Case law

Staten v. Housing Authority

638 F.2d 599 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 25, 1980

In formulating those policies, the Board is guided, in part, by federally established standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c); Public Housing Occupancy Handbook §§ 4-16 (1978). 6. … the State agency qualifies for Federal assistance ( 42 U.S.C. § 1440 (b)(1)), the federal government becomes a guarantor of the Authority’s obligations.

A.L. Blades & Sons, Inc. v. Yerusalim

121 F.3d 865 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 1, 1997

Under the Supreme Court’s test, the Commonwealth was required to establish that non-Pennsylvania residents “constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.” … If they do not qualify as a “peculiar source" in 1990, then the Commonwealth cannot argue the nonresidents satisfy the test for the other years where the job displacement figures were lower. .

James C. Melo, Jr., Louise Jurik, Donald Ruggerio, Karol Danowitz, James Dicosimo, Lucille Russell, Walter W. Speelman, John Weikel v. Barbara Hafer and James J. West. Carl Gurley, W. Gerard Best, Michael Brennan, Margaret Casper, Elizabeth Buchmiller, Daniel Clemson, Mary Fager, George A. Franklin, Jr. v. Barbara Hafer

912 F.2d 628 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 21, 1990

In fact, underlying each of the cases considering the availability of a qualified immunity defense to a claim for damages against the state official was an individual capacity claim. See, e.g., Malley v. … A fortiori, a state official who herself is responsible for an unconstitutional policy would be personally liable, unless of course she is ultimately successful in her qualified immunity claim.

Walker v. Horn

385 F.3d 321 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 28, 2004

The district court rejected claims of lack of jurisdiction and qualified immunity of Auxer and Lasky pertaining to Walker's First and Eighth Amendment claims. … Similarly, because it is understood that Walker seeks equitable relief, Corrections officials have not briefed the issue of qualified immunity, to which they would be entitled if monetary relief were sought.

United States v. Andrew Gera

409 F.2d 117 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 9, 1969

negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided — that the United States, asserting rights vested in [it] as a sovereign government, [is] not bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly … It is clear that the Medical Care Recovery Act does not expressly waive the historic immunity of the United States from the defense of state statutes of limitations, and that circumstance renders the Government immune from

Justin Layshock v. Hermitage Sch Dist

650 F.3d 205 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 13, 2011

The district court granted summary judgment to the school district and Morse, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity and that they had not infringed Frederick’s First Amendment rights. … The court of appeals had ruled that the principal was not entitled to qualified immunity. . Thomas was decided after Tinker but before Fraser . .

Taharqa Dean v. Borough of Glassboro

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 22, 2023

qualified immunity. … “An official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Lee v. Johnson

799 F.2d 31 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 7, 1986

A waiver of immunity must be explicit; hence, the EAJA necessarily applies only to actions that are clearly civil in character. … We must therefore analyze the purposes of the EAJA in some detail to determine whether it was clearly intended to waive governmental immunity in cases such as this.

Larry Bumgarner v. Mary Benianati

316 F. App'x 201 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 6, 2009

While qualified immunity protects officers during the course of their duties, that protection is forfeited when an officer’s conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … We choose to approach the qualified immunity issue here by asking whether the law was so clearly established that the Officer Defendants’ conduct would have appeared unlawful to an objectively reasonable officer.5 Walter

Delaney v. Capone

642 F.2d 57 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 27, 1981

Moreover, the court found that the defendant officials had established their claim to qualified immunity. 3 The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment of the district court, and the defendants have cross-appealed the … We conclude that the district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, and we perceive no reversible error in its rulings of law.

Gisela Carino v. Marc Stefan, Esq Butsavage & Associates, LLC

376 F.3d 156 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 19, 2004

individuals in poor health and naming disinterested parties as the beneficiaries of the policies, and the company referred the charges against Carino to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). 1 Following the procedures established … However, her assertion that Stefan provided no services because he convinced her to withdraw her grievance rather than arbitrate it is clearly incorrect.

United States v. City Of Pittsburgh

757 F.2d 43 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 5, 1985

Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 , 85 S.Ct. 1177 , 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965). 13 Given the proper reluctance that a federal court should have for relinquishing its clearly established jurisdiction, and our limited scope of review, we … In this case, the City's tax is clearly a tax on gross receipts or gross income from the fees.

Cuvo v. De Biasi

169 F. App'x 688 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 14, 2006

Therefore, Officer De Biasi and Detective Monek would be entitled to qualified immunity only if we determine that the right was not clearly established. … Nor, on the facts averred, is Chief Fretz entitled to qualified immunity because he tacitly authorized the deprivation of Cuvo’s clearly established right not to be arrested without probable cause. See McGreevy v.

Sandra G. Narin v. Lower Merion School District

206 F.3d 323 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 10, 2000

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she was over 40 at the time she applied for the position in question; (2) she was qualified for the position in question … The appropriateness of the district court’s decision to grant summary judg *332 ment on Count IV also is supported by Narin’s failure to establish that she was qualified for the position: element two of the prima facie case

Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department

840 F.2d 1139 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 5, 1988

II. 9 We are ordinarily required to address the validity of the qualified immunity defense as an initial matter, but, because the qualified immunity defense is not available to a municipality, Hynson v. … We thus consider whether Copeland is otherwise qualified for the position of police officer. 47 To determine whether a person is otherwise qualified, our court in Strathie established the following standard: "A handicapped

Miller v. Indiana Hospital

930 F.2d 334 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 19, 1991

The Supreme Court has established a rigorous two-part test for determining whether private anticompetitive conduct should be deemed "state action" for purposes of antitrust immunity. … Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir.1989), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3212 , 110 L.Ed.2d 660 (1990). 3 Whether given conduct qualifies as state action for purposes of antitrust immunity is a question

United States v. William T. Smith, Jr.

839 F.2d 175 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 9, 1988

Use of Immunized Testimony We consider first Smith’s contention that the district court improperly relied on his post-conviction immunized testimony. … Ill 1985) (establishing independent sentencing commission to establish national sentencing policies and practices), it nonetheless has left the district courts with discretion to decide whether, and to what extent, to reward

Children First Foundation, Inc. v. Legreide

373 F. App'x 156 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 9, 2010

of clearly established rights. … A state actor who infringes on a plaintiff’s constitutional rights is entitled to qualified immunity if it appears that the challenged conduct “[did not] violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

Johnson v. Knorr

477 F.3d 75 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 14, 2007

Nevertheless, according to Johnson, as he asserted in his brief opposing Knorr’s motion for summary judgment, the complaint and the subsequent motions “clearly advise[d] [Agent Knorr] of all of the facts of a constitutional … from suit based on the principles of sovereign immunity.

Wilcher v. City Of Wilmington

139 F.3d 366 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 17, 1998

. § 1983 and damages for "invasion of privacy" under the state's tort law. 3 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity and … Third, they appeal the district court's determinations regarding qualified immunity and state action. Fourth, they urge that, in denying the plaintiffs a jury trial, the district court misapplied our decision in Bolden.