Case law

Helen House v. Mine Safety Appliances Company, a Corporation, Helen House v. Mine Safety Appliances Company, a Corporation, United States of America, Helen House v. Mine Safety Appliances Company, a Corporation, Pvo International, Inc., a California Corporation and Polytron Company, Also Known as Polyco Liquidating Corporation, a California Corporation, Third-Party v. Silver Dollar Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Polaris Mining Company, a Delaware Corporation, Hecla Mining Company, a Washington Corporation, Big Creek Apex Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Silver Surprize, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Sunshine Consolidated, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Silver Bismarck Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Metropolitan Mines Corporation Limited, an Idaho Corporation, Third-Party Sandra Norris v. Mine Safety Appliances Company, a Corporation, United States of America, Sandra Norris v. Mine Safety Appliances Company, a Corporation, Pvo International, Inc., a California Corporation and Polytron Company, Now Known as Polyco Liquidating Corporation, a California Corporation, Third-Party v. Silver Dollar Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Polaris Mining Company, a Delaware Corporation, Hecla Mining Company, a Washington Corporation, Big Creek Apex Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Silver Surprize, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Sunshine Consolidated, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Silver Syndicate, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Bismarck Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Metropolitan Mines Corporation Limited, an Idaho Corporation, Third-Party Arjvell E. Fowler v. Mine Safety Appliances Company, a Corporation, Pvo International, Inc., a California Corporation and Polytron Company, Also Known as Polyco Liquidating Corporation, a California Corporation, Third-Party v. Silver Dollar Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Polaris Mining Company, a Delaware Corporation, Hecla Mining Company, a Washington Corporation, Big Creek Apex Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Silver Surprize, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Sunshine Consolidated, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Silver Syndicate, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Bismarck Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Metropolitan Mines Corporation Limited, an Idaho Corporation, Third-Party Sunshine Mining Company, a Corporation v. United States of America, Pvo International, Inc., a California Corporation and Polytron Company, Also Known as Polyco Liquidating Corporation, a California Corporation, Third-Party v. Silver Dollar Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Polaris Mining Company, a Delaware Corporation, Hecla Mining Company, a Washington Corporation, Big Creek Apex Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Silver Surprize, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Sunshine Consolidated, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Silver Syndicate, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Bismarck Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Metropolitan Mines Corporation Limited, an Idaho Corporation, Third-Party Anthony Charles Vanier Harden v. United States of America, Pvo International, Inc., a California Corporation and Polytron Company, Now Known as Polyco Liquidating Corporation, a California Corporation, Third-Party v. Silver Dollar Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Polaris Mining Company, a Delaware Corporation, Hecla Mining Company, a Washington Corporation, Big Creek Apex Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Silver Surprize, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Sunshine Consolidated, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Silver Syndicate, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Bismarck Mining Company, an Idaho Corporation, Metropolitan Mines Corporation Limited, an Idaho Corporation, Third-Party

573 F.2d 609 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 14, 1978

The Idaho cases, relied on in the Monsanto case, clearly establish that such a person is not an employer under the statutory definition, even though he benefits from the work done. Moon v. … What is required to qualify as a claim is established by regulation. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 . The purported claims did not qualify as "claims" and, therefore, there is no jurisdiction.

Gonzalez v. Young

560 F.2d 160 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 15, 1977

. § 606 (e)(1) and 45 C.F.R. 233.120 by refusing to authorize emergency assistance in the amount of $163.00 “even though Julia Gonzalez is clearly entitled to same under Federal Law . . . … Moreover, the language of section 1343(3) clearly contemplates a distinction between rights secured by the Constitution and rights secured by “any Act of Congress.”

McDowell v. Sheerer

374 F. App'x 288 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 24, 2010

Government officials are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” … was clearly established at the time the officer acted.

Robert F. Urbano v. The Board of Managers of the New Jersey State Prison

415 F.2d 247 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 5, 1969

Groves: Counties and municipalities do not partake of the Eleventh Amendment immunity enjoyed by the States * *, although they clearly are public bodies and in many cases perform functions on behalf of the State. * * *, Whether … Whether this statute can also serve to grant immunity to officials alleged to have mismanaged a trust fund established for the benefit of prisoners, even though there is a reference in the act to the “management” of inmates

Commercial Water Services, Inc. v. Chang

36 F. App'x 505 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 14, 2002

“designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed,” under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B), an appellant’s failure to cite the correct order does not impede appellate review of issues that he clearly … They did not deprive CWS of any property and would have qualified immunity even if they had. And then finally, if it is on appeal, we affirm the denial of the motion to add Mr. Moore as a defendant.

M.A. Ex Rel. E.S. v. State-Operated School District of Newark

344 F.3d 335 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 16, 2003

As we noted above, the fact that Congress employed the term abrogation does not change the language and structure of the IDEA, which clearly effects a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. … As discussed above, the availability of federal funds was also clearly and unambiguously conditioned on a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Rose v. Bartle

871 F.2d 331 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 20, 1989

It would appear that such activity, if it occurred would lie outside of the rationale for absolute immunity set forth in Imbler . At most, it would be subject to a qualified good-faith immunity. Id. at 566. … We have some misgivings as to this accommodation, especially in light of the availability of qualified immunity as a defense.

Brian Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle

544 F. App'x 129 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 19, 2013

immunity, but that he nonetheless violated clearly established law. … immunity even when his conduct violated law that was clearly established.

Phong Duong v. Telford Borough

186 F. App'x 214 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 25, 2006

a clearly established constitutional right.” … immunity analysis asks if the right violated is “clearly established.”

D.R., a Minor Child, by Her Parent and Natural Guardian, L.R., and L.R., Individually and in Her Own Right, No. 91-1136 v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, William Goode, James C. Bazzel, Martha Richino, Susan Peters, Bucks County Intermediate Unit No. 22, Christina Tuttle, Penn Ridge School District, Charles Fambro, Fred Freeman, James A. Gallagher, Brian Miller, Marc R. Ratcliffe, James M. Sperling, Lester Sutphin. L.H., Bucks County, Pennsylvania, No. 91-1137 v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, and William Goode and James C. Bazzel and Martha Richino and Susan Peters and James A. Gallagher and Brian Miller and Marc R. Ratcliffe and James M. Sperling and Lester Sutphin

972 F.2d 1364 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 11, 1992

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." … Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-92 , 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1202-06 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989), and qualified immunity for individual defendants. See Harlow v.

United States v. Government of the Virgin Islands

363 F.3d 276 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 2, 2004

The parties dispute whether the immunity defense was ever raised in the District Court, but we need not resolve the issue as Eleventh *774 Amendment immunity is relevant to jurisdiction and may be raised at and considered … Supp. 423 , 429 n.6 (D.V.I. 1996), suggesting that these cases establish that the Virgin Islands possesses Eleventh *?

Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard

325 F.3d 412 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 15, 2003

immunity. … entitled to qualified immunity; that Mr.

International Security LLC v. Dana Berry

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 7, 2025

DISCUSSION 1 The qualified immunity doctrine shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … Because the constitutional right Berry and Parsons are alleged to have violated was not clearly established when they acted, they are entitled to qualified immunity. II.

Csx Transportation, Inc., National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Plaintiffs-Cross-Defendants-Appellants v. The City of Garden City, Defendant-Third-Party v. Arco Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Appellee

325 F.3d 1236 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 27, 2003

Nevertheless, the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its permissible waiver is clearly implicated in this case. … [t]he establishment and maintenance of a sewerage system," see City of Douglas v.

Antilles Industries, Inc. v. Government of the Virgin Islands

529 F.2d 605 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 27, 1976

It may be argued that the Act of 1961, in allowing a qualified right of transfer, was meant to narrow a much wider privilege implied in the 1957 legislation. … The same considerations which call for clear and unambiguous language to justify the conclusion that immunity from taxation has been granted in any instance must require similar distinctness of expression before the immunity

M.A., on Behalf of E.S., M.A., A.T. On Behalf of G.T., A.T., G.L. On Behalf A.O., G.L., H.M. On Behalf M.M., H.M., O.J. On Behalf of O.D.J., O.J., A.E. On Behalf of A.J.E. And A.E., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. State-Operated School District of the City of Newark New Jersey Department of Education Vito A. Gagliardi, Sr., in His Individual Capacity William L. Librera, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Education, in His Official Capacity Barbara Gantwerk, Director, Office of Special Education Programs, New Jersey Department of Education, in Her Official and Individual Capacities Melinda Zangrillo, Coordinator of Compliance, Office of Special Education Programs, New Jersey Department of Education, in Her Official and Individual Capacities, United States of America (Intervenor in d.c.)

344 F.3d 335 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 16, 2003

As we noted above, the fact that Congress employed the term abrogation does not change the language and structure of the IDEA, which clearly effects a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. … As discussed above, the availability of federal funds was also clearly and unambiguously conditioned on a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Watson v. Abington Township

336 F. App'x 163 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 15, 2009

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) and dismissed such claims with prejudice; (4) granted Defendants’ motion as to the individual Defendants on qualified immunity grounds; and … The District Court further concluded that the three other individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Praxis Properties, Inc. And Praxis Properties, Inc. For the State of New Jersey v. Colonial Savings Bank, S.L.A. The Resolution Trust Corporation, Colonial Federal Savings Bank v. Dynamic Industries Company, Inc. Angelo M. Gregos Nicholas Poulous and Sharp Construction Company, Inc. Resolution Trust Corporation, as Receiver of Colonial Federal Savings Association

947 F.2d 49 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 13, 1991

An "essential attribute" of qualified immunity, the Court explained, is "an entitlement not to stand trial under certain circumstances." 472 U.S. at 525, 105 S.Ct. at 2815. … Because qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," the Court determined that an official's right to qualified immunity "is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to

Shawer v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania

602 F.2d 1161 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 9, 1979

Generally she claims she was denied several positions which were granted to males who were equally or less qualified. … was “immune from suit as an integral part of the state government performing essential functions as a state (see National League of Cities v.

Haddrick Byrd v. Robert Shannon

709 F.3d 211 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 11, 2013

This is because § 1915(e)(2)(B) includes a ground for dismissal – defendant‟s immunity from suit – that does not qualify as a strike under § 1915(g), which involves dismissals for actions or appeals that are “frivolous, malicious … There, a district court ambiguously dismissed a prisoner‟s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) without clearly indicating whether it was relying on § 1915A(b)(1) for frivolousness, or § 1915A(b)(2) for suing an immune defendant