Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
9,730 results
1.49s
298 F.3d 201 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 24, 2002
The record also supports a finding that the minimum wholesale prices' burdens on interstate commerce clearly outweigh their local benefits. … Bd., 877 F.Supp. 245 , 252-53 (E.D.Pa.1995) (holding that the plaintiffs could establish a dormant Commerce Clause violation by showing that the Board sets minimum prices according to in-state dealers' costs); cf.
Cited 0 timesPublished682 F.2d 72 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 17, 1982
III. 17 In enacting § 365, Congress provided no indication that collective bargaining agreements were to be immune from rejection and thus unique among executory contracts. … 523 F.2d 164 , 169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 , 96 S.Ct. 451 , 46 L.Ed.2d 388 ; 423 U.S. 1073 , 96 S.Ct. 855 , 47 L.Ed.2d 82 (1975). 11 According to REA Express, rejection should be permitted "only where it clearly
Cited 23 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 6, 2004
. § 2314 either knew or should have reasonably foreseen that the Turning to the question whether property would be transported in interstate the evidence was sufficient to establish commerce. … Nor have we found “accused” appears clearly to have been cases interpreting the term “accused” as used in the conventional sense to denote a used in that provision as referring to criminal defendant.
Cited 0 timesPublished682 F.3d 261 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 15, 2012
Although the Court’s colloquy did include some qualifying language, the first thing it said was that it would “[a]bsolutely” exclude that evidence from Bergrin’s retrial. (Joint App. at 49.) … Unlike the District Court’s ruling with respect to the Pozo Plot, however, the District Court’s decision to exclude evidence of the Esteves Plot was not clearly rooted in a flawed premise.
Cited 38 timesPublishedUnited States v. Brandon Segers
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 28, 2024
The district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. … But injuries like those suffered here have been found by courts to qualify as a “life-threatening bodily injury.” See, e.g., United States v.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedMarcavage v. Bd Trustees Temple
232 F. App'x 79 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 1, 2007
“To show an abuse of discretion, appellants must show the district court’s action was arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable. … Immunity from civil and criminal liability attaches unless the individual acts with “willful misconduct or gross negligence.” 50 PA. CONS. STAT.
Cited 2 timesUnpublished747 F.2d 528 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 14, 1984
We find no clearly expressed intention in the legislative history that would lead us to depart from the language which Congress chose in drafting the amendment. … That is, persons having less income than some Pickle amendment beneficiaries are not eligible for categorical Medicaid because, for example, they were not previously recipients of SSI and therefore do not qualify for the
Modified by Lynch v. Rank, 763 F.2d 1098 (1985)Cited 9 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 8, 1995
The regulations promulgated under § 167 provided that in order to qualify for the depreciation deduction, the taxpayer had to establish that the property in question had a determinable useful life. Treas. … Cases that addressed the availability for depreciation deductions under § 167 clearly establish that works of art and/or collectibles were not depreciable because they lacked a determinable useful life.
Cited 0 timesUnknownCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 1, 2005
Employing a Landgraf analysis, Dinnall first maintains that Congress clearly did not intend § 241(a)(5) to apply to these events occurring before the effective date of § 241(a)(5). … for the First Circuit held that “application of § 241(a)(5) to deprive an alien who illegally reentered the country before IIRIRA’s effective date of the ability to apply for relief for which the alien did not theretofore qualify
Cited 0 timesPublishedFendrick v. PPL Services Corp.
193 F. App'x 138 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 25, 2006
Fendrick argues, and we agree, that an ADA plaintiff need not establish that he was qualified to perform his job in order to recover on a retaliation claim. See Krouse v. … We are not, therefore, prepared to say that the erroneous formulation was so clearly prejudicial to Fendrick as to amount to plain error.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedUnited States v. Kenneth Douglas
885 F.3d 124 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 15, 2018
The record does not establish that Douglas’s job required him to exercise any judgment, much less judgment that others accepted. … Furthermore, while a defendant who is a fiduciary or who holds fiduciary-like status may qualify for the enhancement, fiduciary status is not required.
Cited 22 timesPublishedMyers v. American Dental Association
695 F.2d 716 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 10, 1983
Thus, Myers has clearly failed to carry his burden. … ACA never qualified to do business in Virginia (only in Delaware) and its sole office was in Iowa.
Cited 30 timesPublishedGrand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc.
988 F.2d 476 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 19, 1993
Factual conclusions as to minimum contacts are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Stranahan Gear Co. v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 800 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir.1986). … The building receptionist does not qualify.
Cited 66 timesPublished170 F.3d 1200 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 22, 1999
Both Connecticut's negligence and general tort statutes of limitation had run unless Robinson can establish an exception. … The legal memorandum in opposition says nothing about the cross-claims qualifying as affirmative defenses.
Cited 0 timesPublished253 F. App'x 164 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 5, 2007
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004) (“an applicant who does not qualify for asylum also does not qualify for withholding of removal”). … Since Nagi’s BIA appeal was focused on the IJ’s factual findings, findings which were not clearly erroneous, the one-member BIA affirmance was procedurally proper.
Cited 0 timesUnpublished4 F.3d 1153 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 10, 1993
Corwin clearly intended to interfere with Lightning Lube's business relations with Vangarelli, Craig, and Fischer. … Venuto thus was not required to qualify as an expert to offer opinion testimony concerning Lightning Lube's lost profits. Id.
Cited 2 timesPublishedUnited States v. Nahsiem McIntosh
124 F.4th 199 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 23, 2024
. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) by establishing a relatively high threshold below which the enhancement does not apply. … But that does not render us incapable of determining what qualifies for the enhancement.
Cited 11 timesPublishedUnion Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gray
114 F. 422 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 20, 1902
So far, and in this qualified sense as to third parties holding policies of the company, it may be said to have been privy to the contract between Black and Gray. … Here is a clearly defined purpose for the appointment in question. No other and independent purpose can be attached thereto.
Cited 5 timesPublishedUnited States Ex Rel. Judd v. Quest Diagnostics Inc.
638 F. App'x 162 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 26, 2015
Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 945-46 (1997), “there is a presumption against retroactive legislation that is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence” that is applied “unless Congress had clearly manifested its intent to the contrary … The parties do not dispute that the pleadings in Urbanek and Hunter Labs qualify as public disclosures under the public disclosure bar in both its pre- ACA and ACA-amended forms.
Cited 15 timesUnpublishedHozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc.
908 F.2d 1155 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 24, 1990
In other words, although ERISA was clearly “designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,” Shaw v. … determine the exact range of permissible remedies under § 502(a)(1)(A), which varies according to how one balances the obvious tension in § 502(c) between the express $100 per day limitation and the immediately following qualifier
Cited 264 timesPublished
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