The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
)
Debra Nevins,
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. 7:23-cv-01037-LSC
)
DCH Health Systems [The )
DCH Health Care Authority], et )
al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Courtney Wingo, Felicia Ellison, and Rebekah
Boutwell’s (hereinafter “Individual Defendants”) Motion for More Definite
Statement. (Doc. 35.) Under Rule 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite
statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so
vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(e). Even if a court has determined that the complaint should withstand a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it still “may well be that [plaintiff’s]
complaint as now drawn is too vague.” Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d
126, 130 (5th Cir. 1959)1 (quoting Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.A. 231,
1 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent decisions issued by the Fifth Circuit prior
to October 1, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
235 (1959)). For instance, if the plaintiff’s complaint is a shotgun pleading, that is a
reason to require a more definite statement of the complaint. See Beckwith v.
Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 146 F. App’x 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005).2
But “it is clearly the policy of the [Federal] Rules that Rule 12(e) should not
be used to frustrate” the policy of Rule 8, Mitchell, 269 F.3d at 132, which only
requires a “short and plain statement,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[A] motion for more
definite statement is not to be used to assist in getting the facts in preparation for
trial as such. Other rules relating to discovery . . . exist for this purpose.” Mitchell,
269 F.3d at 132.
In support of their Motion for a More Definite Statement, the Individual
Defendants argue: 1) the Amended Complaint is not clear as to which counts are
asserted against which defendants; 2) each count of the Amended Complaint
improperly incorporates each preceding paragraph; and 3) Count VI is
impermissibly vague because it does not contain sufficient factual allegations.
As to the first two arguments, the Court agrees. The Amended Complaint does
not specify which counts are asserted against which defendant, and the first
paragraph of each count does “re-allege[] all paragraphs of the complaint as if set
out fully herein.” (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 94, 108, 129, 184, 208, 263.) Both of these
2 While opinions from the Federal Appendix are not binding on this Court, these opinions can be
persuasive authority.
characteristics make the Amended Complaint a quintessential shotgun pleading. See
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1331–33 (11th Cir.
2015). Accordingly, Plaintiff must provide a more definite statement to address these
deficiencies.
As to the Individual Defendants’ third argument, the Court agrees in part. As
the Court addressed in the previous Memorandum of Opinion, it is clear that Count
VI does not state a claim for slander per se. (Doc. 17 at 3.) But to the extent that
Plaintiff intends to state a claim for slander per quod, she has not alleged her
damages with sufficient clarity under this particular count because she merely
requests compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. See Butler
v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 17 (Ala. 2003) (citing Ceravolo v. Brown, 364 So. 2d
1155, 1156–57 (Ala. 1978)) (explaining that in a slander per quod action that a
plaintiff must allege special damages). In terms of the more specific factual
allegations that the Individual Defendants seek, it appears that they are attempting
to hold Plaintiff to the Rule 9(b) pleading standard, which is inapplicable here. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Court is satisfied that the remainder of Count VI is sufficiently
plead under Rule 8. The Individual Defendants may obtain more sufficient factual
detail through the discovery process.
Therefore, the Individual Defendants’ Motion is granted in part and denied in
part. (Doc. 35.) Plaintiff is ordered to file a more definite statement within fifteen
(15) days of this Order. The parties are then directed to proceed as scheduled.
DONE and ORDERED on April 24, 2024.
L. Scott G
United States DistWét Judge
215755