Case law

Rodney Handy, Jr. v. Leeloni Palmiero

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 4, 2020

Qualified Immunity Turning to the substance of Handy’s appeal, we address his assertion that the District Court erred in concluding that Appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. … This doctrine will shield state actors “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Kelly v.

Paul Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corporation

738 F.2d 587 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 18, 1984

(8) All documents that have been or will be shown to the expert during or in preparation of the expert's testimony at deposition or trial. 13 (9) All documents, including a curriculum vitae, that plaintiffs contend will establish … I conclude in this case that it is the attorney work product-qualified immunity which must give way. 24 Tr. at 35-36, App.F. 25 Thus, it is apparent that the district court ordered production of the documents because it construed

Stephen B. Kuzma v. United States Rubber Company, a Corporation

323 F.2d 657 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 22, 1963

It is well established under the applicable Pennsylvania law that “‘[i]t is only in those cases where contributory negligence is so clearly revealed that fair and reasonable individuals would not disagree as to its existence … Plaintiff’s evidence concerning the ■specific events surrounding the accident itself also clearly establishes that the issue of contributory negligence was for the jury to decide.

Dam Things From Denmark, A/K/A Troll Company Aps v. Russ Berrie & Company, Inc.

290 F.3d 548 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 14, 2002

We believe that the District Court properly determined that Dam Things was likely to establish that Pi’s copyright qualified for restoration and that this copyright was not abandoned by Dam Things. … Clearly we would not apply collateral estoppel in such a case. 16 .

Son Duc Tran v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States

414 F.3d 464 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 12, 2005

He was not prosecuted in Michigan, and seems to have been granted immunity in exchange for his testimony. … This language leaves open the door for an argument that reckless conduct qualifies as the “use of force.”

United States v. Gary Watkins, A/K/A Raheem Okbar, Gary Watkins

54 F.3d 163 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 28, 1995

If so, we believe Watkins is clearly mistaken. Watkins did not assert before the district court that the information provided in the presentence report was an inaccurate account of what had happened in the past. … by some other form of clearly reliable evidence.

Dia Navigation Company, Limited v. James Pomeroy

34 F.3d 1255 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 13, 1994

In brief, we conclude that the provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA") lack the requisite clarity which would justify the policy as it presently has been established. … The district court found that the relief Dia seeks qualifies as money damages for purposes of this section, Dia, 831 F.Supp. at 378-80 , and that as a result recovery is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id.

74 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 545, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,849 Janice P. Stewart v. Rutgers, the State University Joseph J. Seneca, Chair, Promotion and Review Committee Francis L. Lawrence, President, Rutgers University

120 F.3d 426 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 25, 1997

3d Cir.1991), which also involved a rejected bid for tenure at Rutgers, we explained that the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she is within a protected class, that she applied for, was qualified … Burdine, 450 U.S. at 260 , 101 S.Ct. at 1097 (noting that "the defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions"); Ezold v.

United States v. L. Robert Frame, Sr. And Vintage Sales Stables, Inc.

885 F.2d 1119 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 14, 1989

Congress clearly articulated this belief in the Act itself: It, therefore, is declared to be the policy of Congress that it is in the public interest to authorize the establishment, through the exercise of the powers provided … To fix, establish, or control: to adjust by rule, method, or established mode....

Dawn Ball v. Lt. Hummel

577 F. App'x 96 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 17, 2014

Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448 1 Ball qualifies financially to proceed IFP, but because she has accumulated “three strikes” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), see Ball v. … Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (“An allegation of a recent brutal beating, combined with three separate threatening incidents, some of which involved officers who purportedly participated in that beating, is clearly

Loretta E. Stana v. School District of the City of Pittsburgh and Charles N. Allebrand

775 F.2d 122 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 22, 1985

Eligible lists of persons qualified to teach; appointments Eligible lists, properly classified containing the names of persons who have received certificates of qualifications to teach, and arranged as nearly as possible … There appears to have been no plea of qualified immunity for acts done by Allebrand in his individual capacity. Immunity would be inap *131 plicable for acts done in his official capacity. See Brandon v.

Jamila Russell v. Christopher Richardson

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 25, 2019

The qualified immunity doctrine “shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” … Specifically, we “possess jurisdiction to review whether the set of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right,” but “we lack jurisdiction to

Anthony Gober v. David Matthews, as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare

574 F.2d 772 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 17, 1978

The administrative law judge concluded that, while “some degree of lung disfunction is clearly evidenced,” Gober’s disability was attributable to his heart condition, and therefore not compensable under the Act. … As such, values of FEV less than 2.5 and MW less than 100 were required to qualify for a presumption of disability. § 410.490(b)(ii).

Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E.

172 F.3d 238 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 30, 1999

Qualified Immunity A municipal official sued in his individual capacity enjoys qualified immunity if his conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would … s clearly established federal rights". Because we addressed qualified immunity in IDEA claims in W.B. v.

State of Maryland for the Use of Nadine Y. Levin v. United States of America, State of Maryland for the Use of Sydney L. Johns v. United States

329 F.2d 722 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 28, 1964

We do not agree that the “clearly erroneous” test is applicable on the present appeal. … These provisions established a division of mutually exclusive powers.

United States of America Ex Rel. Walter Henderson v. Joseph R. Brierley, Supt., State Correctional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pa

468 F.2d 1193 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 6, 1972

Thus, Congress clearly intended to give the district court the power it exercised in assigning defendant’s petition to the Magistrate. … Thus, no issue of unconstitutional delegation or usurpation appears in this record. 1 Nor, contrary to appellant’s contention, is a magistrate automatically “not qualified to write up a report on a writ of Habeas Corpus.”

Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County ex rel. Lycoming County Solid Waste Department

883 F.2d 245 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 25, 1989

Justice Blackmun, the author of Reeves, dissented on the ground that the majority position would effectively permit any degree of market participation to render a state activity immune from Commerce Clause intrusion. 460 … The Lycoming landfill does not qualify as a market participant even absent the limit of the South-Central Timber plurality.

Alfredo Semper v. Curtis Gomez

747 F.3d 229 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 24, 2014

Section 3602(a) provides that ―[a] district court of the United States shall appoint qualified persons to serve, with or without compensation, as probation officers within the jurisdiction and under the direction of the court … Relying on the doctrine of judicial immunity as well as the Tenth Circuit‘s ruling in Trackwell v.

Purnell v. Norned Shipping B.V.

801 F.2d 152 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 17, 1986

The City correctly points out, however, that there is an exception to this rule where one tortfeasor is immune from liability to the injured party. … In such a situation, the immune tortfeasor cannot be made to pay for the plaintiffs’ injuries indirectly through contribution.

United States v. Sixto Mestres-Janssens

55 F.2d 881 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 22, 1932

Both must be established in-the manner provided by the statute. … In this case, tho continuity of residence was completely broken by the four years’ voluntary absence of the applicant, and it is perfectly manifest that the witnesses could not he qualified to establish his good moral character