Case law

Dodson v. Allstate Insurance

345 Ark. 430 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 28, 2001

The burden of proof in establishing jury misconduct is on the moving party. Id. … This pleading clearly alleges that Dodson was performing illegal, fraudulent acts.

Harger v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.

195 Ark. 107 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Dec 6, 1937

county in which there may be property or debts owing to the defendant. ’ ’ Inclusion of this provision, brought forward into current digests from the Civil Code as a venue statute, and reference therein to the “defendant,” clearly … This statement of the law is qualified by a holding that the process must be bona fide, and not collusive. The “defendant” in this case, so served in an adjoining county, was a corporation.

Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Schroder

353 Ark. 885 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jul 3, 2003

Schroder, and (3) the purchase of the annuity was made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid benefits. … Clearly, the only issue considered and decided by the hearing officer was the issue of whether or not the annuity was a countable asset.

Central Surety Fire Corporation v. Williams

213 Ark. 600 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 7, 1948

But the Alabama court used this language: “ . . . the doctrine is well established that, where the owner intends to transfer not the possession merely, but also the title to the property, although induced thereto by the fraud … In the contract or indemnity in question the word ‘stolen’ is not qualified by the context, and it must be given its usual and ordinary meaning.

Gardner v. State

296 Ark. 41 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 20, 1988

The protections of the Fifth Amendment do not extend to demonstrative, physical tests, but are intended to immunize the defendant from providing the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. … Here, a clear chain of custody had been established as to the tan bag itself, and there was absolutely no evidence of tampering with the bag or its contents.

Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc.

256 Ark. 584 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 20, 1974

The right to offer such evidence, or to have evidence offered by either party considered by the factfinder in considering damages, is clearly indicated by the quotation from Van Winkle. … established.

Southeast Power & Light Co. v. McCarroll

200 Ark. 565 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 6, 1940

We are clearly of the view, therefore, that appellant is liable for the tax in question. Appellant, however, earnestly insists that the opinion of this court in the recent case of McCarroll v. … But it is plain that the business which appellant carries on in Minnesota, or directs from its offices maintained there, is sufficiently identified with Minnesota to establish a ‘commercial domicile’ there, and to give a

Mega Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Jacola

330 Ark. 261 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Oct 16, 1997

Rather, we clearly enunciated that neither the trial court nor the appellate court may delve into the merits of the underlying claim when determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied. Id. … Thus, we hold that the first and second elements of the adequacy requirement have been established. Finally, in order to establish adequacy, the representative must show some minimal interest in the case.

Arnold v. Arnold

261 Ark. 734 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 6, 1977

Shortly thereafter, the Alexanders went to Florida and contact was established between the couples. … She would have been entitled to an undivided oné-half interest in a farm valued by an apparently well qualified real estate appraiser at $118,000. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 61-206 (Repl. 1971).

Rosenow v. Alltel Corp.

358 S.W.3d 879 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jan 21, 2010

Moreover, commonality is satisfied where “the defendant’s acts, independent of any action by the class members, establishes a common question relating to the entire class.” Id. … Clearly, the reasoning by the circuit court goes well beyond the procedural issues of whether there are any common issues and whether those common issues predominate.

Greene v. State

317 Ark. 350 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 20, 1994

The manner in which the murder was committed qualifies as in an especially cruel manner based on either the serious physical abuse circumstance or the mental anguish circumstance. … The evidence also establishes that appellant intended to inflict mental anguish on the victim and did so prior to killing him.

Miller v. State

362 S.W.3d 264 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jan 7, 2010

This rule clearly permits the use of an expanded questionnaire. … To qualify as an abuse of discretion, the trial court must have acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id.

Henderson v. State

349 Ark. 701 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jul 5, 2002

Henderson failed to establish even the initial element of an “affirmative showing.” … Merely fifing the motion does not qualify as an “affirmative showing” that the defense was unaware of the misconduct at trial. See Owens, supra.

Cherepski v. Walker

323 Ark. 43 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jan 16, 1996

Bishop McDonald additionally asserted that the claim for clergy malpractice was not recognized in Arkansas and that the claims were barred by the First Amendment, the doctrine of charitable immunity, and the statute of limitations … To establish a claim for outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the

Smith v. Hansen

323 Ark. 188 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jan 22, 1996

At the ensuing criminal trial for Young, the Smiths and Metcalf testified, as did Hansen and Rice under promise of immunity. … Clearly, no special relationship existed between Hansen and Rice and the Smiths at the time of the beating.

Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board; Lona McCastlain, in Her Official Capacity as the Chairwoman of the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board; The Arkansas Division of Correction; Dexter Payne, in His Official Capacity as the Director of the Arkansas Division of Correction; And Tim Griffin, in His Official Capacity as the Attorney General of Arkansas v. Jodeci K. Norvel

2025 Ark. 63 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 8, 2025

Here, appellants argue that the circuit court erred in finding that Act 683 required Norvel’s sentencing order to cite the code section to establish that he was sentenced under section 16-93-609. … The sentencing order in the present case does not cite section 16-93-609, nor does it clearly or unmistakably represent that Norvel was sentenced under that section.

Childress v. State

322 Ark. 127 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Oct 16, 1995

Subsequently the State granted her immunity, but still she refused to testify. … Given these specific facts, we cannot say the trial court’s finding of fact was clearly erroneous. D.

Shannon v. Wilson

329 Ark. 143 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jun 23, 1997

Leggett, 373 So.2d 494 (La.1979) (there should not be civil immunity for alcoholic retailers even when there is no dramshop statute); Massachusetts: Adamian v. … Clearly, the public policy expressed by the General Assembly in the regulation of the retail liquor industry and in the criminalization of the sale of liquor to persons under twenty-one has not been extended by that body

Hill v. Bush

19 Ark. 522 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Jan 15, 1858

answer on this point, though his testimony has that tendency, as far as positive assertions can do so: but when the entire body of his testimony is considered, we are rather inclined to believe that the assertions are so qualified … The answer not being overturned by evidence om> this point, and it clearly appearing from the proof, that if such representation had, in truth, been made, as charged in the bill, the appellant did not rely on it, but chose

Smith v. State

303 Ark. 524 · Supreme Court of Arkansas · Nov 5, 1990

We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by excluding the thirty days during which the defendant’s motion to suppress was under advisement. … First, in conformanee with the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity.