Case law

Mudric v. Atty Gen USA

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 24, 2006

Furthermore, “to have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. … The petitioner challenged the IJ’s determination that he did not qualify for an exception to the one-year filing deadline.

United States v. John Michael Iannone

184 F.3d 214 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 12, 1999

Thus, the district court did not clearly err in determining that O’Dowd was “particularly susceptible” to Iannone’s fraud. 2. … Though Iannone falsely claimed to be a government agent, this conduct did not qualify for a § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) enhancement because he never claimed to be selling HNR or WDH investment opportunities on behalf of a government

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Larson

683 F.2d 787 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 20, 1982

Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 , 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869), limits application of the privileges and immunities clause to natural persons. … Commonwealth's brief at 7. 42 On the other hand, the Commonwealth vigorously challenges as clearly erroneous the district court's finding that section 4703(a)(2) was not a legitimate safety measure.

R.E. Davis Chemical Corporation, an Illinois Corporation v. Diasonics, Inc., a California Corporation, Third Party Plaintiff v. Glen D. Dobbin and Galdino Valvassori, Third Party

826 F.2d 678 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 10, 1987

Davis' right to restitution, however, is qualified under 2-718(3)(a) to the extent that Diasonics can establish a right to recover damages under any other provision of Article 2 of the UCC. … The district court's order of November 4, 1986, from which Diasonics clearly appealed, made the September 19, 1986 order final and appealable.

Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp.

4 F.3d 1153 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 10, 1993

Corwin clearly intended to interfere with Lightning Lube’s business relations with Vangarelli, Craig, and Fischer. … Venuto thus was not required to qualify as an expert to offer opinion testimony concerning Lightning Lube’s lost profits. Id.

Le v. City of Wilmington

480 F. App'x 678 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 24, 2012

To the contrary, the letters clearly express an unwillingness to acknowledge Le’s ownership of the copyright. … a prima facie case: [A] prima facie case is established when a plaintiff shows the following: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he is qualified for the position; (3) that he “was

Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon

807 F.2d 1150 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 5, 1986

Were we to hold otherwise, the very substantial claims of the plaintiffs would be immunized from judicial review forever. II. … The reasoning in Sullivan , however, is heavily dependent upon this court’s clearly articulated policy against allowing interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions, see, e.g. Gardner v.

Marko Demaske v. Brandon Bonin

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 17, 2022

Based on the above, the District Court did not err in concluding Demaske failed to establish a genuine question with regard to the existence of probable cause. … We similarly leave unaddressed Officer Bonin’s argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

United States v. Bennie Graves

554 F.2d 65 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 18, 1977

To import implied concepts qualifying the nature of the falsehood of which the defendant stands accused would in my view thwart the explicit terms as well as the objective of this enactment. … Clearly, petitioner had adequate notice and warning of the consequences of his action. Id. at 831-32, 94 S.Ct. at 1272 .

Altemose Construction Company v. Building & Construction Trades Council Of Philadelphia And Vicinity

751 F.2d 653 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 15, 1985

We have noted that 26 Apex Hosiery establishes two principles central to the subsequent development of the nonstatutory exemption. … The section 8(e) prohibition against contract clauses in which employers agreed to refrain from doing business with other persons was qualified, however, by the proviso that 31 nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to

United States v. Abraham Cruz

757 F.3d 372 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 10, 2014

The Sell Court did not allocate burdens of proof or establish standards for appellate review for any of the four Sell criteria. … Following close review of the record, we will not disturb the District Court’s factfinding because it is not clearly erroneous.

Ningsih v. Attorney General of the United States

227 F. App'x 115 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 11, 2007

To qualify for protection under CAT, the applicant must “establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 5 … As such, the IJ’s finding is clearly based on specific, cogent reasons in the record. See Dia, 353 F.3d at 250.

Walker v. City of Wilmington

360 F. App'x 305 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 14, 2010

Walker, a reasonable jury could clearly not find that Lawson had the claimed knowledge. The only reason tendered by Plaintiffs is that Plaintiffs are African-Americans. … With respect to those claims, the District Court did not reach Lawson’s qualified official immunity defense or the issues raised by the City under Monell v.

Brown v. Farrell

293 F. App'x 147 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 22, 2008

The District Court, however, determined that Brown had failed to establish any of the four elements. … Sanford, 456 F.3d at 305 (holding that plaintiff’s state-created 5 The School and School District had argued the defense of qualified immunity, however, the District Court did not issue a ruling regarding that argument

Breakiron v. Horn

642 F.3d 126 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 18, 2011

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which constitutes “clearly established Federal law” for AEDPA purposes. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000); Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2010). … Thus, under AEDPA, we may not grant relief on this claim unless that ruling either was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

In re Diet Drugs

92 F. App'x 890 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 12, 2004

“External actions that would disturb that balance, by altering the number of opt outs through a different mechanism, clearly would substantially interfere with MDL 1203.” Id. … She contends that this discovery could reveal negotiations between her counsel and Wyeth over settlement and could establish that Wyeth had constructive notice of her intent to opt out.

Chicago District Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. K&i Construction, Inc., Defendant/third-Party v. Chicago and Northeast Illinois District Council of Carpenters, Third-Party

270 F.3d 1060 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 23, 2001

Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) ("Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator." … Given that it was K&I's burden to prove the reasonableness of its position in light of the contract as a whole, this failure alone strikes a serious blow against its effort to qualify for a Boys Markets injunction. 27 Even

Heather Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc

930 F.3d 136 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 3, 2019

The dissent contends that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Cafazzo upended the Commonwealth's well-established four-factor analysis, thereby rendering the Francioni factors secondary to a threshold question of … The dissent concludes that because Amazon does not have any "exclusive" franchise in the sale of third-party products, it "clearly does not fit this description."

E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare Products, Inc.

538 F.3d 185 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 5, 2008

This raises the question of the proper genus for the Court’s genericness analysis: the established product class or a new product class that modifies the established product class with the new characteristic. … A controversy clearly existed as to the validity of the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” and its place on the supplemental register.

Mary Sable v. Jennifer Velez

437 F. App'x 73 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 12, 2011

In order to show a likelihood of success on the merits, the plaintiffs must establish that it was improper for the agencies to consider the notes as trust-like devices. … To qualify as a “cash loan” under the POMS, the instrument must be a “negotiable, bona fide loan agreement.” § 1120.220(B)(2)(a).