Case law

United States v. Pasquale Stiso

708 F. App'x 749 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 8, 2017

“An abuse of discretion exists where the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). … The Jencks Act did not apply because Stiso’s discovery requests were made before the trial started and, in any case, Mancuso’s informant record would not qualify as a “statement” under the Act.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

751 F.2d 562 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 13, 1984

Clearly, however, the letters are hearsay, and thus inadmissible against the objectors unless they qualify under one of the exceptions in Rule 803. … We have in Part V.B., supra, held that they do not qualify under Rule 803(24)(B). The only other exception arguably relevant is Rule 803(6), records of regularly conducted business activity.

In Re: Prof Ins Mgt

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 1, 2002

This initial termination letter was followed by an "official form letter" dated November 19, 1993 establishing the procedures for termination and renewals. … To aid in this interpretation, we turn first to general rules of statutory construction established by the United States Supreme Court.

Balasubramanrim v. INS

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 1, 1998

The conflict stems primarily from tensions between the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese.1 In an effort to establish an independent Tamil state in the north, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have been in armed … S 1101(a)(42)(A).8 Thus, Balasubramanrim has the burden to show that he qualifies as a refugee because he was persecuted in the past or has a "well-founded fear" of future persecution on the ground of, inter alia, political

Frank Slupski v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 3, 2020

. § 1653, and as stated clearly at oral argument, the complaint is deemed to have been amended such that diversity jurisdiction exists. 1 See, e.g., Local No. 1 (ACA) Broad. Emps. v. … That stacking provision operates much like sec- tion 1731: It establishes a default coverage condition and allows insureds to waive that coverage only by signing a statutorily specified form. See 75 Pa.

United States v. Bishop

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 7, 1995

While I ackno the binding nature of this decision, it is clearly distinguishable. … the powers of the Commerce Clause that something has been manufactured outside of the state of Tennessee and previously transported here, 90% of the merchandise on every merchant's shelf will qualify

In Re: Kaplan

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 9, 1998

March 7, 1995), and that interpretation is clearly supported by the text of the Letter Agreement. … [I]t would be a strange doctrine to allow a state to nullify the judgments of federal courts constitutionally established and given power also to enforce state created rights.

Frey v. Fulcomer

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 30, 1997

At all events, we note that the jury instructions clearly indicated to the jurors that they could consider any circumstances that they felt were relevant as mitigating evidence. … Accordingly, it is well established that the sentencer cannot be precluded from considering any such evidence. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114.

Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 7, 1994

The other two established situations to which equitable tolling applies give rise to equitable considerations wholly unrelated to our discussion of the doctrine here.  In Meyer v. … Nearly seven months later, Reeb learned that soon after dismissing her, the EOA had given her former position to an allegedly less qualified male employee.

Northview Motor Inc v. Chrysler Motors Corp

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 8, 2000

Clearly, the first three of the required elements of an ADDCA claim have been met in this case. … Similarly, a manufacturer's efforts to drive a dealer out of business can qualify as bad faith. See Junikki Imports, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Co., 335 F. Supp. 593, 595 (N.D.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

971 F.2d 999 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 27, 1992

Rather, ERISA is concerned with the administration of an established plan and its elements." … Colt has neither acted in bad faith, nor pressed a clearly meritless position. See Monkelis v.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

778 F.2d 985 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 3, 1986

To establish the first delivery, the government called Leonard Seaman, the president of Zerron, as a witness. … In review of the factual underpinnings for the admission of the evidence, we must decide if the findings of fact are clearly erroneous." 578 F.2d at 964 .

Barnes v. Amer Tobacco Co

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 16, 1998

This is clearly an individual issue. . . . These issues clearly preclude certification." Barnes, 176 F.R.D. at 502. B. … McNally seeks, and would be qualified for under the Burns Program, is a physical examination and cardiovascular risk assessment.

Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 6, 1997

First, this is clearly a case that involves a " `flagrant disregard' of a court order by the proponent of the evidence." Meyers, 559 F.2d at 905. … Based on these facts alone, we are satisfied that this case qualifies as one involving flagrant disregard of the pretrial order.3 Second, we are satisfied that Westvaco was prejudiced.

Machinists Pension Fund, Dist. 15 v. Khale Engineering Corp.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 30, 1994

The court noted that the pension plan may qualify as an installment contract, under which claims do not accrue until each payment comes due. Id. at 374. … Such a result is clearly inconsistent with the public policy served by statutes of limitations.

Flamer v. State of DE

68 F.3d 710 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 19, 1995

Subsection (i) of Rule 61 establishes the procedural bars to relief. … The word "if" or some other qualifying preposition is implicit at the beginning of the phrase, "supported by the evidence."

United States v. Tomko

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 20, 2007

Even if the Guidelines did not so clearly articulate this need to provide for general deterrence in tax evasion cases, our Court has recognized that § 3553(a) requires the sentence imposed to be “minimally sufficient to satisfy … However, simply “being a ‘good person,’ a quality indeed to be admired, does not qualify as extraordinary or exceptional civic or charitable conduct.” Serafini, 233 F.3d at 773.

Rafael Espinoza v. Atlas Railroad Construction LL

657 F. App'x 101 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 30, 2016

Travel away from home is clearly worktime when it cuts across the employee’s workday. The employee is simply substituting travel for other duties. … the FLSA’s implementing regulations refer to “[an] employee’s normal working hours on days when he is working.” 25 Because we must read statutes to avoid surplusage, “on days when he is working” must be some limiting qualifier

In Re: Rickel Home

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 6, 2000

The court also determined that the leases in the Staples transaction constituted 96 percent of Rickel's assets and that, as a result, Staples qualified as a "successor" under Article 15A of the Lease. … We exercise plenary review over the District Court's legal conclusions but will reverse findings of fact only if clearly erroneous. See id. III. We begin by briefly discussing the pertinent Bankruptcy Code sections.

Baker v. Barbo

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 13, 1999

Rejecting his contention that this resentencing constituted a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court stated: This Court has rejected the `doctrine that a prisoner, whose guilt is established, by … The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.