Case law

Jackson v. Danberg

656 F.3d 157 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Sep 7, 2011

In Baze, the Supreme Court recognized “that subjecting individuals to a risk of future harm − not simply actually inflicting pain − can qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.” 553 U.S. at 49. … “Simply because an execution method may result in pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not establish the sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that qualifies as cruel and unusual

United States v. Raymond Isaac, A/K/A Rocky Raymond Isaac

134 F.3d 199 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jan 20, 1998

The practice of defining reasonable doubt by what it is not is well established. … We have repeatedly approved the practice of counseling jurors to view the testimony of accomplices and immunized witnesses with skepticism and caution, particularly when it is uncorroborated and material to establishing the

Jill Pizzola v. Kathryn Gordon

591 F. App'x 125 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 6, 2014

immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim, and because the Fifth Amendment claim is meritless.2 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from private suit when their conduct “does not violate … clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,”3 and protects those officials who make “reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”4 When addressing

Kaucher v. County of Bucks

455 F.3d 418 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 2, 2006

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (qualified immunity); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) (municipal liability). … See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”); Searles v. Se. Penn.

Bright v. Westmoreland County

380 F.3d 729 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Aug 24, 2004

(excluding Defendant Koschalk) violated any clearly established law which would require the court to find the individual Defendants qualifiedly immune. … Based upon this same analysis, the lack of any clearly established law which required the individual Moving Defendants to arrest Koschalk would require the Court to find the individuals qualifiedly immune.

Children's Seashore House v. Waldman

197 F.3d 654 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 30, 1999

Rather, r-4 is a definitional provision that describes certain procedures that a state must satisfy, such as submitting a qualifying plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services by a certain date to establish an adequate … Clearly Congress reached a decision about how much each individual state was entitled to receive and there is no evidence that it considered, in its calculation, that a state may be required to give away significant portions

Beverly S. Reese, Personal Representative of the Estate of James C. Reese, on Behalf of the Estate of James C. Reese and on Behalf of Beverly S. Reese, Surviving Wife of James C. Reese, Jamie L. Reese, Surviving Minor Daughter of James C. Reese, Leandra J. Reese, Surviving Minor Daughter of James C. Reese, Leandra J. Reese, Intervenor v. South Florida Water Management District, an Agency And/or Subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant-Third-Party v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Terrence C. Salt, as District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District, Thomas Taylor, Third-Party

59 F.3d 1128 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 27, 1995

The United States moved to dismiss both cases based on governmental immunity pursuant to 33 U.S.C. … The Tenth Circuit found that while the reservoir was operated by the Corps for flood control purposes, the United States was not entitled to immunity because the "requisite nexus" was not established between its operation

Jason Spears v. Pasquale Leporace

449 F. App'x 187 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Nov 3, 2011

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have … However, an immunity defense ordinarily fails where the law is clearly established, because “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Id.

United States v. Kenny

462 F.2d 1205 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 22, 1972

First, the competitive bidding process was perverted by a “pre-qualifi-cation” arrangement which enabled the defendants to exclude from bidding contractors unwilling to kick back. … The court clearly charged that each defendant had to be connected with this overall conspiracy. This case is like Blumenthal v. United States, supra, rather than like Kotteakos v.

Joseph P. Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. v. Non Destructive Testing Corp., Third-Party Linda A. Degirolamo v. New Jersey Transit Authority D/B/A New Jersey Transit, Felix E. Guzman v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Sidney Kinnear v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Kenneth G. Banta v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. v. Everette G. Whitenour, Christopher Middleton, Justine Smith, and Town of Dover, Third Party William Rockwell v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc. Robert K. Heaton v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., William P. McKenna v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Craig A. Conlon v. New Jersey Rail Operations, Inc., Laurence O'HallOran v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Dennis Martin v. New Jersey Transit Corporation & New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Robert G. Stocker, Sr. v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Clifford E. Williamson v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., David J. Chwaszczewski v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Philip Roxas v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Patrick J. Mueller v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Joseph L. Duffy v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Edward J. Fliller v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., James C. Harden, Jr. v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Lynn R. Stigliano Personal Representative of the Estate of John Paul Stigliano, Deceased v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Louis D. Ellis v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., Ashraf Ghobrial v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., William C. Hazelson v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., George Featherman v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.

873 F.2d 655 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 17, 1989

As the majority points out, the option to invest in the CMF, if relied on, would prove too much considering that other entities that place their funds in the CMF, such as counties, municipalities, and school districts, clearly … Plaintiff has not established that New Jersey has waived its immunity by "express language." See id.

Williams v. New Castle County

970 F.2d 1260 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jul 24, 1992

While the record does not establish that Delaware receives such funds, at oral argument before us in response to our inquiry, the county did not urge that Delaware did not receive the funds. … We are not to be understood as implying that a contention in a brief may substitute for an allegation in a complaint, for clearly it may not.

Carter v. Butz

479 F.2d 1084 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 29, 1973

They urge that the applicable administrative regulations and instructions establish a thirty-day statute of limitations on federal liability. … Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) it was determined that welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.

Treasurer State NJ v. US Dept Treas

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 27, 2012

Payment agents, ordinarily banks, are financial institutions qualified under Treasury regulations to pay sums due on savings bonds. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 315.2(j), 353.2(f). … Intergovernmental Immunity The Supreme Court‟s decision in McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 322, established the bedrock principle that “the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden

Loughney v. United States

839 F.2d 186 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 18, 1988

The Court decided that the FTCA, which established a limited waiver of sovereign immunity from suit, did not extend to “injuries to servicemen [or servicewomen] where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity … The Court reaffirmed each of the three rationales supporting the Feres doctrine and clearly instructed that Feres should be interpreted to “bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Government based upon service-related

United States v. Stephen A. Knox

977 F.2d 815 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Oct 15, 1992

We hold that such visual depictions qualify as an exhibition, and that this construction does not render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. … Clearly, Congress understood how to limit the statute’s scope to encompass only nude displays.

Nathan Clouser v. Todd Johnson

684 F. App'x 243 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 3, 2017

Adopting the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, the District Court determined that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had not violated any “clearly established” right under the Sixth … If none exists, it may be possible that a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” in the Courts of Appeals could clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity. Taylor v.

Becton Dickinson And Company v. Reinhard A. Wolckenhauer

215 F.3d 340 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Jun 6, 2000

Section 7426 clearly constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. … Ct. 1611 (1995) (holding that when confronted with a purported waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity, the Court will "construe ambiguities in favor of immunity"); United States v.

Commissioner v. Thompson

222 F.2d 893 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · May 27, 1955

There appears to be no dispute now that if a value of the contracts can be determined, they qualify as depreciable assets. … Their testimony clearly showed the elements which went into the formation of their opinions, and adequately supports the criticism of the Tax Court.

Laskaris v. Thornburgh

733 F.2d 260 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Apr 24, 1984

The court also held, although it did not need to do so, that Larson and Scheiner had established the defense of official immunity, see Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 , 100 S.Ct. 1920 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980); Scheuer v. … In view of our disposition of the case, we do not reach the issue of official immunity. .

Santana Products Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc.

401 F.3d 123 · Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Feb 9, 2005

(“[I]t is well established that courts have a duty to avoid passing upon a constitutional *131 question if the case may be disposed of on some other ground.”). … The length of the delay is a question of fact which is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Churma v. United States Steel Corp., 514 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir.1975).