Case law

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  • In Re Pillowtex

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 23, 2002

    The reference is to the United States Trustee authorized to supervise the administration of bankruptcy cases in "[t]he judicial districts established for the States of Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania," 28 U.S.C. … At the oral argument, Jones Day contended that all bankruptcy lawyers find themselves with past due bills from putative debtors on the eve of bankruptcy and seek to clear the accounts so that they are qualified to serve as

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Riccobene

    709 F.2d 214 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 20, 1983

    Mario and Harry Riccobene were clearly partners in the illegal numbers and loansharking businesses. *226 They apparently shared the same offices, which were visited with some regularity by higher-ranking members of the enterprise … Nelson was particularly qualified to testify.

    Overruled on other grounds by Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991)Cited 229 timesPublished
  • Joseph Wilkinson v. Maurice Abrams

    627 F.2d 650 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 1, 1980

    . §§ 501-504 , states whose programs satisfy certain requirements set forth in the Act qualify for federal funding. These funds are used to pay the costs of administering the state’s unemployment compensation program. … The regulations do not establish specific percentage criteria for second level appeals. B.

    Cited 42 timesPublished
  • Grace Marvel v. County of Delaware

    397 F. App'x 785 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 14, 2010

    However, all of these claims fail based on Delaware County’s immunity pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). … Marvel has failed to establish that a pattern of violations existed such to alert the County of a need to establish a policy to prevent a deprivation of rights.

    Cited 1 timesUnpublished
  • ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corporation

    696 F.3d 254 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 28, 2012

    Expert testimony is necessary to establish damages in an antitrust case. … The Supreme Court held that, although the plaintiff clearly had standing to seek damages, he lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because he failed to establish a “real and immediate threat” that he would again be stopped

    Cited 271 timesPublished
  • United States v. Deandre Rudolph, A/K/A "Rudy" Deandre Rudolph

    137 F.3d 173 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 23, 1998

    Rudolph’s contention is that his two uncharged bribes do not qualify as relevant conduct for purposes of an enhancement under the sentencing guidelines. … Griswold’s status as a convicted felon is implicated in establishing the base offense level for each offense. However, no separate conduct by Griswold resulted in double counting.” Id. at 296-97 .

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Shahid Qureshi v. Atty Gen USA

    47 F. App'x 162 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 30, 2002

    involving moral turpitude], (B) [inadmissibility for multiple criminal convictions], (D) [inadmissibility for prostitution], (E) [inadmissibility for engaging in serious criminal activity with immunity … [1](B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established

    Cited 1 timesUnpublished
  • 71 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 236, 34 fed.r.serv.3d 1379 Barbara Coleman, Nos. 95-5439/5742 v. John Kaye, Individually, and in His Capacity as Monmouth County Prosecutor County Prosecutor's Office of the County of Monmouth John Does, 1-100 Jane Does, 1-100, County of Monmouth, Intervenor in D.C. Barbara Coleman v. John Kaye, Individually, and in His Capacity as Monmouth County Prosecutor the County Prosecutor's Office of the County of Monmouth John Does, 1-100 Jane Does, 1-100, County of Monmouth, Intervenor in D.C., John Kaye, Nos. 95-5469/5708

    87 F.3d 1491 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 26, 1996

    supersede the county prosecutor's authority, it ultimately concluded that "the existence of this power of supersession does not bring the prosecutors so directly under the influence of the Governor that they automatically qualify … Under this analysis, "each defendant must bear the prevailing plaintiff's fees for time spent on matters clearly related to the claims made against that defendant." Williamsburg Fair Hous. Committee v. Ross-Rodney Hous.

    Cited 127 timesPublished
  • Conley v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

    714 F. App'x 191 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 28, 2017

    The District Court properly concluded that Conley did not qualify for a fee waiver. The FOIA permits an agency to recover costs of processing FOIA requests. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A). … Cir. 1985) (holding that court “decisions clearly tie fee waivers 5 to public benefit … and establish that where the requester seeks information concerning himself only,” the

    Cited 2 timesUnpublished
  • Jamar Boykins v. SEPTA

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 17, 2018

    that McGovern and Kish knew he had filed a discrimination charge, Boykins was not qualified for either position and was therefore unable to establish pretext. … In light of our finding that Boykins cannot establish either McGovern’s or Kish’s knowledge of the complaint, we need not reach this issue. 18 cannot immunize that employee from

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • David Jahn v. Comm IRS

    431 F. App'x 210 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 21, 2011

    Jahn contends that, if a substitute return qualifies as a return for some purposes, due process and equal protection require that it constitute a return for every purpose. … Furthermore, the Commissioner clearly stated in his pretrial memorandum and in his opening argument at trial that he sought penalties in light of that argument as well as Jahn’s argument that the complexity of the tax

    Cited 3 timesUnpublished
  • McTernan v. City of York, Pa.

    564 F.3d 636 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 27, 2009

    We found that the specific evidence adduced by Barth did not establish a “compelling” safety hazard as a matter of law. … We do not address qualified immunity or McTernan's right to specific relief, as these issues were not decided by the District Court. M.A. 29. 13 .

    Cited 1,018 timesPublished
  • Newfound Management Corporation v. Cedrick Lewis

    131 F.3d 108 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 12, 1997

    To qualify, the relevant order must first be a final judgment in the sense that it ultimately disposes of an individual claim brought as part of a multiple claim action. Id. at 1153 . … It applied appropriate legal principles and its findings are not clearly erroneous. 76 We will affirm the judgment of the district court.

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • United States v. Eugene Goldman

    607 F. App'x 171 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 8, 2015

    However, the evidence establishes that these referrals were made in exchange for money and regardless of medical necessity. … Only a physician would be able to determine whether the referred patients were medically qualified for hospice care.

    Cited 12 timesUnpublished
  • Ashok Gurung v. Attorney General United States

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 30, 2020

    that the IJ did not err in 1 In order to qualify for withholding of removal, a petitioner must establish that it is “more likely than not” that he would suffer persecution. … Withholding of Removal To qualify for withholding of removal, a petitioner must establish a “clear probability of persecution,” meaning that it is “more likely than not” that he would suffer persecution.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Irma Pothering v. Parkson Coal Company

    861 F.2d 1321 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 23, 1988

    Administrative practice, however, did not comport with legislative intent, and twice Congress was impelled to specify its intentions more clearly, "in order to insure as broad coverage as possible." 23 Echo v. … Conrad, a board certified radiologist who was qualified as an expert and who read three separate x-rays of Mr. Pothering as positively showing pneumoconiosis. App. at 26. Under 20 C.F.R.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In Re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability Litigation

    596 F. App'x 93 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 16, 2014

    Under the Settlement Agreement, moderate mitral regurgitation is one of the qualifying medical conditions for compensation. … An abuse of discretion may be found if the District Court’s decision “rest[s] on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Id.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Sec Pa Dept Environmental Prot

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 30, 2017

    Whether timeliness is governed by the four-year catchall limitations period established by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a),7 or laches, Schaefer v. … But if a project is not water dependent, “practicable alternatives that do not involve special aquatic sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated otherwise.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp.

    57 F.3d 1231 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 23, 1995

    Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. … These “insulating” statutes provide for various amounts of immunity to directors and officers.

    Cited 1 timesUnknown
  • De La Cruz v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority

    597 F. App'x 83 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 30, 2014

    “A court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions when it ‘base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Adams v. … Experts must be qualified to offer opinions, and their testimony must be reliable. “Before an expert witness may offer an opinion . . ., [the expert] must first be qualified by virtue of specialized expertise.”

    Cited 9 timesUnpublished

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