Case law

8 O.S.H. Cas.(bna) 1196, 1980 O.S.H.D. (Cch) P 24,411

620 F.2d 964 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 24, 1980

They criticize the Advisory Committee for attempting to qualify important textual language in an explanatory note. … exception when "the prescribed administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury."

Murray v. United of Omaha Life Insurance

145 F.3d 143 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 19, 1998

As a result, he had "some immune deficiency." Dr. Scotti testified, however, that Mr. … We observe first that Kievit clearly rejected the proposition that there can be no liability if any known pre existing condition at all contributed to the insured's death.

Mercy Catholic Med v. Thompson

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 18, 2004

of the classification of its . . . costs no later than 180 days after the date of the 6 retain physician allocation agreements 8 was devoted to services that qualify … To make the APRA interpretation “‘qualifies for Chevron accurate and avoid perpetrating errors, the deference when it appears that Congress reaudit requires correcting all relevant

Jason Collura v. City of Philadelphia

590 F. App'x 180 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 27, 2014

Collura’s complaint clearly invoked the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court thus had original jurisdiction to consider those claims, see 28 U.S.C. … ”). 9 Pursuant to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, the City is immune to claims for monetary damages “except with respect to eight specific types of tortious conduct, none of which is applicable here.”

Joseph Aruanno v. George Hayman

384 F. App'x 144 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 14, 2010

His complaint clearly does state such a claim. My colleagues preface the aforementioned quote with a citation to Greenfield v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 382 N.J.Super. 254 , 888 A.2d 507 *154 (2006). … as “exceptional” and establish “good cause.” ” Id., at 1168.

Young v. Quinlan

960 F.2d 351 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 1, 1992

The unre-butted facts before us clearly show that Young was preyed upon by each of a succession of cellmates. … We vacated the district court’s order on the first disciplinary hearing because Young alleged facts sufficient to establish a due process violation.

Lasser v. Reliance Standard

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 18, 2003

Lasser did not qualify for disability benefits, we first determine what is his “regular occupation,” as the Policy leaves this term undefined. Reliance argues that “regular occupation” is broad, indeed generic. … Lasser was told not to perform; and (d) neither stress nor future disabilities could establish Dr. Lasser’s present disability.

Keystone-Conemaugh Projects LLC v. EPA

100 F.4th 434 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 2, 2024

Section 7410(c) contains no qualifying language that the EPA’s power to promulgate a FIP is somehow constrained by the extent or scope of its disapproval. 22 limitations,” Train v. … Indeed, Montour requested the data from the EPA and clearly understood the proposed methodology well enough to “replicate and/or modify [the] EPA’s methodology.” 87 Fed.

Xu Cheng Liang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

206 F.3d 308 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 9, 2000

See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 232 (examining the propositions established by the Supreme Court in Felker, Yerger, and McCardle). … agree that it clearly expresses congressional intent that the district courts be divested of their habeas jurisdiction under S 2241, the issue considered here.

Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 25, 1999

S 1104, establishes for fiduciaries. … S 1104, which establishes fiduciary standards under ERISA).

Bernhard v. Nexstar Broadcasting Group, Inc.

146 F. App'x 582 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 31, 2005

Thus, Bernhard must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by proving: (1) he is within the protected age group of 40-70; (2) he was the subject of an adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for … Huston clearly said in his August 29, 2003, deposition, that salary was a consideration in Bernhard’s termination. App. 150-51, 159.

Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle

889 F.2d 466 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 9, 1989

Similarly, the appellate court may not reverse where the trial court employs correct standards and procedures, and makes findings of fact not clearly erroneous. … We note that the plaintiff established RICO liability as to twenty-six of the thirty-one defendants who remained in the case at trial.

Hero Tiera Smith v. Warden Baylor Womens Correct

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 27, 2024

Under the circumstances, the Delaware courts’ framing of Smith’s counsel’s actions was an unreasonable application of Strickland, because it ignored the clearly established Supreme Court precedent in Flores-Ortega, 528 … Therefore, the prejudice prong of Strickland is clearly established in these circumstances, 528 U.S. at 484, and the remaining merits question is whether Smith’s trial counsel’s performance, in advising her to withdraw

Carmen Deleone Lois Lavon Holland, Defendants/third Party v. United States of America and Title Insurance Company of Minnesota, Third Party

793 F.2d 1291 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 20, 1986

The Nagys sued to establish title to the disputed ten feet, and the DeLeones counterclaimed and also filed a third-party complaint against the U.S. and the Insurance Company. … It is less than clear as to whether sovereign immunity would bar this type of claim, and that a recovery, if any, would have to be by a prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C.

USA Ex Rel Merena v. Smithkline Beecham

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 29, 2000

Clearly, Congress need not provide for such relators to obtain a portion of the proceeds just because they remain parties. … Op. at 41 ("[T]here is absolutely no evidence on the record before me . . . to establish any allocation among various claims.").

United States v. Ronald O'Malley

495 F. App'x 239 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 12, 2012

His company received commissions from lenders for successfully connecting the lenders with qualified borrowers. … Once established, we next ask whether the defendant “abused that position in a way that significantly facilitated his crime.” Craddock, 993 F.2d at 340. This second prong “is easily met.”

New Castle County v. Natl Union Fire Ins

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 21, 2001

It denied summary judgment, however, as to all other claims, including those against the individual County officers who had sought legislative or qualified immunity. See Acierno v. Cloutier, 1993 WL 215133 (D. … It is the obligation of the insurer to state clearly the terms of the policy.").

Arthur Chassen v. Fidelity National Financial In

836 F.3d 291 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 8, 2016

Examiners, 66 F.3d 639, 641 (3d Cir. 1995) (engaging in a “futile gesture to establish ripeness” would be unnecessary); Berger v. … This was not clearly erroneous. . The scope of an arbitration clause is decided by the court absent clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to submit this issue to the arbitrator.

United States v. Bendolph

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 16, 2005

The appointment of counsel is clearly mandatory for an indigent petitioner. See United States v. … Wilson, 393 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2004), deviates from this court’s well-established rule that “a holding of a published opinion of the court may not be overruled without the approval of a majority of the en banc court.”

United States v. Otero

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 16, 2005

The appointment of counsel is clearly mandatory for an indigent petitioner. See United States v. … Wilson, 393 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2004), deviates from this court’s well-established rule that “a holding of a published opinion of the court may not be overruled without the approval of a majority of the en banc court.”