Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Ouachita Industries v. Anderson

    236 Ark. 929 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Sep 30, 1963

    They are clearly terms of limitation, when used in an indorsement on a negotiable instrument. Compare Reynolds v. Shaver, 59 Ark. 299 .” … Instruments Law of Arkansas pertaining to restrictive indorsements, and particularly where the same language is used as was in this present indorsement, ‘all my right, title and interest,’ are in effect re-enactments of the well established

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Terry v. White

    374 Ark. 366 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Oct 2, 2008

    At that time, counsel for White and Sugg indicated an intent to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity. … He argues that comments made at the hearing establish the lack of clarity of the discovery ruling.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Rhodes v. Driver

    69 Ark. 606 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Nov 2, 1901

    Driver, was duly elected clerk of the circuit court of Mississippi county at the general election held oh the 3d day of September, 1900; that he was duly commissioned, qualified, and is now acting as such clerk; that J. … “Ho principle of the law of injunctions, and perhaps no doctrine of equity jurisprudence, is more definitely fixed or more clearly established than that courts of equity will not interfere by injunction to determine questions

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • In re Bailey

    299 Ark. 352 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jul 3, 1989

    The doctors’ testimony, however, did not establish that the remaining two requirements, findings with respect to adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning, had been included in the evaluation. … We will not reverse such a finding unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, or clearly erroneous. ARCP Rule 52.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Hess v. Treece

    286 Ark. 434 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jul 15, 1985

    Hess argues that as a private citizen he was privileged to complain to authorities about the conduct of public officials, and that as a member of the Board of Directors he was entitled to a qualified immunity for discretionary … The claim of immunity is, however, subject to the requirement of good faith, and the question of good faith is one for the jury. McMillion v. Armstrong, 238 Ark. 115, 119 , 378 S.W.2d 670, 673 (1964).

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Larry Walther, Director, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; Andrea Lea, State Auditor; Dennis Milligan, State Treasurer; And the Central Arkansas Planning and Development District v. Mike Wilson

    600 S.W.3d 554 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 14, 2020

    With regard to costs and attorney’s fees, the State argued that these claims were barred by sovereign immunity. … Accordingly, the record establishes that the circuit court considered this factor.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Kristina Gulley v. State of Arkansas Ex Rel. Larry Jegley, Sixth Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney And Pulaski County, Arkansas, Ex Rel. Barry Hyde, Pulaski County Judge

    2023 Ark. 70 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Apr 27, 2023

    She also contended that the docket sheet evidence was insufficient to establish a conviction within the meaning of article 5, section 9 of the Arkansas Constitution when she presented competing evidence that there had been … The discovery that there were no qualified candidates in the 2022 election created a vacancy. This vacancy should be addressed forthwith.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Redd v. Sossamon

    315 Ark. 512 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jan 18, 1994

    § 14-14-917 (d) (1987), in part, provides: If the board of election commissioners fails or refuses to submit a proposed initiative or referendum ordinance when it is properly petitioned and certified as sufficient, the qualified … Undoubtedly, he is not attempting to enforce a right that is already clearly established.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Fort Smith School District v. Beebe

    322 S.W.3d 1 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 4, 2009

    could be granted; (3) the claims are barred by res judicata; (4) some of Appellants’ claims are not ripe for adjudication; (5) Appellants’ complaint failed to name necessary and indispensable parties; and (6) the State is immune … The EETF was established in 1991 by Act 10, as amended, and is currently codified | isat Ark.Code Ann. §§ 6-5-301 et seq. (Repl.2007).

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Ragland v. Arkansas Valley Coal Services, Inc.

    275 Ark. 108 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Feb 8, 1982

    A taxpayer must clearly establish his right to an exemption. If there is any doubt as to that right, the exemption must be denied. S.H. & J. Drilling Corp. v. Qualls, 268 Ark. 71 , 593 S.W. 2d 178 (1980); Gaddy v. … Arkansas Valley has not clearly established its right to the exemption allowed by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-3106 (D) (2). Reversed. The statute then in effect, Act 487 of 1949, § 6, was amended in 1955, after Scurlock v.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • King v. Ochoa

    373 Ark. 600 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 5, 2008

    This appeal arises from an order of the Pope County Circuit Court ruling that Appellant Scott Dale King (“King”) did not qualify as an individual who may adopt minor child J.M.K. (“the child”) under Ark. … As stated above, the statute clearly states that King is eligible to adopt the child, and we should not interpret the statute to say something that it clearly does not. See Parsons, supra.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Archer v. Sigma Tau Gamma Alpha Epsilon, Inc.

    362 S.W.3d 303 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jan 14, 2010

    of alcohol to a clearly intoxicated person. … While the Archers attempt to establish that Moore was not a person who could lawfully possess alcohol because he was clearly intoxicated, the only statute that establishes liability for the sale of alcohol to a clearly intoxicated

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Reamey v. Watt

    240 Ark. 893 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 23, 1966

    Appellants attack the proof offered on this point, asserting that the witnesses based their opinion on a township map, which was not established to be correct. 4 However, appellants admit that the signatures were not acquired … Act 368 of 1947 (Section 78-1401) clearly and unequivocally provides that efforts to obtain an election creating a stock law district are commenced by the petition of 25% of the qualified electors, residing within each township

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee

    351 Ark. 31 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Nov 21, 2002

    Clearly, those acts involved new and different issues to be argued and decided. … In these limited circumstances where the State waived its immunity, the majority court was correct in awarding fees, and, in doing so, utilizing the established factors set out in Chrisco v.

    Cited 88 timesPublished
  • Jackson v. Ivory

    353 Ark. 847 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 26, 2003

    Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Spears v. … In Swink, the court interpreted the accountant-immunity statute, which is analogous to the attorney-immunity statute.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Mears v. City of Little Rock

    256 Ark. 359 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Apr 8, 1974

    legislature, when it intends to repeal a statute, may be expected to do so in express terms or by the use of words which are equivalent to an express repeal, and an intent to repeal by implication, to be effective, must appear clearly … We need say no more to establish that the act is invalid. Affirmed. Another conflict is found in Ark. Stat.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Hopkins v. City of Brinkley

    432 S.W.3d 609 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Apr 3, 2014

    At one time, the clearly-unwarranted-invasion-of-privacy exemption was not limited to personnel records. … Rather, any information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy was not considered to be a part of the public record.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Wilburn v. State

    317 Ark. 73 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 16, 1994

    In reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit an identification, we make an independent review of the totality of the circumstances, and we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. … The State established that Gilpin was the manager of the motel at the time she determined the amount of cash taken in the robbery, that she was the custodian of the records at that time, and that they fairly and accurately

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Ingle v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

    449 S.W.3d 283 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Nov 13, 2014

    In the opinion, we reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded with a qualified instruction for the court to return custody of the child to Ingle. … At no point in the proceedings below.did Ingle argue that DHS was required to initiate a new petition and to establish probable cause for the child’s immediate removal from her custody.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Carmichael v. Saint

    16 Ark. 28 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jan 15, 1855

    This being the case, it is clearly prima faaie evidence of the plaintiff’s right to sue; and, as such, fully sufficient, unless successfully attacked and avoided by legitimate matter of defence introduced by the defendant … "We entertain no doubt of the sufficiency of the proof to establish the plaintiff’s right to sue, and that consequently the court below erred in ruling’ otherwise.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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