Case law

Cochran v. Pinchak

401 F.3d 184 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 15, 2005

There are two exceptions to Eleventh Amendment Immunity: (1) when a State specifically consents to being sued; or (2) when Congress abrogates immunity through legislation. Id. at 55-56 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 . … Here, Congress documented a pattern and practice of irrational discrimination against disabled persons and prisoners, and in response, exercised its prerogatives under § 5 to establish a prophylactic remedy.

Solomon v. Philadelphia Housing Authority

143 F. App'x 447 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 2, 2005

Stat. § 1544, this is not dispositive of the federal qualified immunity analysis. … is protected by qualified immunity.

Pickel v. Lancaster County Children

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 14, 2021

Qualified immunity shields officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” … In determining whether a right is clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity, we must first “define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity.” Peroza-Benitez v.

Pickel v. Lancaster County Children

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 14, 2021

Qualified immunity shields officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” … In determining whether a right is clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity, we must first “define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity.” Peroza-Benitez v.

Everett v. Schramm

772 F.2d 1114 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 6, 1985

Code Ann. tit. 31, § 502 (8) 6 and § 503(d) 7 , that authority for establishing the standard of need in accordance with the statutory definition was vested in the Department, and that the actual standard of need so established … Rev. 61 (1984); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum.L. Rev. 1889 (1983). Thus, in Hans v.

Moore v. Tartler

986 F.2d 682 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 1, 1993

A sentencing judge is required to establish minimum and maximum sentencing dates under 42 Pa.Cons. Stat.Ann. §§ 9756(a) and (b). … Because of our results, we do not to reach the issue of whether the parole board officials are entitled to qualified immunity.

Marcus Rosser v. Thomas Donovan

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 1, 2021

In assessing qualified immunity, a court asks “(1) whether the officer violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established, such that ‘it would [have been] clear to a reasonable officer that … violated here were clearly established at the time of the incident.

Daniel Melancon v. Amoco Production Co., Etc. v. Beraud Enterprises, Inc., Third Party Daniel Melancon and Tressella Aymond Melancon, and American General Fire & Casualty, Co., Intervenor-Appellant v. Amoco Production Co.

834 F.2d 1238 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 22, 1988

Amoco is not entitled to the costs incurred in establishing its indemnity claim against Beraud. … "[T]he indemnitee may not recover those costs and expenses incurred simply establishing the indemnities [sic] right to indemnification from the indemnitors." State v.

Coleman v. Keystone Freight Corp.

142 F. App'x 83 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 29, 2005

Discussion Coleman first claims that the District Court made and relied on clearly erroneous findings of fact. … Therefore, Coleman did not establish that he was a qualified individual who could perform the essential functions of his job with or without accommodation, and his argument must fail.

Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel

256 F.3d 120 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 11, 2001

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory … That is, Burley is entitled to qualified immunity only if she can show that a reasonable person in her position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that her conduct comported with

Kuhn v. Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis

119 F.2d 704 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 16, 1941

An incorrect conclusion by a trial court qualifies as a “clearly erroneous” finding, for the correction whereof on appeal Rule 52(a) specifically provides. … The assessment was based upon income received by the defendant from certain alimony trusts established by her former husband, one Fitzgerald, a subject of Great Britain.

Davidson v. O'Lone

752 F.2d 817 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 27, 1984

Because the Court decided that the defendants were entitled to prevail on the defense of qualified immunity as a matter of law, it did not reach the question on which certiorari was granted. 43 Thereafter, in Baker v. … Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (creating qualified immunity for public officials performing discretionary functions).

Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 19, 2006

The District Court determined that Scheidemantle was not qualified for the locksmith position according to the objective criteria listed in the position announcements, and consequently she could not establish a prima facie … Pa. 1981), aff’d, 681 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982) (concluding that, in order to establish a prima facie discrimination case, courts should look to the hiring decision to determine if the plaintiff was at least as qualified—not

Leckey v. Stefano

501 F.3d 212 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 31, 2007

Thus, her own admission establishes that she knew money was leaving the Trust in a form other than a qualified annuity by that time. … With regard to the Pension Plan, this finding is clearly erroneous.

Dreibelbis v. Young

351 F. App'x 711 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 29, 2009

as agents of the state court; and (5) did Defendants enjoy qualified immunity to the extent they acted in accord with the state judge’s directions? … Having found that Dreibelbis is unable to establish a violation of his federal rights, we need not reach the other issues raised in his appeal. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court. .

State of New Jersey Christine Todd Whitman William H. Fauver Leo Klagholz v. United States of America Janet Reno Doris Meissner Alice M. Rivlin

91 F.3d 463 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 29, 1996

The APA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States and allows for judicial review of federal agency actions in certain circumstances. 5 U.S.C. § 702 . … However, the reimbursement authorized under that statute is qualified by the phrase, “[sjubject to the amounts provided in advance in appropriation acts.”

United States v. Kolodner

204 F. 240 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 17, 1913

Clearly, the exception to the general rule should not be loosely construed, and no interpretation thereof should be indulged in, which is not warranted by express, language of the act, or, where the language is doubtful, … It cannot be claimed that the word “district” would have no force or effect if’ the qualifying adjective “judicial” be not read in with the provisions cited in section 4 and 10.

The Pittston Company Buffalo Mining Company Clinchfield Coal Company Eastern Coal Corporation Elkay Mining Company Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation Kentl And-Elkhorn Coal Corporation Meadow River Coal Company Pittston Coal Group Ranger Fuel Corporation v. United States of America, & Third Party v. Michael H. Holland, Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Plan Elliot A. Segal, Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund William P. Hobgood, Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund Marty D. Hudson, Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund Thomas O. S. Rand, Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund Gail R. Wilensky, Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund Carl E. Van Horn, Trustee of the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund, Third Party and the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association, Incorporated International Union, United Mine Workers of America, Parties in Interest

199 F.3d 694 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 27, 1999

It is well established in this circuit that "[d]elay alone, without prejudice, does not support the denial of a motion for leave to amend." Deasy v. … In doing so, it violates the established principle that when a statute waives sovereign immunity, it must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of preserving the government's immunity from suit

Colon v. Hart

941 F.2d 242 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 13, 1991

It deferred resolution of other relief, ordering briefing on the question of sovereign immunity. The district court dismissed an appeal from this order without prejudice as premature. … There the Court said: We are not inclined to adopt a disposition that requires the merits or nonmerits status of each attorney’s fees provision to be clearly established before the time to appeal can be clearly known.

Doe v. County of Centre, PA

242 F.3d 437 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 5, 2001

The District Court also held that the individual CYS officials were entitled to qualified immunity because any right the Does had was not clearly established, and, further , that County government entities were immune fr … The District Court agreed, holding that qualified immunity applied because the Does failed to show that the individual officials' conduct violated rights clearly established at the time the conduct occurred.