Case law

Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 20, 2009

Clearly, Boyanowski is more analogous than Mosley to the present case. … Further, the letters Acumed sent to appellant’s customers, despite appellant’s view that they “disparage[d] the inventory Advanced was selling,” appellant’s br. at 18, do not qualify as defamation or unfair competition.

Solow v. PPI Enterprises (U.S.), Inc.

324 F.3d 197 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 28, 2003

The debtor bears the burden of establishing good faith. In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 ,162 n. 10 (3d Cir.1999). … SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 159 (abuse exists upon clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant legal conclusions, or improper application of fact to law).

Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.

619 F.3d 287 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 20, 2011

Second, since releases would necessarily be limited to the qualifying class members, those ultimately excluded would no doubt go right back into court to continue to assert their claims. … We have no such concern here, as the District Court clearly set forth its reasoning for the fee award.

Heffernan v. Hunter

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 26, 1999

That, however, does not mean that he can successfully establish a right to recovery here. II. … Nor do we reach the defendants' arguments raising the statute of limitations, qualified immunity, causation, or the First Amendment. 11 under section 1985(2) by an employee who alleged a

Weurope Silvers, a Citizen and Resident of Unicoi County, Tennessee, (87-5946), (87-5984) v. Martin County Coal Corporation, a Kentucky Corporation With Principal Place of Business Located in Inez, Kentucky, (87-5946), Third Party (87-5984), James J. Powell Construction and Erection Company, Inc., D/B/A Powell Construction Company, Third Party (87-5984)

849 F.2d 1473 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 28, 1988

The parties concede that if the Magistrate was correct in holding that the work performed by Powell Construction is a regular or recurring part of the work or business of MCCC, then MCCC is a contractor entitled to immunity … North American Philips Lighting Corp., 821 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir.1987), has a superficial similarity to this case, but is clearly distinguishable. Three things need to be noted about Granus.

Gaul v. Lucent Tech Inc

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 22, 1998

he is `an otherwise qualified' individual." … Gaul must also demonstrate as part of his facial showing that the costs associated with his proposed accommodation "are not clearly disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce." Borkowski v. Valley Cent.

Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Penn Plate-Glass Co.

103 F. 132 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 14, 1900

These requisites to the establishment of an equitable lien are clearly recognized by the supreme court in the late case of Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654, 664 , 17 Sup. Ct. 453, 41 L. Ed. 865 . … As there was nothing in the conduct of Kann in his dealings with the mortgagor company or the complainant, up to the purchase by him at *159 the receiver’s sale, to affect or qualify his rights as a bona ñde purchaser, no

Mohammed Nasir Khan v. Attorney General of the United States

448 F.3d 226 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 22, 2006

relevant to the instant case, the LIFE Act provides that a legal permanent resident alien’s spouse and minor children are eligible, by virtue of their relation to the alien, to apply for adjustment of status if otherwise qualified … However, the BIA suggested that, even where an alien has submitted a visa petition, "[i]t clearly would not be an abuse of discretion for the immigration judge to summarily deny a request for a continuance ... upon his determination

In Re Busy Beaver Building Centers, Inc. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart

19 F.3d 833 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 11, 1994

Congress has clearly delegated to the UST the discretion to assure that fee awards and expense reimbursements are reasonable, a delegation which may at first blush appear exclusive. … Congress rather clearly intended to “provid[e] sufficient economic incentive [to lure competent bankruptcy specialists] to practice in the bankruptcy courts.” In re McCombs, 751 F.2d 286 , 288 (8th Cir.1984).

Rivera v. Rogers

224 F. App'x 148 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 29, 2007

While clearly prisoners and those involuntarily committed, by virtue of their incarceration and custody status, “do not forfeit their First Amendment right to use of the mails,” Jones v. … Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996) (requiring an actual injury to establish a violation of the right of access to the courts). Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Jency Lopez-Cruz v. Attorney General United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 28, 2019

(A.R. 220). 4 The Board did not address whether “young female heads of household” qualify as a cognizable particular social group. … After carefully scrutinizing the BIA’s reasoning, we cannot say that it was in any way wrong to conclude that the IJ clearly erred in finding that Lopez–Cruz had established the requisite nexus.

United States v. Melrose East Subdivision, Third Filing, East Baton Rouge Parish Louisiana, Lyman D. White, Claimant-Appellant

357 F.3d 493 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 13, 2004

While the record does not clearly establish whether some of the funds in the Liberty Bank account might have been left over from a time when DAC was legitimately billing Medicaid, the district court was entitled to draw the … White presented an affidavit stating that he had no other funds with which to pay for a defense attorney, and there were suggestions, which the district judge apparently credited, that White had been found to qualify for

M.C. And G.C., on Behalf of Their Son, J.C. v. Central Regional School District, M.C. And G.C., on Behalf of Their Son, J.C. v. Central Regional School District

81 F.3d 389 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 17, 1996

First, it argues that the district court misapplied Rowley, the principal authority establishing the standard of education services required under IDEA. … We hold that the court's conclusion that J.C had untapped potential was not clearly erroneous. As we have explained in Kruelle v.

United States v. Lee

612 F.3d 170 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 14, 2010

In Pelullo , we established a four-part test to evaluate a spillover claim. … Clearly, it was able to separate the issues and the charges, and it did so, in keeping with the District Court’s instructions.

United States v. Felton

811 F.2d 190 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 6, 1987

Consequently, Felton has failed to establish a claim under the Speedy Trial Act. B. 43 Bruce also has failed to establish her claim. She filed a motion for severance from Felton on August 1, 1983. … That appeal marks the beginning of additional excludable time as to all defendants under Sec. 3161(h)(1)(E), (appeal delay). 51 Therefore, Bruce is unable to establish sufficient chargeable time to qualify for a dismissal

Myers v. American Dental Ass'n

695 F.2d 716 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 10, 1982

Thus, Myers has clearly failed to carry his burden. … ACA never qualified to do business in Virginia (only in Delaware) and its sole office was in Iowa.

Iadimarco v. Runyon

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 8, 1999

However, the holding of Santa Fe Trail as well as the language of McDonnell Douglas itself clearly establishes that the substance of the burden-shifting analysis applies with equal force to claims of "reverse discrimination … applicant instead of a qualified [W]hite[male] applicant."

Alanda Forrest v. Kevin Parry

930 F.3d 93 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 10, 2019

Forrest counters that the failure to object can be excused because the issue qualifies under our plain error doctrine. We agree with Forrest. … There is an abuse of discretion if the district court’s decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. (quoting Oddi v.

Richerson v. Jones

572 F.2d 89 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 17, 1978

We have previously held that, for purposes of Rule 4(a), such a motion qualifies as a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id.; Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 303 F.2d 716 , 718 (3d Cir. 1962). … Finally, Dais argues that since no policies behind the exhaustion rule would be furthered by dismissing his complaint, this court should establish a general exception to the exhaustion requirement.

United States v. Lewis Whoolery

579 F. App'x 78 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 5, 2014

First Capital also put borrowers into loans with higher interest rates than they would have otherwise qualified for in order to generate higher profits from the yield spread premium. … The superseding indictment, however, clearly described fraudulent practices that affected both borrowers and lenders. These practices were also part of the government’s presentation at trial.