Case law

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  • Frederick L. v. Department of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania

    364 F.3d 487 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 13, 2004

    It is notable for our matters such as establishing purposes that the plurality did not envision or declining to establish new the fundamental-alteration defense to be a programs … This is not an issue of detriment of budget items that are not legislative immunity, which DPW has not associated with community care or the care claimed, but a recognition

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Dennis E. Gaul v. Lucent Technologies Inc. John Does 1-100 Jane Does 1-100 Abc Corp. Xyz Corp

    134 F.3d 576 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 22, 1998

    Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir.1996). 2 This matter turns on the second element, namely, whether Gaul was a “qualified individual.” 3 “[T]he burden is on the employee to prove that he is ‘an otherwise qualified’ individual … Gaul must also demonstrate as part of his facial showing that the costs associated with his proposed accommodation “are not clearly dispropor *581 tionate to the benefits that it will produce.” Borkowski v. Valley Cent.

    Cited 445 timesPublished
  • United States v. Allen W. Stewart, in Nos. 98-1260 United States of America v. Allen W. Stewart, in Nos. 98-1302 United States of America v. Allen W. Stewart, in Nos. 98-1541 United States of America v. Allen W. Stewart, in Nos. 98-1716 United States of America v. Allen W. Stewart, in Nos. 98-1860 United States of America v. Allen W. Stewart, in Nos. 98-1968

    185 F.3d 112 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 16, 1999

    The court concluded that the government had satisfied the money laundering substitute asset provision because it demonstrated that qualified property, the $3 million Stewart withdrew from the Tartan Management account, had … Here, the government clearly traced laundered funds forfeited by the jury to Stewart's Account. Stewart does not contest this tracing, which in any event the government clearly established.

    Cited 96 timesPublished
  • O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia

    289 F. App'x 509 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 4, 2008

    If so, the court next determines whether the constitutional right in question was clearly established.” Couden, 446 F.3d at 492 (internal citations omitted). … immunity.

    Cited 4 timesUnpublished
  • Hector Ferrer v. Renetta Aikens

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 29, 2021

    The DCPP Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate any constitutional rights and, even if they did, these rights were not clearly established. … When determining whether qualified immunity is applicable, courts consider: 1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has shown make out a violation of a constitutional right”; and 2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Romeo v. Youngberg

    644 F.2d 147 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 24, 1980

    It takes place, for example, in areas of negligence law, immunity law, and admiralty law. … In order to appreciate the full problem posed by this case, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has recognized a common law of qualified immunity protecting officials and employees from civil liability for acts

    Vacated on other grounds by Youngberg v. Romeo Ex Rel. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)Cited 102 timesPublished
  • United States v. Abdul Williams

    176 F.3d 714 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 17, 1999

    Stated differently, where a particular § 843(b) conviction establishes that the defendant “committ[ed],” “caus[ed],” or “facilitated]” one of the acts enumerated in § 4B1.2(2), that conviction qualifies as a “controlled substance … Walton, 56 F.3d 551, 555-56 (4th Cir.1995) (“The distribution of cocaine is clearly a [‘controlled substance offense’]-”); Uni ted States v. Vea-Gonzales, 999 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1992).

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Kristen M. Good, as Co-Administrator Wwa of the Estates of Roland W. Good and Judith E. Good v. Ohio Edison Company, Defendant/third-Party v. United States of America United States Coast Guard, Third-Party

    149 F.3d 413 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 21, 1998

    it effect[§ is] intended also to narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity of entities [already] subject to sue-and-be-sued clauses." … Since the newly discovered evidence would not have clearly produced a different result if presented before the original judgment, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to alter its

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Nelson v. Hill

    211 F. App'x 88 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 20, 2006

    With respect to Claim III, the District Court found that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. … Second, a court must determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the official’s action. See id.

    Cited 1 timesUnpublished
  • Christ the King Manor Inc v. Secretary US Department of Hea

    Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 19, 2013

    The Federal Defendants argued that the APA claim was barred by sovereign immunity, but the District Court disagreed, concluding that the claim fell within the scope of the waiver of federal sovereign immunity provided for … “Dismissal of an action based upon sovereign immunity is subject to plenary review by this Court.” Blanciak v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • John J. Heffernan v. Robert W. Hunter, Prisoner Cv9408 Bochetto & Lentz, P.C. George Bochetto, Esq

    189 F.3d 405 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 26, 1999

    That, however, does not mean that he can successfully establish a right to recovery here. II. … Nor do we reach the defendants’ arguments raising the statute of limitations, qualified immunity, causation, or the First Amendment. 5 .

    Cited 109 timesPublished
  • Specter v. Garrett

    995 F.2d 404 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 14, 1993

    In my view, Congress clearly wanted to put an end to these delays, but our court, by allowing judicial review of base closings and realignments, is frustrating the implementation of Congress's intent. … While we do not regard Franklin as turning on sovereign immunity doctrine, we note that § 702 might not waive sovereign immunity in the situation there before the Court.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Griffin v. Harris

    571 F.2d 767 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 13, 1978

    THE RENT SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM Section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 1 established the rent supplement program. … district court, in granting summary judgment in favor of HUD, concluded: There can be no question that the Handbook policy fosters economic and social diversity in keeping with the will of Congress and its implementation is clearly

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Knoll v. Springfield Township School District

    699 F.2d 137 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 27, 1983

    That Code provision establishes a six-year limitations period for: Any civil action or proceeding which is neither subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter nor excluded from the application by a period of … Because appellant seeks relief from the school district and related officials for their unconstitutional actions in discriminating against her in her employment, she clearly brings “an action against any officer of any governmental

    Vacated on other grounds by Springfield Township School District v. Knoll, 471 U.S. 288 (1985)Cited 47 timesPublished
  • County Concrete Corporation v. Township Of Roxbury

    442 F.3d 159 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 31, 2006

    all seventeen individual defendants on the ground of absolute legislative immunity. … any, are entitled to legislative immunity.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Alfred R. Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, and Richard Kellman

    576 F.2d 495 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 12, 1978

    . 40 Instead, the Court established for such speech a qualified privilege defeasible only on proof of “actual malice” on the part of a defendant. 41 “Actual malice” is not at all synonymous with common law malice, which includes … Justices Black, Douglas and Goldberg urged that there should be a rule of absolute immunity for speech defaming public officials.

    Cited 87 timesPublished
  • Sally J. Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc

    318 F.3d 183 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 23, 2003

    Thus, “[a]n individual who is adjudged not to be ‘a qualified individual with a disability’ may still pursue a retaliation claim under the ADA.” Id. … There is clearly enough here to allow that decision to be made by a jury.

    Cited 350 timesPublished
  • Thomas Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank NA

    521 F. App'x 49 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 28, 2013

    The District Court concluded that Sheriff Provenzano is entitled to qualified immunity. … The District Court correctly found that the sale of the property did not violate any clearly established rights because the Sheriff acted pursuant to a valid state court judgment.

    Cited 38 timesUnpublished
  • United States v. Criden

    633 F.2d 346 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 10, 1980

    Recognition of the newsgatherers’ privilege surely does not carry with it the notion that reporters are immune from giving non-privileged evidence, or that, unlike all other witnesses, reporters need answer only those questions … Defendants quite clearly have no other source from which they can acquire this insight. The final criterion under Riley , relevance and importance to the particular proceeding, follows from the preceding discussion.

    Cited 49 timesPublished
  • Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines Inc.

    303 F.3d 293 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 9, 2002

    In addition, § 414 of the Federal Aviation Act required the CAB to immunize from the antitrust laws transactions specifically approved or necessarily contemplated by an order of approval under § 412, provided such immunity … Before the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, such immunity attached automatically under § 414 upon approval. Id.

    Cited 3 timesPublished

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