Case law

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  • Petroleos Mexicanos Refinacion v. M/T King a (Ex-Tbilisi)

    554 F.3d 99 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 27, 2009

    We are satisfied that COGSA qualifies as "applicable law" because it is undisputed that COGSA was incorporated into the parties' charter agreement. … It is well-established in contract law that specific and exact terms are given greater weight than general language. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Norwin Sch.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Korytnyuk v. Atty Gen USA

    396 F.3d 272 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 25, 2005

    Thus, we are left qualify as “skilled” and “professional workers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), (ii). 3 At Korytnyuk’s request, we have consolidated our review of his petitions for review of each of these denials. … First, it may hold that the movant has not established a prima facie case for the underlying substantial relief sought.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson

    178 F.3d 649 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 29, 1999

    But the NBCWAs always clearly stated that they were in effect for limited terms. … Furthermore, one day of work would not qualify a miner for benefits under the statute, since a miner must work for twenty years in the industry or be disabled in the course of employment to qualify for benefits.

    Cited 6 timesUnknown
  • United States v. Tanya Stanger

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 5, 2025

    Second, we assess “whether the facts available to the officer up to that moment established reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. … Stanger qualified as an “ordinary inquir[y]” related to the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. McQuilkin

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 15, 1996

    On appeal, McQuilkin contends he did not qualify as a "career offender." … The government maintains Application Note 2 definitively establishes that McQuilkin's conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2, and a predicate offense under the "career offender"

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Coastland Corporation v. Third National Mortgage Company, as Successor to John W. Murphree Company, and Kenneth R. Larish and Grover C. Cauthen, Coastland Corporation v. Third National Mortgage Company, as Successor to John W. Murphree Company

    611 F.2d 969 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 26, 1979

    We do not think the district court was clearly erroneous in its finding that appellant intended to be bound by its verbal commitment made through Cauthen. FRCP 52(a). … In Virginia, as in most other jurisdictions: 35 When an established business, with an established earning capacity, is interrupted and there is no other practical way to estimate the damages thereby caused, evidence of the

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Lin v. INS

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 24, 2001

    To qualify for political asylum, the first type of relief, an alien must be a "refugee" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C.S 1158(a). … In this case Lin seeks to establish that he has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his political opinions.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Diallo v. Attorney General of the United States of America

    553 F. App'x 141 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 29, 2014

    The BIA separately ruled on the CAT claim, holding that Diallo had not credibly established past torture and that there was no clear error in the IJ’s determination that he had not established that he would face torture … The French-qualified interpreter at the hearing translated the phrase as meaning “a request.” R. 172.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins

    198 F.3d 100 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 26, 1999

    This argument was not raised in the District Court, and "[i]t is well established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes a waiver of the argument." Brenner v. … "As a result, even the most clearly written exclusion will not bind the insured where the insurer or its agent has created in the insured a reasonable expectation of coverage." Id."

    Cited 5 timesUnknown
  • Lozano v. City of Hazleton

    620 F.3d 170 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 9, 2010

    It clearly does. Lozano and Espinal have established that if the IIRAO is enforced, it will cause them particularized injury redressable by 40 this court. … That is more than sufficient to establish standing.

    Vacated by City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 180 L. Ed. 2d 243 (2011)Cited 70 timesPublished
  • Frances Lola Womack, (84-5613), and James A. Chandler, (84-5614) v. Donald J. Gettelfinger, Defendants/third-Party v. Ronald D. Kennedy, Third-Party (84-5651)

    808 F.2d 446 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 19, 1987

    Ritter was qualified, and that he had lied when he certified Mr. Ritter as qualified. … In cases governed by federal law, collateral estoppel may clearly be invoked in situations such as that presented here. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Anthony Viola v. US Department of Justice

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 3, 2025

    P. 4(k)(1)(C) (providing that personal jurisdiction can be established as “authorized by a federal statute”). … Pa. 2018) (evaluating whether documents received by a United States Attorney’s Office in civil discovery qualified as agency records).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Karen Tucker v. Secretary US Department of Hea

    487 F. App'x 52 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 16, 2012

    The record establishes that Dr. Tucker did not pursue any of the claims at issue in her complaint to completion. … We have carefully reviewed the record, and we conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in relying 9 on Dr.

    Cited 6 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. Johnson

    119 F. App'x 415 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 21, 2005

    Supreme Court precedent prior to Crawford clearly allows for non-testimonial co-conspirator statements to be admitted over Sixth Amendment challenges. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986). … The Court noted that the requirement of establishing unavailability was developed in cases involving former testimony, which “seldom has independent evidentiary significance on its own, but is intended to replace live testimony

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh

    260 F.3d 233 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 10, 2001

    As we see it, the strength of an agency's supervisory interest can best be gauged by examining the substantive provisions of the grant scheme established by applicable federal statutes and regulations. Cf. … By accepting an invitation to sit on the LSS's Unsecured Creditors Committee, WHO clearly incurr ed a fiduciary obligation to its fellow Committee members.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Armann v. McKean

    549 F.3d 279 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 28, 2008

    McCotter, 782 F.2d 143, 145 (10th Cir.1986), for the principle that a military court’s summary denial can qualify as full and fair consideration. Armann, 2007 WL 1576407 , at *7 n. 2. … As the Government indicates, Watson did not establish full briefing by both sides as a prerequisite to satisfying Burns .

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Zheng Zheng v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States

    422 F.3d 98 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 8, 2005

    . § 1251 (a)(1)(H) ] establishes certain prerequisites to eligibility for a waiver of deportation, it imposes no limitations on the factors that the Attorney General ... may consider in determining who, among the class of … Because Zheng appears to have remained free on parole throughout the pen-dency of removal proceedings, and is free on parole now, we hold that he qualifies as an “alien paroled into the United States” under the terms of section

    Disagreed with by Momin v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 497 (2006)Cited 153 timesPublished
  • Guarino v. Larsen

    11 F.3d 1151 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 29, 1993

    Turning to the issue of damages, the district court concluded that all defendants had absolute immunity, and hence no damages were recoverable; the court, however, did award reasonable attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. … I write separately to briefly express my conclusion that the November 10th and March 10th orders are simply parts of one action by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which to me is clearly adjudicative. 52 Moreover, I disagree

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper

    801 F.2d 130 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 12, 1986

    Those general rules establish a presumption of severability. See 1 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1925 (Purdon Supp.1986). B. … The subsection is qualified, however, by the provision that “[n]ot-withstanding the above, any MSDS which contains the information requested in paragraphs (1) and (2), and which otherwise contains the information required

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • In Re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation

    686 F.3d 197 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 16, 2012

    Whether a restraint qualifies as unreasonable and therefore conflicts with the statute is normally evaluated under the “rule of reason.” Id. … See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (establishing 180-day exclusivity period as reward for successfully challenging a patent); S. Rep.

    Vacated by Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 570 U.S. 913 (2013)Cited 32 timesPublished

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