Case law

Jennifer Binder Le Pape v. Lower Merion School District

103 F.4th 966 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 4, 2024

For the latter, the Court established deadlines for fact and expert discovery, summary judgment, Daubert and in limine motions, and pretrial memoranda. It also set a trial date. … He is a non-speaker who for the first 16 years of his life had “very minimal communication,” was able to say only a few words, and was unable to communicate clearly and as he wished. App. at 1264.

Montgomery County v. Microvote Corporation Carson Manufacturing Company, Inc. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., Inc

175 F.3d 296 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 30, 1999

Thus, In re Ford Motor Co. established a bright-line rule permitting appeals from discovery orders requiring the disclosure of content putatively privileged by the attorney-client and work-product privileges. … The District Court’s factual findings should not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d 147, 148 (3d Cir.1998).

Blue v. Defense Logistics Agency

181 F. App'x 272 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 24, 2006

To establish a prima facie case for discriminatory non-promotion using indirect evidence, a plaintiff must show that she is a member of protected class; that she was qualified for, applied for, and rejected for a position … An abuse of discretion is found if the District Court’s decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” In re General Motors Corp.

United States v. Kenneth Schneider

801 F.3d 186 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 9, 2015

The District Court granted this motion in part, writing that the “innocent round trip” exception established in Mortensen v. … The exception’s application to Schneider’s conviction We turn, then, to the question of whether Schneider’s conviction could qualify for the “innocent round trip” exception.

Ward v. Foulkrod

264 F. 627 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 30, 1920

After qualifying, the State receivers, on March 4, 1919, filed a petition in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, reciting the proceedings pending in the two courts, and praying … A. 83, 84 , and was answered by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as follows: “Well-established equity procedure provides for just such a situation.

Kiewit Eastern Co. v. L & R Construction Co.

44 F.3d 1194 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 10, 1995

immunity provided by the Workers' Compensation Act, Kiewit I, supra, at *8, CNA Insurance argues on appeal that the subcontract does not "expressly provide" that L&R Construction would waive its immunity -- as the statute … Kiewit Eastern also claims a right to attorneys' fees and costs, but it clearly is not a "prevailing party," within the meaning of the subcontract. in hindsight as seeking fees from L&R.29 See, e.g., Brickner v.

Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department

174 F.3d 95 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 11, 1999

The court found that “it is ... inconceivable that in the mass of testimony so clearly establishing negligence in thirty other particulars this issue could have influenced the verdict against American.” … Although Madamba clearly was a supervisor of the personnel under his command, the ACPD contends that he did not establish policy and was not at the top tier of the department so as to be part of upper management.

School District of Lancaster v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd.

789 F.2d 996 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 1, 1986

Clearly, however, this aspect of the litigation transcends the nation’s classrooms and extends to municipal buildings, homes, and other structures. … Counsel’s desire to have a mandatory class is understandable, but the case for such a certification has not been established.

Andrew Mattern v. City of Sea Isle

657 F. App'x 134 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 24, 2016

Mattern] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v. … Mr. 7 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “if a post hoc diagnosis of the . . . injuries would suffice” to establish a serious medical need, there would be “no need” for the second method of establishing such a

Aamir Shaikh v. Attorney General United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 7, 2023

Although New York Penal Law § 130.40(2) does not explicitly contain a mens rea requirement, it is not a strict liability crime because “New York law makes clear that ‘[a] statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating … to “determine: (1) how public officials would likely react to the harms the petitioner fears; and (2) whether this response qualifies as acquiescence under the governing regulations.” 25 Shaikh argues that the

Peachlum v. City Of York

333 F.3d 429 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 19, 2003

C. 27 Even if the administrative finality doctrine is applicable to a post-enforcement First Amendment claim, Peachlum's claim is clearly ripe. … Clearly, however, under the Supreme Court's opinion in City of Ladue v.

Albert J. Brooks v. Village Of Ridgefield Park

185 F.3d 130 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 21, 1999

Subsumed in this question is whether the district court correctly concluded that the Village failed to establish a good faith defense. A. 6 We turn to the first question and commence with a brief background of the FLSA. … We affirmed in part on the basis that the district court's determination was not clearly erroneous within the meaning of Section 213(a)(1) of the FLSA because the employees did not qualify under the first prong of the Secretary

Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 3, 1997

When viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Keller clearly established that he was objectively qualified for his position. … First, Keller clearly established a prima facie case that he was qualified for the position of Chief Operating Officer.

In Re: Sterten

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 4, 2008

The Court examined each fee and concluded that only two of them—a $25 “mark up” in the appraisal fee and $32 charged for notary services—qualified as “finance charges” under the Truth in Lending Act.2 The Court then sua sponte … This argument fails for the same reason the previous argument did—Sterten cannot establish that she suffered any prejudice as a result of Option One’s failure to raise the issue. Cf.

Pinho v. Atty Gen USA

432 F.3d 193 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 20, 2005

Clearly they are not convictions that have been withheld. If they are covered, then, it will be under the first disjunct: “a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court.” … It is unclear how the principle of immunity might extend to subpoenaed testimony about unstated motives.

Greenway Ctr Inc v. Essex Ins Co

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 30, 2007

The fifth Veltri requirement is not found in Pennsylvania law as established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa. 526, 529, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (1996), and infra. … Yet, it clearly was in Ranger’s interest that the court grant Rossi’s petition.

Chrysoula Komis v. Secretary United States Depart

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 12, 2019

Brennan, 4 In construing the ADEA’s federal-sector provision, the Court rejected arguments that the provision, as a waiver of sovereign immunity, must be strictly construed in favor of the government and that federal employees … We do not believe the prohibition is so qualified.”); see also Hale, 808 F.2d at 619 (analyzing a federal employee’s Title VII retaliation claim without conducting a separate “personnel action” inquiry); Ayon v.

Jarbough v. Atty Gen USA

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 11, 2007

Recasting challenges to factual or discretionary determinations as due process or other constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction under § 1258(a)(2)(D). … It is the applicant’s burden to establish the threat to life or freedom by a “clear probability.” Tarrawally, 338 F.3d at 186; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).

Rompilla v. Horn

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 13, 2004

established Federal law.” … In Williams, the Supreme Court held that “the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 529 U.S. at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc.

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 3, 1997

When viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Keller clearly established that he was objectively qualified for his position. … First, Keller clearly established a prima facie case that he was qualified for the position of Chief Operating Officer.