Case law

Green v. USX Corp.

843 F.2d 1511 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 29, 1988

Under the test urged upon this Court by USX, such a scheme would be immune from challenge. … We conclude that the district court’s opinion clearly included applicants for summer employment in the class to which USX was liable.

United States v. Thung Van Huynh

884 F.3d 160 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 6, 2018

After a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Paragraph 10 established Huynh’s total offense level at 20. … The dictionary defines “relocate” to mean “establish or lay out in a new place.”

Westmoreland Hospital Ass'n v. Blue Cross

605 F.2d 119 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 10, 1979

Under the Act, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) administers the mental health program under which these hospitals have qualified for federal grants by providing community mental health services. … Furthermore, federal removal procedure clearly requires that the initial pleading in the state court must set forth the basis for removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b).

Bertha M. Bittel v. Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare

441 F.2d 1193 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 14, 1971

This regulation does indicate that objective evidence of a disability should be given great weight, but clearly does not exclude consideration of objective factors. 5 . … Bittel’s symptomology in determining whether she was able to perform work for which she was qualified.

Turicentro, S.A. v. American Airlines Inc.

303 F.3d 293 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 9, 2002

In addition, S 414 of the Federal Aviation Act required the CAB to immunize from the antitrust laws transactions specifically approved or necessarily contemplated by an order of approval under S 412, provided such immunity … Before the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, such immunity attached automatically under S 414 upon approval. Id.

United States of America, v. Charles M. Hernandez

218 F.3d 272 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 29, 2000

We cannot agree, however, that the Certificates of Disposition conclusively establish the statute of conviction in this case. … In the absence of conclusive proof, we think the defendant is entitled to rely on certain easily produced court documents, such as a plea colloquy, in order to establish that he was not convicted of a statute qualifying as

Bright v. Westmoreland County

380 F.3d 729 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 24, 2004

(excluding Defendant Koschalk) violated any clearly established law which would require the court to find the individual Defendants qualifiedly immune. … lack of any clearly established law which required the individual Moving Defendants to arrest Koschalk would require the Court to find the individuals qualifiedly immune.

Charles W. Cousineau v. United States of America, Third-Party and v. Agricultural Insurance Company, Third-Party And

493 F.2d 692 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 14, 1974

and then to grant immunity to the latter. … to mortgagees, who are also granted immunity under § 17156.

Energy Mgt. P 26,389 Conoco Inc., a Delaware Corporation v. United States Department of Justice. Conoco Inc. v. United States Department of Energy

687 F.2d 724 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 25, 1982

Some legal positions may be unnecessarily trammeled or qualified out of an undue concern for appearances or as a result of a surfeit of caution. … The district court ordered the Department of Justice to release Document No. 3 finding that it did not qualify for exemption under § 552(b)(5).

Kathleen Wright-Gottshall v. State of New Jersey

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 26, 2024

The District Court also held that the Appellants had failed to show a clearly established right that was violated by the challenged state policies, so Murphy, Rabner, and Grant were entitled to qualified immunity for the … Exercising their sound discretion, courts may resolve questions of entitlement to qualified immunity by focusing on the “clearly established” prong of the inquiry.” Id. at 237–38.

Norman Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital Allegheny County Jail Camp Hill Prison United States of America, Intervenor

293 F.3d 103 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 7, 2002

Because Gray-son also sued the Hospital and SCI-Camp Hill, both of which are immune from liability, subsection (iii)—which applies to actions seeking "monetary relief against a defendant who is immune”—is also implicated. … Indeed, the Lopez majority concluded that there was no evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to change the dismissal procedures for non-prisoner indigent plaintiffs, even though that group is clearly

Mckay v. Heyison

614 F.2d 899 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 4, 1980

Such a denial of a motion for intervention of right is clearly appealable under the law in this circuit and does not depend on the merits of the motion. McClune v. … shall designate any other qualified physician.

Acierno v. Cloutier

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 7, 1994

a clearly established property interest. … In a recent discussion of the "clearly established" right aspect of the qualified immunity determination, we stated: The right an official is alleged to have violated must have been "clearly established" in a

Doe v. County of Centre, PA

242 F.3d 437 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 5, 2001

The District Court also held that the individual CYS officials were entitled to qualified immunity because any right the Does had was not clearly established, and, further , that County government entities were immune fr … The District Court agreed, holding that qualified immunity applied because the Does failed to show that the individual officials' conduct violated rights clearly established at the time the conduct occurred.

Sabree Ex Rel. Sabree v. Richman

367 F.3d 180 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 11, 2004

Although they qualify for state assistance to obtain these services under the Medicaid Act, that assistance has not been forthcoming. … There is no dispute that plaintiffs qualify for ICF/MR services under Pennsylvania’s medical assistance plan.

United States ex rel. Fear v. Rundle

506 F.2d 331 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 26, 1974

; and (2) even if the majority is correct in its interpretation of Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff has failed to establish “ordinary negligence” proofs sufficient to impose liability upon the defendants. . … Findings of fact are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous, F.R.Civ.P. 52(a), Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir. 1972), and thus cannot stand in the absence of an evidential basis. Thornton v.

Parker v. Montgomery County Correctional Facility

870 F.3d 144 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 29, 2017

As citizens, we may disagree with the congressional wisdom, but as judges, knowing the clearly stated legislative purpose, we may not disembowel the legislative act. … It is almost certain that Parker is indigent and, but for the three strikes rule, would qualify for IFP status. .

Miles v. Naval Aviation Museum Foundation, Inc.

289 F.3d 715 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 24, 2002

The district court's findings of fact must be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. Andrews v. United States, 121 F.3d 1430, 1438 (11th Cir.1997). IV. … The FTCA's waiver of immunity is subject to several exceptions, including a discretionary function exception. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)(1994).

County Concrete Corp. v. Township of Roxbury

442 F.3d 159 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 31, 2006

But United Artists did not apply the “shocks the conscience” standard to legislative action; rather, we clearly held in United Artists that “executive action violates substantive due process only when it shocks the conscience … immunity.

Leckey v. Stefano

501 F.3d 212 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 31, 2007

Thus, her own admission establishes that she knew money was leaving the Trust in a form other than a qualified annuity by that time. … With regard to the Pension Plan, this finding is clearly erroneous.