Case law

Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

181 F.3d 478 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 29, 1999

The findings of fact on job needs with respect to aerobic capacity are not clearly erroneous. … See Qualifying Standards (updated Oct. 15, 1998). http://www.indiana.edu/#A1#preschal/qualifying.html>.

United States v. Khaled Miah

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 20, 2024

. § 1519. 4  Prior to trial, Miah moved to dismiss Counts Two, Three, Five and Seven of the indictment, claiming that the December 2020 tweets did not qualify as … When assessing the district court’s application of the Guidelines to a particular set of facts and if “th[ose] facts ‘fit’ within what the Guidelines prescribe,” we apply the deferential clearly erroneous standard of review

William Baum v. Commissioner Social Security

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 14, 2022

Baum also failed to cast doubt on the SSA’s evidence that he was not promoted because he was less qualified for the position than other candidates. 3 … Rather than being used for credibility and intent purposes, which would best be left to a jury, the District Court clearly referred to these comments to underscore the non-discriminatory reasons why Baum was not promoted

Paul Hondros v. United States Civil Service Commission

720 F.2d 278 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 13, 1983

283, insofar as it might be interpreted as controlling statements of law, rather than factual background only. 105 Nevertheless, the majority is surely correct that the actions of the Marshals Service in this case are not immune … Sec. 213.101 (1983). 3 A "register" is defined as a "list of qualified applicants compiled in order of relative standing for certification." 5 C.F.R.

Richard Waterman v. John Farmer, Jr., New Jersey Attorney General

183 F.3d 208 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 30, 1999

The Court concluded that the second Safley factor was "clearly satisfied" because "the regulations permit a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read." Id. at 418 . … Such a review, Defendants argue, "would have to be specifically controlled and monitored by a qualified therapist, thereby causing an undue burden on a staff already inundated with sex offender cases."

Caroline Dellapenna v. Tredyffrin/easttown School Dis

449 F. App'x 209 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 28, 2011

For Dellapenna’s prima facie case of intentional discrimination, she must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) … Dellapenna simply has not “shown that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

Daniels v. Thomas & Betts Corp.

263 F.3d 66 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 24, 2001

This clearly connotes, in her view, that existing supplemental insurance would continue unaffected by the new plan and that it would do so without further action on the part of the employee. … ; and (2) when does an individual making a request for plan documents qualify as "a person . . . who is or may become entitled" to such a benefit?6 _________________________________________________________________ 5.

Steigerwalt v. Terminix International Co.

246 F. App'x 798 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 21, 2007

Although the interpretive canons the District Court employed are well established, the proper starting point is the plain meaning of the Arbitration Agreement. … The phrase “intentional tort” quite clearly refers to a category of torts; the adjective “intentional” limits the phrase so that it refers only to certain torts. Id.

United States v. Gary Basralian

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 11, 2021

Relying on those letters, the Court determined that multiple clients qualified. … The first victim found to be vulnerable is a woman in her eighties who suffers from dementia, (although the record does not clearly establish the precise date of the disease’s onset).

In Re One2One Communications, LLC

805 F.3d 428 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 21, 2015

Moreover, rather than establish a general “policy” supporting equitable mootness, these provisions weigh against the doctrine. … While that right can be waived, id., bankruptcy appellants whose appeals are dismissed as equitably moot clearly do not do so.

Salazar Quiceno v. Attorney General

304 F. App'x 40 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 17, 2008

On May 8, 2007, the IJ found that Salazar qualified for withholding of removal, holding that she had “met [her] burden of proof to establish that [s]he is likely to encounter persecution as a member of the extended LGBT … of persecution.8 I respectfully dissent. 8 Salazar must establish a “clear probability” of persecution to receive withholding of removal.

Engage Healthcare Comm LLC v. Intellisphere LLC

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 20, 2019

“In order to qualify for Lanham Act protection, a mark must either be suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful, or must be descriptive with a demonstration of secondary meaning. . . . … If we hold a term arbitrary or suggestive, we treat it as distinctive, and it automatically qualifies for trademark protection at least in those geographic and product areas in which the senior user applies

Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Department

98 F.3d 107 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 18, 1996

class and was qualified for an employment position, but that he or she was either not hired for that position or was fired from it "under circumstances that give rise to an inference … In doing so, it clearly usurped the role of the jury. It does not appear that the race of any other evaluator was a source of concern for anyone involved in deciding who was to be promoted.

United Automobile Workers Local 259 Social Security Department v. Metro Auto Center

501 F.3d 283 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 4, 2007

As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged, § 1132(g)(2)(B) refers to unpaid contributions “not to establish a limit on qualifying judgments, but rather because the amount of an award of interest or liquidated … “ERISA clearly assumes that [benefit plan] trustees will act to ensure that a plan receives all funds to which it is entitled.” Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent.

Burstein v. Retirement Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Education & Research Foundation

334 F.3d 365 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 2, 2003

The bold text above, which qualifies the statutory guarantee requirement, is directly applicable to this situation. … Burstein argues that “[i]n some cases, causation may be established based upon the employee’s expectancy interest in the misrepresented benefits.”

Ruefenacht v. O'halloran

737 F.2d 320 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 11, 1984

Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as [a] matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their … The Court’s analysis was clearly not intended to, and did not, apply the Howey test to stock.

Charles S. JONES, Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA

198 F.3d 403 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 10, 1999

Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir.1995), the district court stated that a prima facie case is established when a plaintiff shows the following: (1) “that he is a member of a protected class”; (2) that he “is qualified … As a result of the first transfer, he lost his opportunity to teach physics, which clearly was the subject he sought most to teach.

Jaramillo v. Commissioner of Social Security

130 F. App'x 557 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 10, 2005

To qualify for SSI benefits under the Social Security Act, Mesa must demonstrate that he is “disabled” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1382.2 An examiner makes the following three-step evaluation, found in 20 C.F.R. § … By contrast, in the present case, the ALJ clearly identified the specific Listings to which he was referring, 8 i.e., 111.00 (pertaining to neurological impairments) and

Shannon Ripley v. Myna German

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 1, 2021

It makes no distinction between “operators” and passengers, but rather extends to all qualifying providers insuring vehicles “used or operated” in the state.7 Plus, the “verbal threshold” explicitly limits tort liability … Ripley contends, without support, that an undated printout from a website clearly is not the type of evidence required to establish that the Deemer Statute applies.

United States v. Robert Brace

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 6, 2023

Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 201 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding appellant must show the court’s decision was “arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable”). … Because mere negligence does not qualify as affirmative misconduct, the court properly determined that estoppel is inappropriate here.5 See United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 1992).