Case law

Christopher Davis v. Stephen Malitzki, Jr.

451 F. App'x 228 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 17, 2011

It offers not only immunity from liability, but ―immunity from suit.‖ Mitchell, 462 U.S. at 526 (emphasis omitted). Qualified immunity can be invoked through a motion for summary judgment or during trial. … established constitutional right . . .

United States v. Julio Aviles, Sr.

938 F.3d 503 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 12, 2019

Because the indictment clearly established that Aviles’s conviction had 7 included heroin as an element for each of his New Jersey convictions and because crimes involving heroin are felony … Because this type of “hybrid” statute is not addressed by Mathis and because we conclude that Aviles’s Maryland conviction clearly cannot qualify as a federal drug offense, we decline to address whether his second New Jersey

Sean Burke v. Edward Bachert

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 5, 2025

The District Court dismissed Appellants’ claims at summary judgment, holding qualified immunity applied as it was not clearly established whether the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement allows police … Appellants do not challenge the substance of the court’s immunity analysis.

United States v. Calabrese

942 F.2d 218 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 21, 1991

Every person on the master jury wheel is mailed a qualification questionnaire, which elicits information that would establish whether a juror is qualified under 28 U.S.C. § 1865 . … jurors is selected at random from the qualified wheel, and summoned to the court for jury service.

Thimons v. PNC Bank, N.A.

254 F. App'x 896 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 23, 2007

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Thimons must demonstrate: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions … The evidence established that Thimons’ responses during the interviews caused PNC to have a good faith and reasonable belief that Thimons may have committed fraud and he therefore no longer qualified for coverage under its

No. 98-1327

189 F.3d 353 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 18, 1999

testify. 11 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) prohibits a conspiracy formed "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities … "The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.

Fred Clayworth v. County of Luzerne

513 F. App'x 134 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 5, 2013

Qualified Immunity “The qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights … Because the Amended Complaint failed to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right, we need not address the issue of qualified immunity. 5  E.

Mierzwa v. United States

282 F. App'x 973 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 26, 2008

Whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-step inquiry: whether the Officers’ acts violated a constitutional or statutory right, and if they did, whether that right was clearly established at … Therefore, summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Defendants Officers Marsh, Stewart and Keating on the issue of qualified immunity. See Fed. R. Civ.

Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly

822 F.2d 388 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 30, 1987

The DCMP was approved in 1979, enabling Delaware to qualify for CZMA funding of program implementation. The DCMP was reapproved in 1980, 1982, and 1984. … This point is made most clearly in Philadelphia v.

Gamal Johnson, in No. 05-5029 v. Parole Agent David Knorr, Individually & as a Parole Officer for the Commonwealth of Penna. Parole Agent William Jones Individually & as a Parole Officer for the Commonwealth of Penna. Commonwealth of Penna. Dept. Of Probation & Parole Police Officer John Doe Individually & as a Police Officer for the City of Philadelphia Police Officer Richard Roe Individually & as a Police Officer for the City of Philadelphia City of Philadelphia. Gamal Johnson v. Parole Agent David M. Knorr, Individually & as a Parole Officer for the Commonwealth of Penna. Parole Agent William Jones, Individually & as a Parole Officer for the Commonwealth of Penna. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. Of Probation and Parole Police Officer John Doe, Individually & as a Police Officer for the City of Philadelphia Police Officer Richard Roe, Individually & as a Police Officer for the City of Philadelphia City of Philadelphia. David Knorr, in No. 05-5139

477 F.3d 75 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 14, 2007

from suit based on the principles of sovereign immunity. … Nevertheless, according to Johnson, as he asserted in his brief opposing Knorr's motion for summary judgment, the complaint and the subsequent motions "clearly advise[d] [Agent Knorr] of all of the facts of a constitutional

United States v. Brown University in Providence in the State of Rhode Island

5 F.3d 658 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 17, 1993

Our holding that the Overlap Agreement clearly implicates trade or commerce is consistent with Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. … Nor does it necessarily mean that commercially motivated conduct of such organizations should be immune from per se treatment.

In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In the Matter of Joques Egan

450 F.2d 199 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 14, 1971

Blue is clearly inapposite here. … Each of these cases raised questions regarding “use” immunity as distinguished from “transactional” immunity. .

Blake McSpadden v. William Wolfe

325 F. App'x 134 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 21, 2009

We now proceed to determine whether Appellant’s alleged right to a proper sentencing computation was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; if not, then Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity. … Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009) (holding that a federal court deciding qualified immunity issues has discretion to decide a case based solely on whether an alleged right was “clearly established”).

Edwin Soto-Santana v. Stephan Wengen

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 25, 2025

Accordingly, Officer Wengen would be entitled to qualified immunity. District of Columbia v. … Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (“[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established

Gardner v. Parson

874 F.2d 131 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 3, 1989

But the Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether a guardian ad litem is absolutely immune, nor is there an established commonlaw tradition of absolute immunity for court-appointed guardians. 59 In Kurzawa v. … This position clearly places him squarely within the judicial process to accomplish that goal." Id. at 1458 . 60 The Kurzawa court based its holding on the Supreme Court's decision in Briscoe v. LaHue, supra.

Cohen v. United States

722 F.3d 168 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 1, 2013

SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Courts cannot intelligently supervise the Commission‟s allocation of its staff‟s time, because although judges see clearly the claim an activity designed to be protective of the interest … Appellants cannot establish a “reasonable expectation that 16 discovery will reveal evidence of” any such policy. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

The Republic Of The Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation

43 F.3d 65 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 5, 1995

XI, Sec. 5 (1987) (Office of the Ombudsman established as independent office); In re Raul M. … The more modern, "restrictive" theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which was "largely codifi[ed]" by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (Republic of Argentina v.

Juvelis, Juvelis v. Snider

68 F.3d 648 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 10, 1995

A. 13 DPW maintains Niki neither is an "otherwise qualified" person, nor has been discriminated against because of his handicap. … DPW contends Niki is not "otherwise qualified" because he lacks the capacity to form the intent to establish Delaware County or Pennsylvania as his residence.

Joanie Alston v. Park Pleasant Inc

679 F. App'x 169 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 15, 2017

Medtronic, Inc., 844 F.3d 748, 756 (8th Cir. 2016) (agreeing, after the ADAAA, that cancer is an impairment qualifying as a disability because “the functioning of one’s immune system is a major life activity”). … the immune system.

Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States

846 F.2d 888 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 10, 1988

Whether (assuming Eagle-Picher’s claim is not foreclosed by the answer to question 1) Eagle-Picker, in order to support its claim, must, in addition to establishing that Mr. … Therefore, the government argues, if it is immune from direct suit, it is necessarily immune from a third-party suit.