Case law

United States v. Balter

91 F.3d 427 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 29, 1996

The court ruled that the prejudicial effect of this statement on co-defendant Garcia outweighed the probative value for Balter to establish fear. … The statement in question here is clearly relevant to show Balter's knowledge of the original plan and his involvement in the plan to cover up the murder.

Bohler Uddeholm Amer v. Ellwood Grp Inc

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 17, 2001

This point is not clearly defined by Pennsylvania law. … outcome, (6) the affidavit was corroborated, partially, by minutes of directors meetings (some statements Jonsson said were made match others' notations), and (7) his position and background qualified

United States v. Reilly

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 27, 1994

Moreover, the indictment quoted only the first, more general question, "ignoring the qualifying definitions [subsequently] used by the prosecutor," and therefore it was "misleading." Id. … I therefore suggest that the majority's reliance on Carcamo's testimony, see Majority Transcript at 40-41, is clearly misplaced.

United States v. Joseph Meehan

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 11, 2018

Under the two-part standard established in Strickland v. … The trial court “must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified,” Fed. R.

Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co.

46 F.3d 258 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 18, 1995

Additionally, Theodore, Sr. and Mark ("the defendants") contend that Jaguar's RICO claims were legally insufficient because Jaguar failed to establish sufficient distinctiveness between the defendant "persons," allegedly … The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences.

M.C. v. Central Regional School District

81 F.3d 389 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 17, 1996

First, it argues that the district court misapplied Rowley, the principal authority establishing the standard of education services required under IDEA. … Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 1985). 8 untapped potential was not clearly erroneous. As we have explained in Kruelle v.

United States v. Samirkumar Shah

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 22, 2022

Based on these sworn statements, the District Court did not clearly err in finding that Miller was screened from Shah’s prosecution. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ford, 122 A.3d 414, 418 (Pa. Super. … “[T]he government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of loss.” United States v.

Burgh v. Borough Council of Montrose

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 25, 2001

Burgh alleges that he was more qualified than the person hired and that the department failed to hir e him because of his race. … However, the court held that the filing of the action almost five years after the filing of the first administrative complaint was "clearly unreasonable" and therefor e untimely. This timely appeal followed. II.

Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co. v. Rollins-Purle, Inc., Defendant-Third-Party v. Philip Alan Froude, Defendants-Third-Party v. Insurance Company of North America, Defendant-Third-Party

678 F.2d 1293 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 24, 1982

The evidence clearly indicates that Young intended, ab initio, to have the corrupt substance introduced into a crude oil pipeline wherein it would be diluted and dispersed. 106 Young's delictual activity was manifested in … Upon establishing that the product was defective, the manufacturer is presumed to know the condition of the product. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Welsh v.

Abdulai v. Ashcroft

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 12, 2001

Because he concedes that none of the evidence presented at the remand hearing qualified as such corroboration, we conclude that the failur e to include the evidence in the administrative record, though error , was harmless … Abdulai submits that this language clearly establishes that the BIA may not hold that an applicant has failed to meet his or her burden of proof simply because he or she has failed to produce corroborating evidence.

Fison Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 22, 1994

The logical consequence of [failing to recognize reverse confusion] would be the immunization from unfair competition liability of a company with a well established trade name and with … Fisons therefore presented evidence that its use of the common term was unusual enough that it could qualify for trademark protection.

Luden's, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6, Bakery, Confect'ryTobacco Wrkrs Internat'l

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 16, 1994

Ct. at 2227 (construing the qualified seniority provision as not having vested) with id. at 2230-31 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contra) and Corcoran, Arbitrability of Labor Grievances, supra, 43 SYRACUSE L. … Once an implied term is established, a unilateral change regarding the term is unlawful." (citation omitted)); Franklin Elec. Co. v.

Susan Fischer v. Governor of New Jersey

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 15, 2021

We need not define the precise contours of the “informational injury” doctrine here; it suffices to say that Curcio’s claim does not qualify because the challenged statute does not require the disclosure of information. … 706 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is a generally accepted rule of construction that ‘changes in the law subsequent to the execution of a contract are not deemed to become part of [the] agreement unless its language clearly

Todd Tarselli v. Superintendent Greene SCI

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 23, 2018

opportunity to renew his claims in federal court, if necessary, once those claims have been fully developed and exhausted in the state court system.”32 As discussed above in Section II(A), this determination was clearly … As neither the District Court nor the Commonwealth have identified definitive proof that Tarselli was not a minor at the time of his offense, this undoubtedly qualifies as potentially meritorious under the rule established

Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 30, 1997

The plaintiff first must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of age discrimination by proving that he: (1) is over forty years of 14 age; (2) is qualified … For instance, in the sentence immediately following the erroneous sentence, the court clearly instructed that a verdict for Ryder was proper if the jury found that Westinghouse used the elimination of his job "as an excuse

Reynolds v. Wagner

128 F.3d 166 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 22, 1997

Some accidents qualify as emergencies, but some do not. … We found it unnecessary to decide this question because the inmates' claims clearly failed on the merits.

Wilburn v. Maritrans GP Inc

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 10, 1998

"The duty of the vessel owner to furnish a reasonably safe place for a seaman . . . to perform his chores is clearly a duty of care, the breach of which results in liability for negligence . . . ." Earles v. … The evidence established the following facts concerning the events that occurred aboard the Enterprise on November 9, 1992.

Welsh & Forbes, Inc. v. Cendant Corp.

235 F.3d 176 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 13, 2000

Santander's prompt response to the August 27th letter and its initiative in sending another letter in November establish that it was not derelict in discovering that its Proof of Claim had been postmarked late. Fed. R. … I see nothing that would even qualify for excusable neglect under any of the motions and therefore they ar e denied.

Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 3, 1998

Thus, because the evidence of Shade's general work history apparently referred to employment with independent employers, this testimony clearly was irrelevant to the determination of Shade's seaman status, and the district … Thus, the contacts would not seem to assist Papai in establishing seaman status.

Fire & Casualty Co. v. Cook

155 F. App'x 587 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 9, 2005

Although Cook qualifies as an insured under the policy, he had no part in the selection of coverage limits under the policy. 7 Finally, Fire and Casualty notes that Cook has not presented any evidence discrediting or refuting … For the same reason, we reject Fire & Casualty’s contention that the District Court erred by refusing to consider extrinsic evidence that establishes that Atlantic Express intended to limit UM coverage to $35,000.