Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • United States v. Michael Calabretta

    831 F.3d 128 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 26, 2016

    Further, “the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony. … We should not grant his request because, as the District Court clearly found, Calabretta’s sentence was the “minimum sentence sufficient.” J.A. 143.

    Abrogated in part by Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017)Cited 34 timesPublished
  • United States v. Shawn Cavanaugh

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 22, 2021

    As we have held that provision qualifies as a crime of violence under the Career Offender Guidelines, the Court correctly determined Cavanaugh’s aggravated assault conviction so qualified. … Armed bank robbery, rather, is an enhanced form of simple bank robbery, and not a distinct offense, as shown by the statutory text of § 2113(d), which does not establish an offense without reference to § 2113(a).

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • White v. Napoleon

    897 F.2d 103 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 23, 1990

    To some degree, this appears to conflict with the well-established rule that mere disagreements over medical judgment do not state Eighth Amendment claims. See Bowring v. … As noted earlier in the opinion, however, White clearly has a cause of action *111 under the Eighth Amendment based on allegations that Napoleon used Debrox solely to inflict pain and for no valid medical purpose.

    Cited 742 timesPublished
  • DeJohn v. Temple University

    537 F.3d 301 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 4, 2008

    Yet, unless harassment is qualified with a standard akin to a severe or pervasive requirement, a harassment policy may suppress core protected speech. 22 See id. … “While the harassment policy may be said to regulate conduct, it clearly regulates speech, insofar as it specifically targets certain expression.” Sypniewski v.

    Cited 70 timesPublished
  • Dean Woods v. Barnett Bank Of Fort Lauderdale

    765 F.2d 1004 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 15, 1985

    Smith wrote this letter without knowing whether any of its details were in fact true. 14 This qualifies as severely reckless conduct, as Smith's representation was given without basis in reckless disregard of its truth or … Although the evidence on this question is far from overwhelming, there is sufficient evidence to support this finding, given our clearly erroneous standard of review.

    Cited 65 timesPublished
  • Bates v. Tandy Corporation

    186 F. App'x 288 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 27, 2006

    Failure to Promote To make their prima facie failure to promote case, Cummings and Payne must establish that: (1) they belong to a protected category; (2) they applied for and were qualified for a job in an available … We believe International Brotherhood is clearly distinguishable. There, it was already established that employees who had applied for promotions were denied because of their race.

    Cited 4 timesUnpublished
  • Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella

    613 F.3d 102 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 27, 2010

    On appeal the Superior Court did not clearly state whether or not it considered this information to constitute trade secrets under Pennsylvania law. … Botticella does not dispute that these types of information qualify as trade secrets under Pennsylvania law. 10 See Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1121-22.

    Cited 122 timesPublished
  • Sun Oil Company, Transferee, Sunray Dx Oil Company and Subsidiaries, Transferor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

    562 F.2d 258 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 29, 1977

    Thus understood, the provision establishing the option price would preclude the Trust from enjoying appreciation in the value of the property subsequent to the conveyance by Sunray. … Our review of this holding by the Tax Court is not limited to the clearly erroneous rule, as Sunray argues, since the interpretation of the option provisions is a question of law.

    Cited 48 timesPublished
  • Thelosen v. Commissioner of Social Security

    384 F. App'x 86 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 17, 2010

    To qualify for DAC, TheLosen was required to establish that she was disabled prior to her twenty-second birthday – October 13, 1995. … To qualify for DIB, TheLosen was required to establish she became disabled during her last employment or the statutory 2 period – in her case, on or before March 31, 2001

    Cited 3 timesUnpublished
  • Davis v. Philadelphia Housing Authority

    121 F.3d 92 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 29, 1997

    Collectively, these factors are clearly sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the zone of interests test. … When we have done so, however, the party whose standing was in question clearly satisfied the zone-of-interests test and we therefore declined to engage in any extensive analysis.

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • Charles Bracken v. Township of Manor

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 17, 2024

    And in making his probable cause determination, Petrosky “was not required to undertake an exhaustive investigation in 5 For false arrest claims involving multiple charges, establishing probable cause on one charge insulates … immunity.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Elsinore Shore Associates v. Local 54, Hotel Employees And Restaurant Employees International Union

    820 F.2d 62 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 25, 1987

    The court held that Elsinore qualified for the anti-strike injunction under Boys Markets, Inc. v. … Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 , 90 S.Ct. 1583 , 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970), which authorizes a court to enjoin a strike if the employer establishes that: 1) the contract contains an implicit or explicit no-strike

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. David Shulick

    994 F.3d 123 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 13, 2021

    As the District Court correctly concluded, a conclusory claim of this sort falls short of what is required of a defendant to successfully establish prejudice. … Under this version of the statute, Shulick would have a better argument that the condition qualifies all words before it, as a unitary whole.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Jackson v. O'bannon

    633 F.2d 329 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 11, 1980

    Such a presumption, which is implicit in the Pennsylvania policy, clearly violates the principle that only "actually available income" be used in determining eligibility for AFDC benefits. … Jackson's two member household would have qualified for a monthly benefit of $247 ($164 for the father and $83 for Tarik).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In Re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC

    599 F.3d 298 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 22, 2010

    Clearly this is not the case. See, e.g., First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. … Section 363 establishes certain rights and procedures in connection with, inter alia, the sale of debtor assets.

    Cited 71 timesPublished
  • In Re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation (Mdl 414). Appeal of John E. Koerner & Co., Inc., Imperial Products Corporation, and Pan-O-Gold, Inc

    748 F.2d 157 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 15, 1984

    Under the ABA Model Rules, this duty is clearly stated in Rule 1.9: 17 A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 18 (a) represent another person in the same or substantially related … In less celebrated cases and in those in which the availability of a statutory attorney's fee is uncertain, it often will not be possible for dissenters to attract qualified counsel.

    Cited 140 timesPublished
  • United States v. Eatherly

    525 F.3d 265 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 31, 2008

    presence" jury instruction in order to explain to the jury the legal justification for his defense theory: "Mere presence in the area of any contraband, including a firearm, or awareness of its location is not sufficient to establish … Specifically, Weatherly asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because the jury, not the District Court, should determine whether any of his prior convictions qualified as "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Oleksiak v. Comm Social Security

    231 F. App'x 150 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 4, 2007

    In this Process Area, twenty-six SSA employees, including her, were initially determined to be eligible and minimally qualified for the BA positions. … Oleksiak was clearly not among the highest qualified candidates for the promotion 12 to BA.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. Dowling, Reuben. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, Reuben. Appeal of Reuben Dowling

    855 F.2d 114 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 28, 1988

    The court held that although Krop qualified as an expert in eyewitness identification, the testimony would not be admitted. The court gave two reasons for its ruling. … The photograph was not a "mug-shot" that was clearly identifiable as the product of an arrest, and its introduction was not reversible error. re United States v.

    Cited 47 timesPublished
  • United States v. Stamatios Kousisis

    82 F.4th 230 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 22, 2023

    It is now well established that the federal wire fraud provision only extends to property rights. 12 Moreover, for the government to establish wire fraud, the property involved “must play more than some bit part in a scheme … Rather, they schemed to have PennDOT pay them millions of dollars that they were clearly not entitled to given their material breach of the contracts.

    Cited 7 timesPublished

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