (2) Dr. … Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff claiming unlawful termination must establish a prima facie case showing that: (i) the employee was in a protected group; (ii) the employee was qualified for the position

Jacada (Europe), Ltd. F/k/a Client/server Technology (Europe), Ltd. v. International Marketing Strategies, Inc.

401 F.3d 701 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 18, 2005

To merit reversal, the award “must fly in the face of clearly established legal precedent.” Ibid. … Similarly, there exists no clearly established principle barring a finding of procedural unconscionability.

David Cook, Jr. v. Laura Takacs

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 16, 2020

immunity. … Because there was no due process violation, we need not address Cook’s qualified immunity argument. See Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 916 (6th Cir. 2009).

General Environmental Science Corp. v. Horsfall

25 F.3d 1048 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 25, 1994

Indeed, our decision to vacate the judgment as to Horsfall would not change even assuming he did control the relevant documents, for his conduct during the discovery process was clearly not motivated by bad faith. … This court will not construe Congressional silence with respect to extraterritorial service as a Congressional grant of immunity from such service.

Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation Jerry C. Pendergrass v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

421 F.3d 417 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 31, 2005

“Prevailing Party” Status It is beyond dispute that as of the dates that the attorneys’ fees awards were entered, Deja Vu was a prevailing party under the well-established standards for such awards. … Hence we review awards of attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion, which exists only when a district court “relies upon clearly erroneous factual findings, applies the law improperly, or uses an erroneous legal standard”

United States v. Helton

935 F.2d 739 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Jun 3, 1991

At least lk kilogram was qualified as attributable to Viey-ra. Chazulle was caught with IV2 kilograms. These quantities alone add up to more than five kilograms. … We therefore find that the district court’s ruling in this regard was not clearly erroneous. U.S.S.G. 4A1.1.

United States v. Al-Cholan

610 F.3d 945 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · May 27, 2010

Setting aside the question of inducement, Al-Cholan’s entrapment de *951 fense fails because the evidence ineontrovertibly establishes that he was predisposed to commit the offense. … (n.4(B)(i)). *955 These two separate occasions may include “the instant offense,” and prior occasions need not have resulted in a conviction to qualify. Id. (n.4(B)(ii)).

Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Products, Inc.

796 F.3d 576 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Aug 5, 2015

We express no opinion on whether Best’s knowledge of the manufacturing techniques in question qualifies as a protectable trade secret under OUTSA. … First, Dastar opined only that a “trademark owner who commissioned or assumed responsibility” for the production of the product might qualify as the product’s origin. Id. (emphasis added).

Irwin v. Odyssey Contracting Corp.

61 F. App'x 150 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Mar 13, 2003

However, the district court’s analysis clearly shows that despite its use of the word “prove,” it applied the correct standard and determined whether there is any “genuine issue as to any material fact.” … Johnson Company, because it was his employer, and was therefore immune from tort liability under the "exclusive remedy" provision of Michigan’s workers' compensation statute. .

Becton Dickinson & Co. v. R. P. Scherer Corp.

211 F.2d 835 · Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · Apr 6, 1954

This is a finding of fact and binding on this court if not clearly erroneous. … These cases are based on the established rule that the licensor is not entitled to destroy or to restrict the enjoyment of the rights which he has granted to another.