Case law

United States v. Felton

811 F.2d 190 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 30, 1987

Consequently, Felton has failed to establish a claim under the Speedy Trial Act. B. Bruce also has failed to establish her claim. She filed a motion for severance from Felton on August 1, 1983. … Therefore, Bruce is unable to establish sufficient chargeable time to qualify for a dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act. 8 *200 IV In Novak , we recognized that subsection (F) (hearing time), if read as completely open-ended

In Re: Ariel Adan

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 14, 2006

Under these circumstances, Adan and Avans clearly had a “settled purpose” and “shared parental intent” to raise their daughter in Argentina, and that country is therefore her habitual residence. … There is little question that, under this standard, the abuse, sexual and otherwise, that Avans contends Adan has 29 inflicted on Arianna would, if true, qualify as an intolerable situation

Antonello Boldrini v. Martin Wilson

609 F. App'x 721 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 13, 2015

A court may vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) only if a party establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, see Brown v. Pa. R.R. … Here, the CHRI, standing alone, does not clearly show that the sundry documents concerning Boldrini’s criminal case are false or that the defendants committed fraud. Cf. Eley v.

Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

539 F.3d 199 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 19, 2008

Without the parenthetical, a public entity could immunize itself from § 12147(a) liability by delegating renovation projects to private entities that are not subject to ADA liability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 . … Thus, it is apparent that the rule of law established by the District Court is ineffectual in preventing cases from being brought after construction is completed.

Brooke Grassmyer v. Shred-It USA Inc

392 F. App'x 18 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 25, 2010

The Court held that the Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case because they were qualified and they were all replaced with male sales representatives but that Shred-It had satisfied its burden of articulating a … We agree with the District Court that Ryan and McGrane established their prima facie case because they are female, qualified to be sales representatives, were discharged, and were replaced with male sales representatives

In Re Community Bank of Northern Virginia

418 F.3d 277 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 11, 2005

The Court responded that “the Court of Appeals from [sic] the Third Circuit has said pretty clearly that simply consolidating claims where there’s proper federal jurisdiction with one that there is not does not get us there … The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood language . . . that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires [and] . . . that the court will

Keystone Mining Co. v. Gray

120 F.2d 1 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 22, 1941

It appeared that all of the petitioner’s capital stock, with the exception of qualifying shares, had been issued to Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, for which trustees had been appointed pursuant to the provisions … the railroad company is to be treated as the producer for the purpose of the exemption conferred by subsection (Z), the railroad company must be treated as the producer for all purposes of the act for the coal produced clearly

International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Skinner Engine Co.

188 F.3d 130 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 10, 1999

It cannot be said that the phrases clearly and expressly indicate vesting since there is simply no durational language to qualify these phrases. … The 1980-1981 CBA established the amount of life insurance coverage at $3,000.

In Re: Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation Alexander Sambolin

246 F.3d 315 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 16, 2001

As a result of the dismissal, Sambolin’s claim fails to qualify for compensation pursuant to the multidistrict class action settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) between the Appellees — AcroMed Corporation (“AcroMed … First, the AcroMed settlement immunized doctors and hospitals from AcroMed bone screw products liability lawsuits (though not malpractice actions), so notice was not entirely against their interests.

Grossberg v. Comm Social Security

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 29, 2005

rather than vindicating their rights, simply by threatening them with costly litigation, Congress enacted the EAJA, waiving the United States’ sovereign and general statutory immunity … However, when the government’s legal position “clearly offends established precedent . . . its position cannot be said to be ‘substantially justified.’” Id.

James William Riley v. Stanley W. Taylor M. Jane Brady

277 F.3d 261 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 28, 2001

With respect to Nichols, Liguori remembered clearly that “Mr. … C. § 4209(e)(l)(j) (establishing felony murder aggravator).

United States v. Sabir

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 30, 1997

The government does not claim that Sabir's offense could not qualify for disposition under the safety value provisions if the five statutory conditions are satisfied. … Thus, the fact that the defendant qualified for a two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction under § 3E1.1 does not establish eligibility for a safety valve reduction under § 5C1.2. United States v.

Marilyn Goepel Ronald Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, a Division of Liuna, D/B/A Mail Handlers Benefit Plan

36 F.3d 306 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 25, 1994

recharacterizing a state law claim as a federal claim removable to a district court, the district court concluded that the removal was proper because the Goepels’ complaint was “ ‘necessarily federal in character by virtue of the clearly … The jury returned a general .verdict in the plaintiffs favor, however, the court of appeals reversed, partially because it concluded that federal law immunized the helicopter manufacturer from state tort liability based on

United States v. Katora

981 F.2d 1398 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 7, 1992

In contrast, where the Commission spoke of culpability without any such explicit limitation, the concept was clearly meant to apply broadly. … The majority also relies on prior case law in establishing a limitation on the applicability of § 3Bl.l(c).

Tice v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.

325 F. App'x 114 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 8, 2009

Congress has clearly stated that administrative findings in a SOX case are subject to review only by direct appeal, not collateral attack. See § 42121(b)(4)(B). … It merely reconciles the qualified exception for discrimination claims brought within the framework contemplated by Title VII with Congress’s express intent to protect the finality of SOX adjudications.

United States v. John Doe

806 F.3d 732 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 2, 2015

Hendricks by a lawyer who miscalculated a well- established deadline. Indeed, Doe’s lawyer was not negligent at all. … That contention is clearly wrong. First, Rule 60(b)(6) has no built-in time limit.

Gagliardo v. Connaught Lab Inc

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 22, 2002

Here, the PHRA, with its similar language and applicability, clearly provides a cause of action nearly identical to that of the ADA. … Hence, the jury was fully aware that the impairment itself did not establish a disability within the meaning of the ADA.

United States v. Ammar

714 F.2d 238 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 31, 1983

133 Refused to grant use immunity to a co-defendant whose testimony would contradict that of the witness concerning the single directly incriminatory event? … Stillman then moved to have Welkie examined by any qualified person concerning the effect of these drugs on his memory and perception.

Bhinder v. Attorney General of the United States

654 F. App'x 537 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 5, 2016

Proceeding to the merits, the IJ denied Bhinder’s request for waiver of inadmissibility, ruling he failed to establish “extreme hardship” to Qureshi as his qualifying relative. … But this statement was clearly not the reason underpinning the BIA’s decision to affirm the IJ. 15 We note all of Bhinder’s claims arise from the IJ’s adjudication of his request for a waiver of inadmissibility based on

Common Cause of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania

558 F.3d 249 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 26, 2009

First, an organization may be granted standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the organization or association itself may enjoy. … Clearly these allegations, which challenge the legislative process, are insufficient to allege more than a generalized, abstract grievance, shared by all Pennsylvania citizens.