Case law

Sanford v. State

331 Ark. 334 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Feb 5, 1998

Moreover, the State established that Sanford had been adjudicated a delinquent on two prior occasions. … Donald’s responses did not prevent her from being death qualified, but did indicate her propensity towards rendering a life sentence instead of the death penalty.

Ward v. State

298 Ark. 448 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Apr 24, 1989

Accordingly, the jury was death qualified. … The trustworthiness of the proffered testimony was clearly established by the extremely incriminating character of these statements.

Spencer v. State

348 Ark. 230 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Apr 18, 2002

Clearly, the evidence of Spencer’s guilt was so overwhelming as to render harmless any error that may have been committed by allowing the introduction of Brown’s testimony. … Persons comprising the venire are presumed to be unbiased and qualified to serve, and the burden is on the party challenging a juror to prove actual bias. Taylor v. State, 334 Ark. 339 , 974 S.W.2d 454 (1998).

Bean v. Humphrey

223 Ark. 118 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Feb 15, 1954

But there is a distinction between a public office and a public employment which is not always clearly marked by judicial expression and is frequently shadowy and difficult to trace. … He was a nonresident when appointed, and at the time could not even qualify as an officer.

Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co.

338 Ark. 410 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jul 15, 1999

The ad, placed by Kraft Tool Company of Kansas, sought an individual highly qualified in the manufacturing of hand tools. … Thus, it has become equally well-established that reasonable post-employment restrictive covenants are not in restraint of trade. Roger M.

Aven v. Wilson

61 Ark. 287 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Nov 23, 1895

Hinton, his successor, qualified, and entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office. … These omissions clearly show that the statutes relied on were never intended to prescribe the only proceeding that shall be followed in contests for elections, but left other statutes consistent with them, and appropriate

Ark. La. Gas Company v. Wood

240 Ark. 948 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 23, 1966

For reversal appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for defendant because appellee wholly failed to establish that appellant used more of the property than was reasonably necessary and … Commenting on this provision the Oklahoma court stated: ‘ ‘ Clearly this does not mean that lessee was entitled to use water from the private pond or tank of the lessor, hut means water produced hy lessee hy drilling wells

Rodgers v. State

261 Ark. 293 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Mar 14, 1977

The admissibility of such a report has been established by this Court in Nail v. State, 231 Ark. 70 , 328 S.W. 2d 836 (1959). In Downs v. … There is no contention by the appellant that the death penalty jury was improperly qualified under the guidelines established in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).

Spradlin v. Arkansas Ethics Commission

314 Ark. 108 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jul 19, 1993

Rogers, supra , which is clearly distinguishable. In Martin v. … not clearly erroneous; and, accordingly, appellants' challenge to Mr.

McGrew v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Arkansas, Inc.

371 Ark. 567 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Nov 29, 2007

Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that coverage was clearly excluded under the policy. The Zulpos, however, contended that the policy provisions were ambiguous. … The exclusion of activities normally performed by minors from the definition of business was further qualified by the phrase “unless the activity is your full time occupation.”

Ligon v. Walker

297 S.W.3d 1 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Mar 12, 2009

The special judge’s findings of fact are accepted by this court unless they are clearly erroneous. Dunklin, supra; Ligon v. Price, 360 Ark. 98 , 200 S.W.3d 417 (2004). … Therefore, even if, as Walker argues, a mental disorder could serve as a defense to a disbarment proceeding, Walker’s proof fell short of establishing such a defense.

Union Pacific Railroad v. Vickers

308 S.W.3d 573 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 7, 2009

The named plaintiff, Williamson, argued that there were issues in common for each sales person, such as the fact that they all qualified for the bonus program, they were all Sanofi-Winthrop employees, and none of them received … Clearly, there is “no one set of operative facts,” see Baker v. Wyeth-Ayerst, 338 Ark. at 247 , 992 S.W.2d at 800 , that establishes Union Pacific’s liability to any given class member.

Junction City School District v. Alphin

313 Ark. 456 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 14, 1993

Similarly, in the case before us, joint liability was clearly lacking. The School District was sued for debt for failure to pay salary increases as mandated by statute. … It is clear to us that the School District is required to pay certified personnel an amount equal to 56 percent of its increase in net current revenue, and if it does not do so, it does not qualify for state aid.

Transport Co. v. Champion Transport, Inc.

298 Ark. 178 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Mar 6, 1989

. § 23-13-224 (1987), states that: [A] permit for a contract carrier by motor vehicle shall be issued to any qualified applicant if it is found that the applicant is fit, willing, and able to properly perform the service … Moreover, the need appears to have been clearly established, among other things, by the testimony of the shipper that it would have to discontinue shipping by motor carrier if the application were not approved.

Spear v. State

184 Ark. 1047 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Dec 21, 1931

The county contained 37 townships and several thousand qualified electors, and none of the affiants testified as to any prejudice except in a few of these townships and as to a limited number of people. … in passing upon questions of this kind, and it must always be assumed that his rulings are based upon a fair and impartial consideration of the questions before him, and his decision ought not to be disturbed unless it clearly

Edmundson v. Estate of Fountain

358 Ark. 302 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jul 1, 2004

Surely, rules governing the probate of holographic wills qualify as those governing the decent of property. … In a seminal decision on the issue, we held that extrinsic evidence was admissible to establish testamentary intent of a purported holographic will: Review of our cases clearly indicates that our courts have customarily admitted

The Money Place, LLC v. Barnes

349 Ark. 518 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 27, 2002

P. 23 to establish the necessity for handling this matter as a class action. A hearing was held on June 22, 2001, at which counsel presented arguments to the court. … Rule 23(a). 2 The first of these challenges addresses the issue of adequacy under Rule 23(a)(4), and this court has previously interpreted Rule 23(a)(4) to require three elements: (1) the representative counsel must be qualified

McCuen v. Harris

321 Ark. 458 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jul 17, 1995

The chancery court clearly had no power to invoke its jurisdiction in such election matters or political rights issues. … Section 16-123-103(a) provides that a governmental entity or person who, under color of law, deprives any person of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Arkansas Constitution, shall be liable “in an action of

Isom v. State

356 Ark. 156 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Feb 19, 2004

At times, the judge clearly did not believe that additional questions would be productive or beneficial. … This argument was not made to the circuit judge and as a result does not qualify for this court’s review.

Jerry Lard v. State of Arkansas

595 S.W.3d 355 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Mar 12, 2020

After Lard requested waiver of his postconviction remedies, the circuit court ordered him to undergo competency testing by a disinterested psychiatrist or qualified psychologist. Dr. … Further, he established that his trial counsel had not 10 made the pretrial filing required by section 5-4-618.