Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- emphasis supplied, second and fourth alterations in original, other alteration supplied
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
GREG CHAPMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:24-cv-00023-CLS
)
CALEB SKIPPER, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This opinion addresses defendant’s motion to dismiss. Doc. no. 5. It is
charitable to say that the parties’ pleadings are not a model of clarity. As best the
court can determine from the complaint of pro se plaintiff, Greg Chapman, the motion
of defendant, Caleb Skipper (who is the Solid Waste Director for Jackson County,
Alabama), and plaintiff’s response, plaintiff alleges that: “On or about May 2, 2023,”
he was served by a “police officer” with a summons to appear in the Jackson County,
Alabama, District Court for allegedly violating Alabama Code § 22-27-7: a statute
that provides enforcement authority and penalties for failure to pay solid waste
collection fees.1 “Plaintiff verbally made clear to the police officer that the address
on the summons was not the address [at which] he resides. . . .”2 In addition, plaintiff
1 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 9.
2 Id. ¶ 12 (alteration supplied).
mailed a letter to defendant, in which he asserted that he was “exempt” from
participation in the County’s Solid Waste Program.3 Defendant, nevertheless,
continued with the court proceedings to which plaintiff had been summoned, but
(plaintiff alleges) without affording him the opportunity described in Alabama Code
§ 22-27-6(b)4 to show cause for his failure to subscribe to the County’s Solid Waste
Program and failure to pay the required fees, or to provide proof that he obtained a
3 Id. ¶ 13.
4 The statute cited in text provides that:
Whenever the Solid Waste Officer shall find that any person,
household, business, industry or any property owner has failed to
subscribe to the County Solid Waste Collection Program and pay the
required solid waste collection and disposal fees or has failed to
obtain a certificate of exception in violation of this article[,] such
failure shall constitute a public nuisance. The Solid Waste Officer
shall thereupon cite such delinquent to appear before the Solid Waste
Officer within 10 days at the courthouse of the county in which the
citation is issued and to show cause why subscription has not been
made, such fees have not been paid or an exemption has not been
obtained and, at the same time and, at the same time, shall file with
the county commission a copy of such citation showing service on the
delinquent. Should such delinquent appear timely before the Solid
Waste Officer and cannot give satisfactory proof that he has obtained
a certificate of exception such officer shall cause the delinquent to
subscribe to the Solid Waste Collection and Disposal Program and
pay the required fees. If such delinquent shall fail or refuse to
subscribe to such program and pay such fees, the Solid Waste Officer
shall institute or cause to be instituted proceedings as provided in
Section 22-27-7 against such delinquent before any court having
jurisdiction of such offense. Should such delinquent fail to appear
before the Solid Waste Officer within the time allowed such officer
shall institute or cause to be instituted proceedings as provided in
Section 22-27-7 against such delinquent before any court having
jurisdiction of such offense.
2
certificate of exception. The case was tried before Jackson County District Judge
Don Word on July 21, 2023. Following consideration of the testimony and evidence
presented, Judge Word adjudged plaintiff to be “GUILTY of Failure to Participate in
the Jackson County Garbage Service [sic],” and ordered him to pay a fine in the
amount of $200, restitution in the amount of $838.50, and court costs.5 Plaintiff also
was sentenced to thirty days in the Jackson County Jail, but imposition of his
sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for a period of twelve
months.6
Plaintiff appealed his conviction to the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Alabama. On December 15, 2023, the State filed a motion to dismiss the case, stating
that plaintiff had paid the $838.50 balance owed to the Solid Waste authority.7 The
motion was granted by Jackson County Circuit Court Judge M. Brent Benson on
5 Doc. no. 6-1 (Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss), Ex. A (Order entered
in Jackson Count District Court Case No. DC-2023-000992.00, styled State of Alabama v. Chapman
Greg [sic]), at ECF 2. Note: “ECF” is an acronym formed from the initial letters of the name of a
filing system that allows parties to file and serve documents electronically: i.e., “Electronic Case
Filing.” See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, Rule 7.1.4, at 21 (Columbia Law Review
Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). When this court cites to pagination generated by the header
electronically imprinted on a scanned copy of a document filed in this case, it will, as here, precede
the page number(s) with the letters “ECF.”
6 Id.
7 Id. at ECF 3 (Criminal Case No. CC-2023-404, correctly styled State of Alabama vs. Greg
Chapman).
3
January 9, 2024.8
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to move to dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). That rule must be read together with Rule 8(a), which requires that a
pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While that
pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.
To survive a motion to dismiss [founded upon Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
8 Id. at ECF 4 (styled State of Alabama V. Chapman Greg [sic], and stating that “The Court
waited over three weeks to give Defendant [i.e., plaintiff in the present proceedings] a chance to
respond. He has not. Therefore, on Motion of the State, and without objection from the Defendant,
the Defendant shall pay the Court Costs in this case.”).
4
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely
consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557
(brackets omitted).
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,
the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a compliant is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. at 555 (Although for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the
complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss. Id. at 556. Determining whether a complaint states
a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. 409 F.3d at 157–58. But where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has
not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.
5
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis supplied, second and fourth alterations in
original, other alteration supplied).
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts two claims against the sole defendant, Caleb Skipper, Director
of Jackson County’s solid waste program. Plaintiff contends that he was deprived of
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution when defendant failed to issue a citation in accordance with Alabama
Code § 22-27-6(b), prior to initiating state court criminal proceedings. He also
alleges that defendant fabricated evidence, thereby violating his constitutional rights,
because defendant “claim[ed] under oath that Plaintiff refused to participate” in the
County’s solid waste program, even though plaintiff “was never contacted in any way
to ask if he wants to participate as mandated by law.”9
Defendant argues that plaintiff’s first claim should be dismissed, because
adequate procedural due process was provided by the State of Alabama: i.e., plaintiff
received a trial in Jackson County’s District Court, the opportunity to appeal, and the
case ultimately was dismissed on the State’s motion following plaintiff’s payment of
the outstanding balance due to the Jackson County Solid Waste authority. Defendant
also contends that plaintiff’s second claim constitutes an impermissible collateral
9 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) (emphasis supplied).
6
attack on plaintiff’s underlying state court conviction.10 Defendant submitted copies
of state court pleadings relating to the prosecution of plaintiff for violation of
Alabama Code § 22-27-7 in support of his motion to dismiss.
Ordinarily, when on a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded
by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Notwithstanding that general rule, a court may consider
public records of a prior state court adjudication without converting the motion to
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Addams v. Kellett, No. CV-07-
S-2346-NE, 2009 WL 10694800, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 20, 2009) (citing Boateng v.
InterAmerican University, Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000)). Likewise, plaintiff’s
exhibit to his response opposing the motion to dismiss (i.e., a form letter from
defendant to plaintiff detailing the process for seeking an exemption from solid waste
collection fees) does not require conversion of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, because it is “central to the plaintiff’s
10 Both claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
7
claim,” and “the authenticity of the document is not challenged.” Day v. Taylor, 400
F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005).
A. Procedural Due Process Claim
The so-called “Alabama Solid Wastes and Recyclable Materials Management
Act,” Ala. Code § 22-27-1 et seq., authorizes any county commission or municipal
authority to provide solid waste collection services, and to require public participation
in, and subscription to, those services. Id. § 22-27-3(a)(2). The Act requires that
“[e]very person, household, business, industry, or property generating solid wastes,
garbage, or ash . . . shall [i.e., a word that in law means must] participate and
subscribe to such system of service unless granted a certificate of exception as
provided in subsection (g).” Id. (alteration and emphasis supplied). Further, another
section of the Act provides, in part, that:
A person, household, business, industry, or any property owner may
store, haul, and dispose of his or her own solid wastes on his or her land
or otherwise, provided such storage, haulage, or disposal is
accomplished pursuant to a certificate of exception as provided in this
subsection. In order to obtain a certificate of exception, an application,
an application fee, and plan must be filed with the county health officer
or his or her designee in the case of household waste . . . setting out the
proposed method of storing, hauling, and disposing of solid waste so as
to comply with rules and regulations adopted by the state or county
boards of health or the department as appropriate and not create a public
nuisance or hazard to the public health.
Id. § 22-27-6(g). Additionally, an exemption is available to “[a]ny household whose
8
sole source of income is Social Security benefits,” upon proof of that status. Id. § 22-
27-3(a)(3). If an individual does not pay the required fee, rate, or charge established
by the county commission, or obtain a certificate of exception, or qualify for an
exemption, he is subject to the penalties prescribed by Alabama Code § 22-27-7: i.e.,
“Any person violating any provision of this article or any rule or regulation made
pursuant to this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall
be fined not less than $50.00 nor more than $200.00 . . . .”
The key question to be answered when a plaintiff alleges a deprivation of his
procedural due process rights is whether the state has “fail[ed] to provide adequate
procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected
interest.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, even
assuming that defendant’s failure to strictly comply with the citation requirements of
Alabama Code § 22-27-6(b) was a violation of plaintiff’s procedural due process
rights, it was cured by the state’s provision of adequate remedies to redress any such
violation. Specifically, a Jackson County District Judge conducted a trial at which
he received evidence and took testimony. Following the court’s determination, based
upon the evidence presented, that plaintiff was guilty of violating one or more
provisions of the “Alabama Solid Wastes and Recyclable Materials Management
Act,” plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to appeal the conviction to the Circuit
9
Court of Jackson County.
Accordingly, the court concludes that adequate state remedies were available.
Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to
procedural due process.
B. Fabrication of Evidence
Plaintiff also has failed to state a claim that his rights were violated by the
fabrication of evidence. Plaintiff alleges only that defendant made a statement under
oath that plaintiff refused to participate in the solid waste collection program, and that
“Plaintiff was never contacted in any way to ask if he wants to participate as
mandated by law.”11 As stated above, however, participation in a county’s solid
waste collection program is mandatory. An individual, such as plaintiff, who has not
been granted an exception or exemption must pay the fees associated with the
program. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Trussville, 376 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1979). As such, the court cannot conclude that defendant’s statement
constitutes fabricated evidence.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court foreclosed claims for an allegedly
unconstitutional conviction, such as the one brought by plaintiff, in Heck v.
11 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 3.
10
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff's conviction was not invalidated and,
thus, his claim that it was obtained in an unconstitutional manner must fail.
Ht. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is due to be
granted. A separate judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion will be
entered contemporaneously herewith.
DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of April, 2024.
Ss United States District Judge
11