Watkins v. Tuscaloosa County School District

U.S. DISTRICT

N.D. OF AL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

SABRINA WATKINS and )

LEJUANE THORNTON, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

V. ) 7:23-cv-01082-LSC

)

TUSCALOOSA COUNTY )

SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs Sabrina Watkins and Lejaune Thornton bring this action against the

Tuscaloosa County School Board, its Board Members, and fictitious defendants

“Bus Driver” and “Driving Trainer.” Plaintiffs allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and state tort law.’ Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 8.)

Because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim over which this Court has jurisdiction,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is due to bb GRANTED.

1 Thornton joins this suit in his capacity as the “life partner” of Watkins to allege a loss of

consortium. (Doc. 7 J 2, 81.) Because loss of consortium is a derivative claim, his claim rises and

falls with Watkins’s claims. Lyons v. Vaughan Reg’l Med. Cir., LLC, 23 So. 3d 23, 29 (Ala. 2009).

Accordingly, this Court will not address his claim further.

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Il. Background?

This action derives from a non-contact automobile accident on I-59 allegedly

involving a Tuscaloosa County school bus. (Doc. 7 J 16.) According to Plaintiffs,

Watkins’s vehicle was in the blind spot of a Tuscaloosa County school bus when it

veered into her lane, forcing her vehicle off the road, and causing her to strike a

concrete barrier. (/d. [] 16, 18, 20.) Plaintiff alleges that, at the time, Driving Trainer

was training Bus Driver how to drive the bus. (/d. J 16.)

An Alabama State Trooper responded to the accident and drafted a report.

(Id. J 33; doc. 2-1.) The accident report indicates that the State Trooper spoke with

Bus Driver and Driving Trainer, but it does not identify them. It also describes the

bus as a Tuscaloosa County school bus. (Docs. 7 JJ 27, 33; 2-1 at 2.) Despite this

report, Defendant Tuscaloosa County School Board denies that it had any school

buses on the roadways on the date of the accident. (Doc. 7 J 32.) Accordingly, the

School Board has not provided Plaintiffs with the identity of Bus Driver or Driving

Trainer. (/d. { 36.)

2 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept the plaintiffs version of the facts as

true, and “[construe] the reasonable inferences therefrom . . . in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Bryant ». Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). The following facts

are, therefore, taken from Plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint, and the Court makes no ruling

on their veracity.

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Plaintiffs describe several unsuccessful attempts to identify Bus Driver and

Driving Trainer. (See zd. J] 36, 38-40.) They claim to have made “numerous

attempts” to obtain the names of Bus Driver and Driving Trainer from Defendants,

although Plaintiffs do not describe those attempts. (/d. J 35.) They allege that the

State Trooper has the names of both Bus Driver and Driving Trainer—as well as

audio and video recordings of his interactions with them—and is willing to provide

that information to Plaintiffs but is allegedly unable to do so without a subpoena or

other court order. (/d. J] 33, 37.) Plaintiffs state that they also requested a copy of

the video recordings from the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, which allegedly

responded that it would not provide the video without a subpoena. (/d. J 38.)

Eventually, Plaintiffs filed a petition for pre-suit discovery in the Circuit Court of

Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. (/d. J 39.) After waiting for months with no ruling on

their petition, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the pre-suit discovery action in state

court. (/d. JJ 42-43.) They then filed suit in this Court, along with a motion for

discovery prior to a Rule 26(f) conference. (Docs. 1, 2.)

To supply this Court with subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs included

§ 1983 claims in their complaint related to Defendants’ failure to identify Bus Driver

and Driving Trainer. (See doc. 1 J 15.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants denied them

access to the courts by “refus[ing] to cooperate with [their] attempts to seek

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justice,” and that they “would have received significantly better treatment were

[they] white wom[e|n.” (Doc. 7 JJ 70, 76.) To support their racial discrimination

claim, Plaintiffs allege a “history of racial bias against African Americans” occurring

within the school district. (/d. J 46.) For example, they claim that white employees

have called African American students racial slurs, and that an African American

woman who applied for a job was “overlooked in favor of an older white male

candidate who was less qualified.” (Ud. J 54, 57.) Defendants challenge the

sufficiency of these allegations and this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

III. Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Where, as here, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion implicates

the merits of a plaintiff’s claims, this Court must proceed as if the motion were a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell

& Assocs., M.D.’s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997).

To satisfy Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must include “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). However, to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), a complaint “must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347-48 (11th Cir.

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2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint must be

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Edwards v. Prime,

Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). A complaint that “succeeds in identifying

facts that are suggestive enough to render [the necessary elements of a claim]

plausible” will survive a motion to dismiss. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289,

1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first ‘“identiflies]

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then “assume[s] the[ |

veracity” of the complaint’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine[s|

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Jd. Review of the

complaint is “‘a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Jd. If the pleading “contain[s] enough information

regarding the material elements of a cause of action to support recovery under some

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‘viable legal theory,’ it satisfies the notice pleading standard. Am. Fed’n of Labor &

Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Roe ». Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683-84 (11th Cir.

2001)).

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs assert two constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one for

denial of access to courts and one for racial discrimination, along with several state

tort law claims. Defendants move to dismiss the entire action on the grounds that the

§ 1983 claims lack merit, and without them, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide

the state law claims.* As explained below, Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead their

§ 1983 claims, and this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

state law claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is due to be GRANTED.

A. Plaintiffs plead no facts supporting their claim that Defendants

denied them meaningful access to the courts.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ refusal to identify Bus Driver and Driving

Trainer constitutes a denial of their constitutional right to access the courts in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983 for denial of access to

courts, a plaintiff must allege “official acts frustrating the litigation” of an underlying

3 The Board Member Defendants also raise a qualified immunity defense. However, because

this action is due to be dismissed on other grounds, the Court does not address qualified immunity.

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cause of action. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Chappell v.

Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff need not be physically

barred from entering a courthouse to state a claim, but must have been denied

meaningful access to judicial recourse. Worthy v. City of Phenix City, Alabama, 930

F.3d 1206, 1221 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1282).

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim in that their pleadings establish they had

meaningful access to the courts. /d. Plaintiffs admit to filing a petition in state court

and then voluntarily dismissing that petition. (Doc. 7 J 40, 42.) Although Plaintiffs

note that Defendants objected to their petition, they do not allege any actionable

conduct by Defendants that denied them meaningful access to judicial recourse. (Ja.

q 41.) As Defendants argue, nothing prevented Plaintiffs from litigating their claims

in state court other than their own decisions.’ Plaintiffs do not dispute this point.°

Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “intentionally neglected to perform

any investigation” to avoid liability. (Doc. 9 at 2.) Even assuming the truth of this

allegation, it is insufficient to support a claim for denial of access to courts. See

4 Defendants explain that they objected to Plaintiffs’ state court petition on multiple

grounds, including procedural deficiencies, and that in the nine months in which their petition was

pending, “[Plaintiffs] never attempted to cure the deficiencies in [their] Petition, never requested

a hearing on [their] Petition, and never sought [certain] information [they] now seek[] in” their

pre-Rule 26(f) conference discovery motion. (Doc. 8 [{ 12-13.)

Plaintiffs nominally oppose the motion to dismiss but offer minimal response to

Defendants’ arguments.

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Chappell, 340 F.3d at 1283; Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1264 (6th

Cir. 1997) (finding allegations that defendants failed to investigate and covered up

evidence insufficient to support a claim for denial of access to courts where the

plaintiff “never presented evidence that the state court could not adequately address

these problems”). Plaintiffs cite—and this Court finds—no authority to support

their contention that Defendants’ refusal to help them investigate could plausibly

constitute a violation of § 1983. See, e.g, Watkins v. Six Unknown Broward Sheriff Jail

Deputies, 671 F. App’x 761, 762 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of access-to-

courts claim where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “refused to voluntarily

identify” fictitious defendants). Thus, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under § 1983 that

Defendants denied them access to the courts. Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1221; Igbal, 556

USS. at 678.

B. Plaintiffs fail to support their equal protection claim with factual

allegations plausibly showing that Defendants racially

discriminated against them.

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated § 1983 by denying them equal

protection. They claim that, if they were white, Defendants would have identified

Bus Driver and Driving Trainer. However, because Plaintiffs rely on wholly

unrelated allegations to support this claim, it fails.

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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits racial

discrimination. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). To plead an equal protection

claim, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing that state actors, motivated by a

discriminatory purpose, treated similarly situated persons disparately. Thigpen v.

Bibb Cnty., Ga., Sheriff’s Dep’t, 223 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000); Jones v. Bd. of

Comm?rs of Ala. State Bar, 737 F.2d 996, 1003 (11th Cir. 1984). Relevant allegations

may include “racially biased comments, better treatment of similarly situated

persons outside the plaintiff’s class, or pretext in the justification offered for the

[challenged] official action.” Red Door Asian Bistro v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 22-

11489, 2023 WL 5606088, at *7 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2023) (per curiam) (citing Jenkins

py. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2022)); see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.

229, 242 (1976) (“[A Jn invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from

the totality of the relevant facts....”).

Defendants highlight four key pleading deficiencies plaguing Plaintiffs’ equal

protection claim. Plaintiffs offer no response to any of these concerns.

First, those pleadings that appear relevant are insufficient to prevent dismissal

in that they are no more than “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of

facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Lid. ».

Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002); Igbal, 556 U.S. at 679. These include

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Plaintiffs’ allegations that they “would have received significantly better treatment

were [they] white wom[e]n,” and that the “disparate treatment” they received

“occurred solely because [Watkins], as a Black woman, is seen by Defendant[s] as

unimportant.” (Doc. 7 J] 76-77.)

Second, Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of the Defendants in this action are or

were aware of their race. Defendants could not have racially discriminated against

Plaintiffs unless they knew their race. Lubetsky v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d

1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002).

Third, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts regarding what any of the named

Defendants did or failed to do. Plaintiffs also do not allege their attempts to learn the

identities of Bus Driver and Driving Trainer, from whom they sought that

information, or whether anyone was authorized to share that information. These

shortcomings impermissibly leave the basis of Plaintiffs’ discrimination claim

entirely to speculation. Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1291. Defendants are left without

‘‘adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim

rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir.

2015).

Fourth, Plaintiffs assert wide-ranging allegations purporting to show racial

bias. Although some of the allegations are reprehensible if true, not one describes an

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incident involving Plaintiffs or Defendants, and not one has any bearing on Plaintiffs’

claim. Cf Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 760 F. App’x 803, 808 (11th Cir.

2019) (per curiam) (finding unrelated allegations insufficient to support racial

discrimination claim).

In sum, Plaintiffs’ pleadings, taken as true, suggest that others may be victims

of racial discrimination. But they do not support an inference that Defendants are

culpable or that Plaintiffs were discriminated against. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to

state an equal protection claim. Thzgpen, 223 F.3d at 1237.

C. This Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs’ state law claims.

Plaintiffs assert that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over their state

law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. When, as here, a district court has original

jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s federal claims, § 1367 provides supplemental

jurisdiction “over all other claims that are so related ... that they form part of the

same case or controversy....” Jd. § 1367(a). However, the Eleventh Circuit

“encourage[s| district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here,

the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370

F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004).

This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. As explained above, those claims are due to be dismissed. Assuming without

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deciding that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are “so related” to their § 1983 claims as to

allow this Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, it declines to do so here. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is due to be

GRANTED. The Court will enter an Order consistent with this Memorandum of

Opinion.

DONE anv ORDERED ON January 18, 2024.

Xe

UNITED STATES DIS¥RICT JUDGE

215647

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