Case law

Edgar v. Avaya Inc

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 26, 2007

Id. 10 the trustee to invest in a particular stock, then the trustee is “immune from judicial inquiry.” Id. … [is] invested primarily in qualifying employer securities.” Id.

United States v. William T. Smith, Jr.

839 F.2d 175 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 9, 1988

Use of Immunized Testimony We consider first Smith’s contention that the district court improperly relied on his post-conviction immunized testimony. … Ill 1985) (establishing independent sentencing commission to establish national sentencing policies and practices), it nonetheless has left the district courts with discretion to decide whether, and to what extent, to reward

Pareja v. Attorney General of the United States

615 F.3d 180 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 29, 2010

The statute is clearly written in the singular, and it speaks without equivocation: hardship may be established by reference to but one qualifying relative. … On the one hand, by citing how many qualifying relatives the Recinas petitioner had, the BIA simply might have meant that the Recinas petitioner had established hardship to each individual qualifying relative because her

Africa v. City of Philadelphia

158 F.3d 711 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 9, 1998

It is axiomatic that the qualified immunity inquiry focuses on whether an official's conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. … Ct. 1584, 1597 (1998)(noting that in resolving the threshold issue of qualified immunity, "the court must determine whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiff 's allegations, the official's conduct violated clearly established

In Re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation Indirect Purchaser Class

868 F.3d 132 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 17, 2017

Noerr-Pennington immunity, however, is not absolute. … “[A]ctivity ‘ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action’ does not qualify for [first amendment] immunity if it ‘is a mere sham to cover ... an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships

United States v. Harry P. Casoni, A/K/A Pete Casoni

950 F.2d 893 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 9, 1992

under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and then qualify for admission under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. … This included traveling to Massachusetts and helping GEM establish its computer facilities.

Drew Whitley v. County of Allegheny

402 F. App'x 713 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 22, 2010

Whitley also takes issue with the District Court’s ruling that the individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. … Whitley incorrectly characterizes the District Court's decision as impermissibly extending the qualified immunity defense to Allegheny County.

King v. County of Gloucester

302 F. App'x 92 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 10, 2008

immunity. … immunity.

Anela v. City of Wildwood

790 F.2d 1063 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 22, 1986

It dismissed this claim as to the individual defendants on the ground that they enjoyed qualified immunity as officials exercising discretionary functions. … The court entered summary judgment for the city police officers on the ground of qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Miller v. Indiana Hospital

930 F.2d 334 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 19, 1991

The Supreme Court has established a rigorous two-part test for determining whether private anticompetitive conduct should be deemed "state action" for purposes of antitrust immunity. … Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir.1989), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3212 , 110 L.Ed.2d 660 (1990). 3 Whether given conduct qualifies as state action for purposes of antitrust immunity is a question

Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department

840 F.2d 1139 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 5, 1988

II. 9 We are ordinarily required to address the validity of the qualified immunity defense as an initial matter, but, because the qualified immunity defense is not available to a municipality, Hynson v. … We thus consider whether Copeland is otherwise qualified for the position of police officer. 47 To determine whether a person is otherwise qualified, our court in Strathie established the following standard: "A handicapped

Wilian Gomez v. William J. Fiessner

474 F. App'x 53 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 30, 2012

From our review, we conclude that this account does make out a violation of the Gomezes’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Feissner therefore does not have qualified immunity from this claim. … These allegations suffice to make out a violation of the Gomezes’ clearly established right to be free from unreasonable seizure, and Feissner accordingly does not have qualified immunity from this claim.

Aitchison v. Raffiani

708 F.2d 96 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 13, 1983

Thus, the complaint establishes active participation by the mayor in the legislative process and, consequently, for that act, the mayor is entitled to absolute immunity. … That factual finding may be overturned by us only if clearly erroneous. See Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir.1979); Goodman v.

United States v. Richard P. Herman

614 F.2d 369 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 12, 1980

Victor Kozlowski, a former bailbondsman at the Levitt Agency, testified under a grant of immunity. … Mary Hupert, formerly a secretary at the Agency, also testified under an immunity grant.

Davidson v. O'Lone

752 F.2d 817 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 27, 1984

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (creating qualified immunity for public officials performing discretionary functions). … Were an absolute grant of immunity, precluding state tort suits, sufficient to establish a right to a federal remedy, a pedestrian negligently struck by a police car racing to apprehend a criminal, would be entitled to maintain

Donald Carroll v. Clifford Township

625 F. App'x 43 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 2, 2015

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … Marcho and Knowlton failed to sign Carroll’s application, violating his clearly established First Amendment rights. Therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Delaney v. Capone

642 F.2d 57 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 27, 1981

Moreover, the court found that the defendant officials had established their claim to qualified immunity. 3 The plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment of the district court, and the defendants have cross-appealed the … We conclude that the district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, and we perceive no reversible error in its rulings of law.

True Blue Auctions v. Robert Foster

528 F. App'x 190 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 10, 2013

The officers moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing in part that they were entitled to qualified immunity. … In determining whether to apply qualified immunity, “we ask: (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the law was clearly established at the time of the

Salahuddin Smart v. Borough of Bellmawr

528 F. App'x 163 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 17, 2013

The qualified immunity analysis is two-pronged, requiring a determination of (1) whether the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established; in other words, whether … The Court concluded, however, that Draham was nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because the “clearly established” qualified 4 immunity prong was not established.

Sandra G. Narin v. Lower Merion School District

206 F.3d 323 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 10, 2000

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she was over 40 at the time she applied for the position in question; (2) she was qualified for the position in question … The appropriateness of the district court’s decision to grant summary judg *332 ment on Count IV also is supported by Narin’s failure to establish that she was qualified for the position: element two of the prima facie case