Case law

United States v. Inadi, Joseph. Appeal of Joseph Inadi

748 F.2d 812 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 8, 1985

Counsel’s efforts here clearly do not constitute a “good faith effort” under Barber . … We do not deal with any exceptional circumstance where the trial judge has a record — for example, in the form of an affidavit — that clearly establishes that the declarant would claim the privilege and that requiring him

Stephen Conklin v. Kristine Anthou

495 F. App'x 257 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 30, 2012

We are otherwise unable to discern a clearly established constitutional right that Root‘s conduct violated. Contrary to Conklin‘s assertion, behavior in a courtroom setting is hardly ―unfettered.‖ Cf. … Thus, Root was entitled to be shielded by qualified immunity, at the very least. See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012).

Jose Suchite-Salguero v. Attorney General United States of America

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 14, 2025

The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that (1) the daughter’s birth did not qualify as new evidence because she was born while the appeal was pending, and (2) her birth did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief … Though the text does not identify clearly the forum in which “the former hearing” must have occurred, the statutory and regulatory context clearly answer that question: “the former hearing” refers to the last hearing before

Fagan v. City of Vineland

22 F.3d 1283 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 29, 1994

City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1499-500 (10th Cir.1992) (city can be liable if pursuing officers violate Constitution but escape liability because of qualified immunity); Garner v. … These appeals do not involve the doctrine of qualified immunity, which may enable an officer who has actually violated the Constitution to avoid liability. See Harlow v.

Makky v. Secretary Homeland

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 7, 2008

We held that we could review the merits of Stehney’s claims because Stehney had standing, and her claims were not barred by the political question doctrine or the doctrine of sovereign immunity. … Under that familiar test, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 13 discrimination by showing that: (1) s/he is a member of a protected class; (2) s/he was qualified for

Walker v. James

297 F. App'x 177 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 27, 2008

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages if the allegedly unconstitutional official action was objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established rules at the time the action … Even assuming that this asserted statutory right as applied to these circumstances is clearly established in a sufficiently “particularized” sense, see Anderson v.

Camphill Soltane v. Us Department of Justice Immigration & Naturalization Service

381 F.3d 143 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 26, 2004

II at 62-146. 2 Notwithstanding the supplemental submissions, the INS denied Camphill’s petition in February 2001, finding that Camphill had failed to establish that Goetze was to be employed in a religious occupation, as … The AAO clearly did not “consider[ ] all relevant [eviden-tiary] factors” in this case, Florida Power & Light Co. v.

Constitutional Guided Walking Tours v. Independence Visitor Center Corp.

454 F. App'x 118 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 6, 2011

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials „from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … The Supreme Court established a two-prong test for claims of qualified immunity in Saucier v.

Cooper v. SEPTA

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 26, 2008

Act 44 repealed the provisions in Chapter 13, implemented a new source of funding, and established a new financing scheme for entities applying for and receiving funding. 6 445 F.3d 227, 229 … The subfactors here do not point clearly in one direction. Certain attributes of SEPTA under state law weigh against immunity. Under its enabling statute, SEPTA has (1) a separate corporate existence, 74 Pa. Cons.

Glenn R. Mahone and Harvey L. Mahone v. David S. Waddle, Albert B. Ellway, Jr. And the City of Pittsburgh

564 F.2d 1018 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 24, 1977

Moreover, the City believes that it is immune from any section 1981 liability whatsoever. … The reason, of course, is that section 1343 vests jurisdiction only over “civil action[s] authorized by law” whereas a section 1983 action against a municipal defendant is clearly not “authorized by law.” 32A Aldinger v.

George W. Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Company

113 F.3d 433 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 8, 1997

Kodak argues that because Mitchell’s records contain no explicit doctor’s statement that “Mitchell was totally disabled as of June 26, 1989,” they fail to establish that Mitchell was in fact “totally disabled” by CFS on June … Gantz’s letter of August 18, 1994 clearly explains how those symptoms rendered Mitchell totally disabled from gainful work.

In the Matter of J.P. Fyfe, Inc. Of Florida v. Bradco Supply Corporation

891 F.2d 66 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 8, 1989

The record establishes such a finding. According to flollingsworth, Bradco and Fyfes had in the past conducted business on an open account basis. … In light of the failure of Bradco to establish that the new workout *72 arrangement complied with the ordinary course of business exception carved out by 11 U.S.C. § 547 (c)(2), we conclude that it was not clearly erroneous

Pineda v. Ford Motor Co.

520 F.3d 237 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 24, 2008

Pineda proffered Clauser as an expert to establish two points. … However, the Rule's balancing test clearly establishes a presumption against disclosure to the jury of otherwise inadmissible evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 703 advisory committee’s notes (2000 Amendments).

Carino v. Stefan

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 19, 2004

Court noted that “the legislative history of Viewed narrowly, this language could be § 301 clearly reveals Congress’ intent to said to only exempt union members from shield individual employees … attorneys employed by or hired arbitrate it is clearly incorrect.

United States v. Keith Mathis

264 F.3d 321 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 30, 2001

Loftus specifically rejected any notion that police officers would be immune to the psychological principles he described. With respect to the particular location of the gun, Dr. … Loftus was an extremely qualified, experienced academic presenting opinions on topics near the heart of his expertise. Moreover, Dr.

Torres v. United States

200 F.3d 179 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Dec 29, 1999

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions are`shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or … The inquiry when a defendant claims qualified immunity is "whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful, in light of the clearly established law and the information in the officer's

University of Pittsburgh v. United States

507 F.3d 165 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 2, 2007

According to the University, tenure fosters an environment of free inquiry because, once conferred, it affords faculty "rights and immunities," including immunity from termination except for cause or financial exigency. … United States, 435 U.S. 21, 25 , 98 S.Ct. 917 , 55 L.Ed.2d 82 (1978) (discussing the definition *176 of "wages" and noting "many items qualify as income and yet clearly are not wages").

Mitan v. United States Postal Inspection Service

656 F. App'x 610 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 27, 2016

immunity, the “clearly established” language in its ruling is almost certainly a reference to qualified immunity, a defense that Clark argued before the District Court and thereby preserved for appeal. … “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability” unless “the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established” — in other words, unless it can be said that “every reasonable official

Carr v. American Red Cross

17 F.3d 671 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Mar 4, 1994

The “conclusiveness” prong of the test clearly is satisfied inasmuch as the district court’s determination represented its final word on dismissal. … This certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal. .

Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.

618 F.3d 398 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 17, 2010

Second, it argued that it was immune from suit under the “combatant activities” exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. … Because the plaintiff maintained that her complaint was legally sufficient, and clearly signaled her intent to stand upon it, we treated the dismissal without prejudice as a final decision. Id.