Dove v. Gainer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

MARLENA DOVE, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:22-cv-00754-SGC

)

EVERETT C. GAINER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER1

This is a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

Marlena Dove and Darda Dove assert claims of negligence, wantonness, and

negligent training and supervision against Everett C. Gainer and Crete Carrier

Corporation. (Doc. 1).2 Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion for

partial summary judgment. (Doc. 25). The defendants seek summary judgment in

their favor on the plaintiffs’ claims for wantonness and negligent training and

supervision. (Id.). For the reasons stated below, the motion is due to be granted,

and the plaintiffs’ claims for wantonness and negligent training and supervision are

due to be dismissed with prejudice.

1 The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 15).

2 Citations to the record refer to the document and page numbers assigned by the court’s CM/ECF

I. Material Facts

The accident that forms the basis of this action occurred on a two-lane stretch

of I-20 East on April 14, 2020. (Doc. 26-1 at 26-29). Marlena and Darda were

traveling in the left lane in a pickup truck. (Doc. 26-1 at 27, 29). Marlena was

driving, and Darda was her passenger. (Doc. 26-1 at 27). Gainer was traveling in

the right lane in a tractor-trailer. (Doc. 26-1 at 29). Gainer began merging into the

left lane and, as he did so, locked eyes with Marlena in his driver-side mirror. He

continued merging, and the tractor-trailer and pickup truck collided. (Doc. 26-1 at

28-30).4 Marlena believes Gainer hit her on purpose because “drivers do it all the

time” to prevent other drivers from getting in front of them. (Doc. 26-1 at 42).5 She

conceded when pressed that she did not know why Gainer would have wanted to

cause his vehicle to collide with hers because she was “not in his mind.” (Doc. 26-

1 at 42).

Gainer had been a commercial truck driver for six years at the time of the

accident. (Doc. 26-3 at 11, 26-27). He had never been cited for a moving violation.

3 The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. They are viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-movants, with the non-movants given the benefit of all reasonable inferences.

4 Gainer remembers things differently. He testified Marlena was trying to pass him and collided

with his tractor-trailer when she prematurely entered his lane of travel. (Doc. 26-3 at 57-70).

However, the court credits Marlena’s version of events for present purposes because, as stated, the

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movants when ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.

5 Marlena and Darda are commercial truck drivers, themselves. (Doc. 26-1 at 15; Doc. 26-2 at

12).

He did once damage the driver-side door of a commercial vehicle when the door

made contact with a fence as he was backing out of a property. (Doc. 26-3 at 33-

39). Additionally, he had been reprimanded and counseled for driving in excess of

the hours allowed by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, known as an

hours-of-service violation. However, he was within the hours-of-service limitations

at the time of the accident. (Doc. 26-3 at 87-91).

II. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he [district] court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party seeking

summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the record the party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party carries its initial burden, the non-movant must

go beyond the pleadings and come forward with evidence showing there is a genuine

dispute as to a material fact for trial. Id. at 324.

The substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are

irrelevant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 248. If the

evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment is

appropriate. Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted). All reasonable doubts about

the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-movant, and all justifiable inferences

should be drawn in the non-movant’s favor. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d

1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

III. Discussion

A. Wantonness Claim

“To hold a defendant liable for wanton conduct in Alabama, a plaintiff must

establish a high degree of culpability.” Craft v. Triumph Logistics, Inc., 107 F. Supp.

3d 1218, 1220 (M.D. Ala. 2015). “While negligent conduct is characterized by

inattention, thoughtlessness, or heedlessness and a lack of due care, wantonness is

characterized by a conscious act.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Wantonness requires proof of “the conscious doing of some act or the

omission of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious

that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.” Ex

parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007) (citing Bozeman v. Central Bank of the

South, 646 So. 2d 601, 603 (Ala. 1994)). The “most crucial” element of a

wantonness claim is knowledge injury will likely or probably result from an act or

omission. Roberts v. Brown, 384 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Ala. 1980). “Knowledge need

not be proven directly but may be inferred from the facts of the case.” Klaber v.

Elliott, 533 So. 2d 576, 579 (Ala. 1988). But the inference must be a legitimate one.

Roberts, 384 So. 2d at 1048. “[I]t may not be left to the conjecture or speculation of

the jury.” Id.

Evidence a driver actually saw a vehicle slowing in front of him at a yellow

or red light and accelerated toward the vehicle is sufficient to submit the question of

wantonness to a jury. T&J White, LLC v. Williams, 375 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (Ala.

2022). By contrast, evidence a driver simply failed to look to his left before merging

into the left lane is not sufficient to submit the question of wantonness to a jury.

Craft, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1221-23. The evidence on which the wantonness claim

asserted by Marlena and Darda hinges is Marlena’s testimony Gainer locked eyes

with her in his driver-side mirror as he was merging into the left lane (her lane).6

This testimony does not show Gainer realized Marlena and Darda were in the left

lane before he started merging into the left lane and proceeded with the lane change

anyway. At most, it shows that after Gainer became aware Marlena and Darda were

in the left lane, he did not attempt to reverse the course he already had set in motion.

As such, the evidence falls somewhere in between the evidence held sufficient to

support a wantonness claim in T&J White and the evidence held insufficient to

support a wantonness claim in Craft but, in the court’s estimation, decidedly closer

6 Marlena’s testimony she personally believed Gainer hit her on purpose because “drivers do it all

the time” to prevent other drivers from getting in front them is not competent evidence of Gainer’s

state of mind at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs cannot rely on a generalization to establish

the knowledge element of their wantonness claim. Marlena herself conceded as much when she

testified she did not know why Gainer would have wanted to cause his vehicle to collide with hers

because she was “not in his mind.” (Doc. 26-1 at 42).

to the latter. The court does not believe a reasonable jury could infer from Marlena’s

testimony that Gainer knew he was engaging in a maneuver likely or probable to

injure Marlena or Darda.

B. Negligent Training and Supervision Claim

Under Alabama law, the torts of negligent training and supervision require a

plaintiff to show an employer knew or should have known its employee was

incompetent. See, e.g., Buckentin v. SunTrust Mortg. Corp., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1273,

1288 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (negligent supervision); Armstrong Bus. Servs. v. AmSouth

Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 682 (Ala. 2001) (negligent supervision); Big B, Inc. v.

Cottingham, 634 So. 2d 999, 1002-03 (Ala. 1993) (negligent training and

supervision), abrogated on other grounds recognized by Horton Homes, Inc. v.

Brooks, 832 So. 2d 44 (Ala. 2001). A driver is incompetent if he is “unable or

unlikely to [] operate[] [a] motor vehicle with reasonable safety due to one of several

characteristics or conditions, including general incompetence or habitual

negligence.” Edwards v. Valentine, 926 So. 2d 315, 322 (Ala. 2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “More specifically, proof may be established by evidence

of previous acts of negligent or reckless driving, previous accidents, or previous acts

of driving while intoxicated.” Id. (internal quotation marks, punctuation, and

emphasis omitted); see also Halford v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, 921 So. 2d 409,

413-14 (Ala. 2005) (“[T]he incompetence of a driver is measured by the driver’s

demonstrated ability (or inability) to properly drive a vehicle.”).

The evidence shows Gainer at fault for no more than one accident in the six

years he had worked as a commercial truck driver as of April 2020, and while he had

been reprimanded and counseled for hours-of-service violations, he was within the

hours-of-service limitations at the time on the accident. This is not sufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Gainer’s competence as a driver.

See, e.g., Thompson v. Havard, 235 So. 2d 853, 857 (Ala. 1970) (“ ‘[P]roof of only

one previous traffic violation is grossly inadequate to establish incompetency.’’’)

(quoting Broesche v. Bullock, 427 S.W. 2d 89, 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968)); Vines v.

Cook, 2015 WL 8328675, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 8, 2015) (holding that, as a matter

of law, one speeding ticket and one accident did not render commercial driver

incompetent). Moreover, the plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. They do not

oppose the dismissal of their negligent training and supervision claims. (Doc. 31 at

1 n.1).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment (Doc. 25) is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs’ claims for wantonness and

negligent training and supervision are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

DONE this 6th day of May, 2024.

STACI G. CORNELIUS

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE