“We also remind district courts of their supervisory obligation to sua sponte order repleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) when a shotgun complaint fails to link adequately a cause of action to its factual predicates.”
How later courts described this case
- “We also remind district courts of their supervisory obligation to sua sponte order repleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) when a shotgun complaint fails to link adequately a cause of action to its factual predicates.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL PARRISH, }
}
Plaintiff, }
}
v. } Case No.: 2:23-cv-1230-RDP
}
JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION, }
}
Defendant. }
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively for More
Definite Statement. (Doc. # 7). The Motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 9, 10). For the reasons
discussed below, the Motion is due to be granted in part.
I. Background
Plaintiff, Michael Parrish, alleges that he was hired by Defendant, Jefferson County
Commission, as Tire Shop Supervisor in August 2017. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 12).
In 2019, Plaintiff applied for the position of Maintenance Supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 13). He
alleges his competition for the position, Jacob Moore, issued him a fraudulent disciplinary action.
(Id.). Plaintiff contends Moore was not his supervisor at the time. (Id.). Ultimately, Plaintiff did
not receive the position. (Id.).
Eventually, on some unspecified date, Plaintiff received the Highway District Maintenance
Superintendent position. (Id. at ¶ 14). His supervisor was Heather Carter, a white female. (Id.).
Plaintiff asserts that Carter prevented him from being trained in the duties of the Maintenance
Superintendent position and prevented him from performing the duties of that position. (Id.) He
claims that, because of that interference, on another unspecified date he received a poor
performance evaluation. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that he was assigned engineering duties and other duties outside of his
classification. (Id. at ¶ 15). He complained to his supervisor, but was instructed to perform the
duties anyway. (Id.). He was also denied the opportunity to consult an engineer. (Id.). Plaintiff was
then reprimanded by Carter for not completing tasks properly and received poor performance
evaluations on more unspecified dates. (Id. at ¶ 16). He was removed from the Highway District
Maintenance Superintendent position in 2019. (Id.).
The allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint then jump to January 2023, when Plaintiff was
demoted to Tire Shop Supervisor. (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff filed multiple “inquiries” with HR and the
Personnel Board about this demotion to Tire Shop Supervisor and his previous demotion. (Id.).
Carter then told him that he would be disciplined for insubordination if he continued to make
inquiries about his demotions. (Id.). Plaintiff made no further inquiries, but Carter issued him a
disciplinary action anyway. (Id.).
Plaintiff identifies female employees Dayla Baugh and L’Tanya Blackmon as having been
treated more favorably than him. (Id. at ¶ 18).
The remaining allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint are conclusory and devoid of factual
information.
Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge of discrimination, which he signed on April 8, 2023. (Doc.
# 9-1). On June 21, 2023, the EEOC issued a Determination and Notice of Right to Sue. (Doc. #
1-2). Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on September 18, 2023. (Doc. # 1).
II. Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
However, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that contain nothing more
than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not meet Rule 8 standards,
nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon “labels and conclusions” or “naked
assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Id. at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A plausible claim for relief requires “enough fact[s] to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the claim. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556. In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “1) eliminate any allegations
in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.’” Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 F. App’x 136, 138
(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)).
That task is context specific and, to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the court based
on its “judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted as
true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570.
III. Analysis
Based on these bare-boned allegations, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts five causes of action:
(1) Count I - Retaliation in Violation of Title VII; (2) Count II - Sex Discrimination In Violation
Of Title VII; (3) Count III - Sex-Based Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Title VII; (4)
Count IV - Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment in Violation of Title VII; and (5) Count V -
14th Amendment Due Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 25-68).
Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or, alternatively, for a more definite
statement of his claims. (Doc. # 7). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed (1) because he failed to timely serve Defendant and failed to explain his late service; (2)
because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a timely EEOC charge; and (3)
because it is a shotgun pleading. (Id.).
There are clearly deficiencies in Plaintiff’s pleading. He asserts a Title VII retaliation claim
but has not alleged facts showing that he engaged in any protected conduct under that statute. (Doc.
# 1 at 6-8). An “inquiry” is neither a complaint of discriminatory or retaliatory treatment nor
opposition to discriminatory or retaliatory treatment. Plaintiff also asserts a continuing violation,
but there are no plausible (i.e., non-conclusory) factual allegations that any conduct occurred
between 2019 and 2023. (Id. at 8-12). Moreover, Plaintiff impermissibly adopts and re-alleges
every factual allegation into every count in the Complaint. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 34,43, 52, 60).
Shotgun pleadings violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
by “fail[ing] to one degree or another ... to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against
them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291,
1294-95 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313,
1323 (11th Cir. 2015)).
The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly and vehemently condemned shotgun pleadings. See
Est. of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.3 (11th Cir. 2020). There are four basic
categories of shotgun pleadings: 1) those in which “each count adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts;” 2) those that do not re-allege all preceding counts but are “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”;
3) those that do not separate each cause of action or claim for relief into a different count; and 4)
those that assert multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which applies to
which. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun
pleadings is that they fail to ... give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and
the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323; see also Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x
796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e ‘have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.’”). Plaintiff’s
Complaint falls into each of the first three categories.
A court faced with a shotgun pleading has the inherent authority to demand, and if
necessary sua sponte demand, repleader of such a complaint under Rule 12(e). See Wagner v. First
Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We also remind district courts of
their supervisory obligation to sua sponte order repleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(e) when a shotgun complaint fails to link adequately a cause of action to its factual
predicates.”). Here, Defendant has moved to dismiss and, alternatively, requested the court to order
a more definite statement.
The Eleventh Circuit strongly encourages “a district court that receives a shotgun pleading
[to] strike it and instruct counsel to replead the case—even if the other party does not move the
court to strike the pleading.” Est. of Bass, 947 F.3d at 1358. Therefore, the court will require
Plaintiff to replead any viable claims in his Complaint.
IV. Conclusion
For all these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively for More Definite
Statement (Doc. # 7) is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs current Complaint (Doc. # 1) is
STRICKEN.
On or before March 29, 2024, Plaintiff SHALL file an amended Complaint which
remedies the shotgun pleading issues discussed above. The Amended Complaint SHALL comply
with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a),' 8(d)(1),” and 10(b).? Each count in the Amended
Complaint SHALL contain no more than one discrete claim for relief. The Amended Complaint
must also contain plausible and non-conclusory allegations of fact which support each discrete
claim.
DONE and ORDERED this March 13, 2024.
R. DAVID □□ 24 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
' Rule 8(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement
of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new
jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3)
a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
2 Rule 8(d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative Statements; Inconsistency. (1) In General. Each
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.
3 Rule 10 Form of Pleadings. (b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses
in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer
by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence — and each defense other than a denial — must be stated in a separate count or defense.