Case law

Kenneth Rossiter v. City of Philadelphia

674 F. App'x 192 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 29, 2016

As the First Amendment right at issue was not clearly established, we hold that Ramsey and the Department are entitled to qualified immunity. … If none exists, it may be possible that a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” in the Courts of Appeals could clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.

Keaugntey Hughes v. Nicholas Herbster

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 7, 2024

that violated clearly established law. … III 4 On appeal, Herbster and Roberts claim that Herbster’s conduct did not violate a clearly established right, and thus they are entitled to qualified immunity for Hughes’s § 1983 claims.

Eugene Hector v. Gordon J. Watt Alberto Diaz Richard Davy Scott Hunter, in Their Individual and Official Capacities

235 F.3d 154 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 13, 2000

The officers’ request for qualified immunity has already been denied and the order affirmed. Hector v. Watt, 203 F.3d 817 (3d Cir.1999) (unpublished table decision). … We are assuming here that a constitutional violation occurred and qualified immunity does not apply.

Thomas Englert D/B/A Northeast Electrical Inspection Agency v. City of McKeesport and Middle Department Inspection Agency

872 F.2d 1144 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 20, 1989

McKeesport asserts that it enacted the resolution “in an effort to tighten up its enforcement of its building codes,” Englert, 698 F.Supp. at 100 , selecting MDIA because it “was uniquely well-qualified and reliable, and … The most the proofs established was, as Englert sets forth in his brief, that “MDIA’s conduct clearly evidences that it acquiesced to McKeesport’s exclusive appointment and accepted the position created by the ordinance.”

Dwayne Harvard v. Christopher Cesnalis

973 F.3d 190 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 1, 2020

immunity because this right was not clearly established at the time of the investigation. … First, no such constitutional right was ‘clearly established’ at the relevant time, as required to overcome qualified immunity.”

Northern Michigan Hospitals, Inc. v. Health Net Federal Services, LLC

344 F. App'x 731 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 8, 2009

Instead, the dispute is over whether the hospitals’ claimed charges qualify for reimbursement as facility charges.” … But these reasons are not enough to excuse exhaustion and do not establish that exhausting administrative remedies would be futile.

Dr. Joseph T. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College

501 F.2d 31 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 11, 1974

Skehan contends this finding is clearly erroneous. … It is well established that the defense of sovereign immunity from suit in a federal court may be waived. E. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24 , 54 S.Ct. 18 , 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933).

Brawer v. Horowitz

535 F.2d 830 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 12, 1976

Ibid. 18 Clearly, the government has an interest in the effective enforcement of its criminal laws. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 627 , 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 644 (1957). … laws, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any citizen of the United States lawfully entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a lawful manner towards or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified

United States of America, No. 92-5105 v. Paulo Santtini, A/K/A Carlos Garcia, Gonzalo Higera Pena, Harold Holquin, Jaime Arenas. United States of America, No. 92-5106 v. Paulo Santtini, Gonzalo Higera Pena, Harold Holquin, Jaime Arenas, the Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, Nominal

963 F.2d 585 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 8, 1992

However, the court of appeals may review a district court's decision under the "collateral order doctrine" established in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. … Id. at 972 . 54 If Smith has any application in this case, clearly only its discussion concerning judicially fashioned immunity concerns us because there has been no showing that the government's interest in arresting Boris

Brannon v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.

940 F.2d 832 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 26, 1991

sovereign immunity. … The sole objective of the Immunities Act was to specify those instances in which sovereign immunity would and would not apply.

Anderson v. The City Of Philadelphia

845 F.2d 1216 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 31, 1988

Schuylkill County, 476 F.Supp. 191, 195 (E.D.Pa.1979) 3 The individual defendants, Police Commissioner Tucker and Prison Superintendent Owens, raise a claim of qualified immunity. … Because no relief was awarded against them or is sought on appeal, and in light of our holding, we do not address the qualified immunity issue.

Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Village Supermarkets, Inc.

806 F.3d 162 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 12, 2015

The harm to subscribers like McCready was not only clearly foreseeable, “it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy.” Id. … Accordingly, Hanover Realty can establish that the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity applies because it sufficiently alleges that Defendants “instituted the proceedings and actions ... with or without probable cause

CNA v. United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 22, 2008

Armstrong, the assailant in our case, was an Army recruit but does not qualify as a government employee. … But Sheridan established that claims of independent negligence committed by Government employees are not barred by the assault-and-battery exception.

Jacqueline and Salvadore A. Dipippa v. United States

687 F.2d 14 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 24, 1982

DiPippa correctly points out that the first two memoranda indicate only that agency-sponsored medical services provided *17 under 5 U.S.C. § 7901 (1976) qualify for FECA coverage, and that she received her swine flu shot … DiPippa argues that “[singling out those who happen to receive federal workers’ compensation benefits and denying them the right they would otherwise be entitled to ... is clearly an irrational classification.”

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources v. United States Postal Service

13 F.3d 62 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 21, 1993

applies to the Postal Service, since it is an “independent establishment of the executive branch.” 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1988). … Accordingly, we believe that the Postal Service is not immune unless it can be “clearly shown that certain types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or constitutional scheme, that an implied restriction of the

Kristen Giovanni v. United States Department of Na

906 F.3d 94 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 2, 2018

A well-established body of case law, including our own, provides guidance on what it means to “challenge” a response action. … Under the correct test, neither medical monitoring nor health assessments qualify as “challenges to removal or reme- dial action[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).

Spiess v. Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department

580 F. App'x 116 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 16, 2014

Qualified immunity protects government officials from the burdens of a trial “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known … The Appellants argue that “their actions did not violate clearly established law and were 10 objectively reasonable” (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 20 (emphasis added)), yet what

In re U. S. Hoffman Can Corp.

373 F.2d 622 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 10, 1967

Appellants are not immune from possible criminal proceedings because of § 7(a) (10) of the Bankruptcy Act ( 11 U.S.C. § 25 (a) (10)), which invests a bankrupt with immunity from criminal proceedings because of “testimony” … Appellants are not relieved of their duty under the Bankruptcy Act because, as they argue, the Referee could have called on the petitioning creditors 4 or could have appointed a qualified accountant 5 to prepare and file

Fowler-Nash v. Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives

469 F.3d 328 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 29, 2006

In addition, the act must be “procedurally” legislative, that is, passed by means of established legislative procedures. … The Caucus, Harhai, and Brubaker clearly exercised an 28 administrative function when they terminated Fowler-Nash. Common law legislative immunity does not apply.

Elvira Pamintuan, M. D. v. Nanticoke Memorial Hospital

192 F.3d 378 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 21, 1999

To establish such a case under section 1981, Dr. … Pamintuan had the burden of establishing that the hospital did not meet the standard for immunity. See Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 167 F.3d 832, 839 (3d Cir.1999).