Case law

Nedal Elfar v. Township of Holmdel

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 3, 2025

But deprivations of liberty suffered during retrial, after a defendant’s conviction has been vacated, also qualify as seizures under the Fourth Amendment. … 617 A.2d 238, 244 (N.J. 1992) (“[T]he State is the municipal prosecutor’s client . . . .”), and New Jersey had divergent interests from Holmdel as a potential § 1983 claim posed no danger to New Jersey given its state immunity

Oxford House Inc v. Township of North Bergen

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 28, 2023

We review the District Court’s denial of Oxford House’s motion for an abuse of discretion, deferring to underlying factual findings if they are not clearly erroneous and evaluating legal conclusions de novo. … The District Court determined that Oxford House failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

389 Orange Street Partners, a Connecticut Partnership, Cross-Claimant and Clifford Robinson, Defendant-X-Claim Third-Party v. Richard L. Arnold Kyle Arnold Regis Conlon, Third-Party Cross-Claimants and Trail Blazers Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Plaintiff-Cross v. Sebastian S. Ciarcia, and Law Office of Sebastian Ciarcia, a Connecticut Corporation, Third-Party Clifford Robinson, Cross-Claimant Third-Party v. Sebastian S. Ciarcia, and Law Office of Sebastian Ciarcia, a Connecticut Corporation, Richard L. Arnold Kyle Arnold Regis Conlon, Third-Party Cross-Claimants Trail Blazers Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Plaintiff-Cross and 389 Orange Street Partners, Defendant-Cross Trail Blazers Inc., an Oregon Corporation v. 389 Orange Street Partners, a Connecticut Partnership, Defendant-Cross and Clifford Robinson, Cross-Claimant Third-Party v. Sebastian S. Ciarcia, and Law Office of Sebastian Ciarcia, a Connecticut Corporation, Richard L. Arnold Kyle Arnold Regis Conlon, Third-Party

170 F.3d 1200 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 22, 1999

Both Connecticut's negligence and general tort statutes of limitation had run unless Robinson can establish an exception. … The legal memorandum in opposition says nothing about the cross-claims qualifying as affirmative defenses.

Lightning Lube, Inc. Laser Lube, a New Jersey Corporation v. Witco Corporation Avis Service, Inc. Avis Lube, Inc. Avis Enterprises, Inc., Defendants/third Party v. Ralph Venuto, Individually and D/B/A Laser Lube, Lightning Lube, and Automotive Management Systems Carol Venuto, His Wife, Individually Automotive Management Systems, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Third Party Witco Corporation, Lightning Lube, Inc. Laser Lube, a New Jersey Corporation v. Witco Corporation Avis Service, Inc. Avis Lube, Inc. Avis Enterprises, Inc., Defendants/third Party v. Ralph Venuto, Individually and D/B/A Laser Lube, Lightning Lube, and Automotive Management Systems Carol Venuto, His Wife, Individually Automotive Management Systems, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Third Party Lightning Lube, Inc., T/a Laser Lube

4 F.3d 1153 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 10, 1993

Corwin clearly intended to interfere with Lightning Lube's business relations with Vangarelli, Craig, and Fischer. … Venuto thus was not required to qualify as an expert to offer opinion testimony concerning Lightning Lube's lost profits. Id.

Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States

549 F.3d 260 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 26, 2008

To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear that he will be persecuted if removed to his home country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership … The court concluded that “Li’s evidence of a recent campaign of forced sterilization in her home village, evidence consistent with the conclusion of recent government reports, clearly satisfied the criteria for a motion to

Pamela Kern v. DAS Companies Inc

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 31, 2025

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is at least forty years old, (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, (3) he was qualified for the position in question … But Bonafede testified and the record evidence clearly proves that several individuals at DAS were aware of issues related to Kern’s work product around the time it declined to interview her.

John Corigliano v. Classic Motor Inc

611 F. App'x 77 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 11, 2015

“To the extent that the district court made factual findings, a clearly erroneous standard of review applies. … Classic Motor’s interactive website does not qualify as purposeful contact.

Jude Jeremiah v. Attorney General United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 13, 2022

Alternatively, the IJ determined that Jeremiah would not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal based on his proposed PSGs because (a) “criminal deportees” is not a cognizable PSG and (b) he is not an “American national … that it would be unsound policy to recognize “criminal deportees” as a PSG because it would “unquestionably create a perverse incentive for Haitians coming to or residing in the United States to commit crimes, thereby immunizing

Union Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gray

114 F. 422 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 20, 1902

So far, and in this qualified sense as to third parties holding policies of the company, it may be said to have been privy to the contract between Black and Gray. … Here is a clearly defined purpose for the appointment in question. No other and independent purpose can be attached thereto.

Susan Rocke v. Pebble Beach Company

541 F. App'x 208 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 10, 2013

Pebble Beach‟s interactive website also fails to qualify as purposeful contact. … This Court has instructed that unless a plaintiff‟s claim is “clearly frivolous,” 8 jurisdictional discovery should be allowed.

In Re Chevron Corp.

650 F.3d 276 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 25, 2011

The Ecuadorian plaintiffs‘ primary challenge is to the Court‘s conclusion that, ―[t]o the extent that any privilege or immunity from disclosure would otherwise apply to some or all of the discovery sought by Chevron or individual … Here, the communications captured on film clearly were not made ―in confidence‖ due to the presence of the filmmakers at the time of the communications, and so the protections of the attorney-client privilege never attached

South Camden Citizens v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

274 F.3d 771 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 17, 2001

Clearly, therefore, the regulation at issue in Wright merely defined the specific right that Congress already had conferred through the statute. … Ash the plaintiff must establish that Congress intended the remedy.

Schurr v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.

196 F.3d 486 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 12, 1999

Both Stevenson and his direct superior, Robert Chambers, believed that each of the applicants was qualified for the open position. Stevenson viewed the two as equally qualified. … If a casino licensee fails to meet the established goal, the licensee is required to document its good faith efforts to hire a qualified female or minority candidate for the position. N.J.A.C. 19:53-4.3.

In Re Isolagen Inc

279 F. App'x 133 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 22, 2008

In the District Court, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on three alternative grounds: (1) the complaint did not establish demand futility; (2) the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish that any … The damages the Plaintiff is claiming are clearly contingent on the related securities class action lawsuit because the Plaintiff states as much in his Response to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Weiner v. Quaker Oats Company

129 F.3d 310 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 7, 1997

A third asserted that "[i]t is clearly a defensive move. They're paying a fair amount for Snapple. Suddenly someone can't swoop in and buy up Quaker. … A per se rule immunizing Quaker from the need to speak truthfully about the future merely because the company had performed well in the past seems to us improvident.

Yusupha Sanneh v. Attorney General United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 17, 2020

If an alien fails to qualify for asylum, he or she will be ineligible for withholding of removal, which has a more demanding standard. Id. … The record thus does not compel a contrary finding to that of either the BIA or the IJ regarding whether Sanneh qualified for CAT protection. IV.

Wolk v. UNUM Life Ins Co

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 30, 1999

To reiterate, it is undisputed that the 1990 Policy qualifies as an employee benefit plan under ERISA. … Co., 969 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992) (health insurance plan whose sole beneficiaries were company's owners cannot qualify as an "employee benefit plan" under ERISA; nor can employers qualify as "participants" of an ERISA

United States v. Geiser

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 10, 2008

because the meaning of the word was understood to be well established by administrative and court precedents.’).” Id. at 233. … United States v. 20 Kumpf: “While the precise parameters of personal assistance under the [RRA] have not been delineated by the courts, Kumpf’s own actions [as a concentration camp guard] clearly

Kinney v. Yerusalim

9 F.3d 1067 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 23, 1993

Sec. 12132 (Supp.1991), provides: 12 [N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of … Balancing these interests, Congress acknowledged the existence of an undue burden defense for existing facilities but clearly warned, "[n]o other limitation should be implied in other areas."

United States v. Marquise Bell

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 8, 2020

Relying on Anglin and Rosario, Bell argues that “more than a mere threat is required to establish physical restraint.” Appellant’s Br. 10. … We established a distinction between brandishing and otherwise using a weapon in United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.