The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
SANDY BURKE,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:21-cv-1094-CLM
TALLADEGA CITY BOARD OF and consolidated case no.:
EDUCATION, et al., 1:22-cv-666-CLM.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sandy Burke sues the Talladega City Board of Education and many
individuals within the Talladega School System for discrimination based
on race, age, and disability, and for retaliation and retaliatory harassment
while she worked for the Board. The individual defendants now move to
dismiss all claims brought against them in their official capacities.
Additionally, Board CFO Leslie Bollendorf moves to dismiss Count 13
(Race Discrimination, Failure to Promote) and Count 14 (Retaliation)
against her. As explained below, the court GRANTS the defendants’
motion to dismiss in its entirety. (Doc. 54).
BACKGROUND
Sandy Burke is a white woman who has worked for the Talladega
City Board of Education for 24 years. Before that, she worked as assistant
manager at a financial institution for 10 years. Burke alleges that for at
least 10 years, while she worked for the Board, the Board only hired
African American individuals for positions. She says she did not receive
promotions and was not selected for positions even though she was more
experienced than the African American individuals selected. (Doc. 52, p.
6, ¶¶ 19-24).
Burke alleges several instances over seven years in which the Board
did not select her for various positions. Burke now sues the Talladega City
Board of Education and individual defendants within the Talladega
School System for:
• Race Discrimination:
o Failure to Promote (Counts 1-4 and 13)
o Disparate Treatment (Count 11)
• Age Discrimination: Failure to Promote (Count 5)
• Disability Discrimination: Failure to Promote (Count 6)
• Retaliation (Counts 7-10 and 14)
• Retaliatory Harassment/Hostile Work Environment (Count 12).1
Along with suing the Board, Burke sues Cynthia Watts (Principal),
Leslie Bollendorf (Board CFO), Terry Roller (Superintendent), Tony Ball
(Superintendent), and Gloria Thomas (student services) in their
individual and official capacities. (Doc. 52, pp. 3-4, ¶¶ 6-10).
Before Burke filed her fourth amended complaint (doc. 52), the
Board and many individual defendants moved to dismiss her Race
Discrimination (Failure to Promote) and Retaliation claims against them
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (by and through § 1983). (Docs. 26, 27). The court
issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part the defendants’
motions. (Doc. 32). Burke then moved to consolidate this case (Case No.
1:21-cv-1094) with a similar case (Case No. 1:22-cv-666), and the court
granted her motion to consolidate. (Doc. 36).
In response to Burke’s fourth amended complaint, individual
defendants Watts, Bollendorf, Roller, Ball, and Thomas collectively move
the court to dismiss all official capacity claims asserted against them. And
Bollendorf moves to dismiss Count 13 (Race Discrimination, Failure to
Promote) and Count 14 (Retaliation) against her. (Doc. 54).2
1 Burke’s causes of action are stated here as alleged in her fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 52).
2 In this court’s memorandum opinion and order addressing the defendants’ motions to dismiss
plaintiff’s first amended complaint, the court dismissed the same claims: race discrimination
(failure to promote) and retaliation, against all individual defendants except Superintendents
Roller and Ball. (See Doc. 32).
Drawing on its previous ruling (doc. 32) and the reasons stated
below, the court will DISMISS all official capacity claims asserted against
individual defendants Watts, Bollendorf, Roller, Ball, and Thomas. The
court will also DISMISS both Count 13 (Race Discrimination, Failure to
Promote) and Count 14 (Retaliation) against Bollendorf in her individual
capacity.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. The court accepts the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations as true and makes reasonable inferences in her favor. Crowder
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 963 F.3d 1197, 1202 (11th Cir. 2020). But those
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And the court disregards
both conclusory statements and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
DISCUSSION
Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination and retaliation in
connection with employment contracts. But Section 1983 “constitutes the
exclusive federal remedy for violation by state actors of the rights
guaranteed under § 1981.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1288 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2009). Other than causation, these Section 1981 claims use the same
requirements of proof and the same analytical framework as claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc.,
161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). As for
causation under Section 1981, the plaintiff “bears the burden of showing
that race was a but-for cause of [her] injury.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020).
A. Official Capacity Claims
Individual defendants Watts, Bollendorf, Roller, Ball, and Thomas
collectively move the court to dismiss all official capacity claims asserted
against them in Counts 1-4 and 7-14. (Doc. 54, p. 1). They argue that any
official capacity claims against them are redundant of the claims against
the Board. (Doc. 54, pp. 3-4).
“Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official
capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally
equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions
against local government officials, because local government units can be
sued directly.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir.
1991). As the circuit court reasoned in Busby, “[t]o keep both the City and
the officers sued in their official capacity as defendants in this case would
have been redundant and possibly confusing to the jury.” Id.
As stated in the court’s memorandum opinion on the defendants’
motion to dismiss Burke’s first amended complaint, all official-capacity
race-discrimination claims alleged against the individual defendants are
redundant of those against the Board. See Cook v. Randolph Cnty., 573
F.3d 1143, 1149 (11th Cir. 2009); Busby, 931 F.2d at 776; Harris by &
through Davis v. Autry, No. 20-13480, 2022 WL 392169, at *6 (11th Cir.
Feb. 9, 2022). And this rule applies “when [a municipal] officer is sued
under Section 1983.” Busby, 931 F.2d at 776. So the rule applies equally
to Burke’s race-discrimination claims brought by and through § 1983
(Counts 1-4, 11, 13, and 14) and to Burke’s retaliation claims brought by
and through § 1983 (Counts 7-10 and 12). Accordingly, the court will
DISMISS all official capacity claims against individual defendants
Watts, Bollendorf, Roller, Ball, and Thomas.
—
Before moving on to the individual counts, the court must clarify an
error in its prior opinion. The court previously dismissed all official
capacity claims against the individual defendants, but simultaneously
stated that Burke’s retaliation claim could “proceed to discovery against
the Board and against Gloria Thomas in her official capacity.” (Doc. 32, p.
13). Circuit precedent requires the court to dismiss all claims against
individual defendants redundant of those against the Board. See Busby,
931 F.2d at 776. So the court’s previous statement that Burke’s retaliation
claim could proceed against Gloria Thomas in her “official” capacity was
error. But the court reaffirms that Burke’s retaliation claim may proceed
against the Board and against Thomas in her individual capacity.
B. Individual Counts
Count 13: Race Discrimination, Failure to Promote under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (by and through § 1983)
Because Burke brings a race discrimination claim, the court must
ultimately analyze this claim under the framework outlined in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Eleventh Circuit
recently clarified that the ultimate question under the McDonnell Douglas
framework is “whether there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury
to find that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 947 (11th Cir.
2023) (citing Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189,
1194 (11th Cir. 2004)). But at the pleading stage, Burke “need not allege
facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.”
Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)).3 Burke must
provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” intentional race
discrimination. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “This is because
McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found.,
3 The Supreme Court abrogated Davis on other grounds through Twombly and Iqbal. See
Doscher v. Holding, No. 22-13184, 2023 WL 6060559, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 18, 2023) (recognizing
abrogation); see also LaCroix v. Western Dist. of Ky., 627 F. App’x 816, 818 (11th Cir. 2015).
789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). And allegations
that, taken as true, show but-for causation would attach liability to a
particular defendant. See Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014.
In Count 13, Burke alleges that she applied for the Secretary
position at R.L. Young in August 2022, that Bollendorf conducted the
interviews, and that Bollendorf did not interview Burke or select her for
the position. Burke says she was qualified for the position but an African
American applicant with far less experience or no experience at all was
selected. Burke says the Board had a custom of hiring only African
American applicants, so her race was a reason that she wasn’t selected.
(Doc. 52, pp. 67-70, ¶¶ 402-23). She also alleges in her response to
Bollendorf’s motion to dismiss that as Board CFO, “Bollendorf is the
Board” and that Bollendorf selected applicants and then recommended
them to the Board. (Doc. 58, pp. 10-12).
The court will assume (but not decide) for purposes of its analysis
that Burke’s allegations, taken as true, suggest intentional
discrimination. So Burke can proceed against Bollendorf on her race-
discrimination claim if her complaint plausibly alleges an “adequate
causal link” between Bollendorf’s allegedly unlawful conduct and Burke’s
injury. Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th Cir. 2019); Doc. 32,
p. 8. But Burke’s complaint fails to do so. The court even addressed this
claim against Bollendorf (among other individual defendants) previously.
See Doc. 32, p. 9. And the court found that Burke’s allegations that
Bollendorf did not provide Burke with an interview or select her for the
Secretary position do not support a finding that Burke would have
received the Secretary position but-for Bollendorf’s actions. Id. at 9-10.
But even if it did, causation does not exist “when the continuum
between Defendant’s action and the ultimate harm is occupied by the
conduct of deliberate and autonomous decision-makers.” Carruth, 942
F.3d at 1056 (citation omitted). As Board CFO, Bollendorf worked under
the superintendent.4 And the superintendent had final say in
recommending applicants for hire to the Board.5 Burke makes no
allegations in her complaint that the Board CFO was synonymous with
“the Board” to which the superintendent reported. And if she did, Burke
would be alleging claims against Bollendorf in her official capacity—which
would be redundant of Burke’s claim against the Board itself. Busby, 931
F.2d at 776. As the court has found (see doc. 32, p. 9), Superintendent
Roller and Superintendent Ball are “deliberate and autonomous decision-
makers” who stand in the way and break the causal connection between
Bollendorf’s actions and Burke not receiving the Secretary position.
Carruth, 942 F.3d at 1056.
The court previously dismissed all failure to promote claims against
the individual defendants (including Bollendorf) in this lawsuit for the
same reason. The court then allowed Burke the opportunity to amend her
complaint. In her fourth amended complaint, Burke reasserted the same
claims (Race Discrimination: Failure to Promote, and Retaliation) among
others. But the court finds no reason to stray from its previous decision
on those claims. (Doc. 32, pp. 9-10). For these reasons, the court dismisses
Count 13 (Race Discrimination, Failure to Promote) against Bollendorf.
Count 14: Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (by and through
§ 1983)
Burke brings a retaliation claim in Count 14 under 42 U.S.C. §
1981.6 “To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII or section 1981,
4 See Ala. Code. § 16-13A-5 (“The chief school financial officer shall work under the direct
supervision of the local superintendent of education but shall have a fiduciary responsibility to
the local board of education.” (emphasis added)).
5 See Ala. Code § 16-12-19 (“The city board of education shall, upon the recommendation of the
city superintendent of schools, employ such professional, clerical, accounting and statistical
assistants as, in the judgment of the board, are necessary.” (emphasis added)).
6 While Burke does not specify in her complaint under which statute she brings her retaliation
claim, in her response to the pending motion to dismiss (doc. 54), she alleges that she has “pled
plausible Section 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims against Bollendorf.” (Doc. 58, p.
15). So the court construes her retaliation claim as pled under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. But even if
Burke intended to bring her retaliation claim under Title VII, both statutes require the same
a plaintiff must prove that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, he
suffered a materially adverse action, and there was some causal relation
between the two events.” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261,
1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Burlington, 548 U.S. 53). So at the pleading
stage, Burke must allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest these three
elements are present.
Burke alleges that she engaged in protected activity by filing an
EEOC discrimination charge in March 2022 and by filing this lawsuit. She
says that since then, the Board and Leslie Bollendorf retaliated against
her by (1) not providing her an interview when she applied for the
Secretary position at R.L. Young in August 2022 and (2) not selecting her
for that position. Burke says that the defendants’ conduct would deter a
reasonable person from engaging in protected activity, and that
retaliation against her was a motivating factor underlying the decision to
not interview or select her for the position. (Doc. 52, pp. 70-71, ¶¶ 424-27).
First, the court finds that Burke engaged in statutorily protected
activity when she filed her EEOC complaint. See Doc. 32, p. 11 (citing
Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2001)).
And Burke alleges that Bollendorf “actually knew about” the EEOC
charge because she was interviewed about the charge within two months
of its filing. Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1053
(11th Cir. 2020); Doc. 52, p. 19, ¶ 113.
Second, Burke suffered a materially adverse action. The failure to
hire Burke is a materially adverse employment action because, as she
correctly notes, not being interviewed or selected for the Secretary
position could “dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 (11th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
But Burke has not plausibly alleged causation. Burke must
plausibly allege facts that would prove Bollendorf’s retaliatory motive was
proof and analytical framework. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2023) (citing Standard, 161 F.3d at 1330)).
a but-for cause of her rejection. See Comcast Corp., 140 8. Ct. at 1014.
Burke alleges that Bollendorf did not interview her or select her for the
Secretary position at R.L. Young when she applied in August 2022. But
her allegations do not support a finding that Burke would have received
the Secretary position but-for Bollendorf’s actions. See Doc. 32, p. 9.
And again, even if Burke plausibly alleged that Bollendorf’s actions
were a but-for cause of her rejection, the superintendent—not the Board’s
CFO—has the sole responsibility under Alabama law to make final
employment recommendations to the Board. See Ala. Code § 16-12-19. So
Superintendent Roller and Superintendent Ball are “deliberate and
autonomous decision-makers” who stand in the way and break the causal
connection to any alleged retaliatory motive or action of Bollendorf’s.
Carruth, 942 F.3d at 1056 (citations omitted). So the court similarly
dismisses Count 14 (Retaliation) against Leslie Bollendorf.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will DISMISS all official capacity
claims asserted against individual defendants Watts, Bollendorf, Roller,
Ball, and Thomas. The court will also DISMISS both Count 13 (Race
Discrimination, Failure to Promote) and Count 14 (Retaliation) against
Bollendorf in her individual capacity.
DONE and ORDERED on February 20, 2024.
COREY @%. MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE