Martin v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, The

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES C MARTIN, III, }

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Plaintiff, }

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v. } Case No.: 2:23-cv-00167-MHH

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THE ALABAMA GREAT }

SOUTHERN RAILROAD }

COMPANY, et al., }

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Defendants. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Charles C. Martin III has sued The Alabama Great Southern Railroad

Company, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, and Norfolk Southern Corporation

for employment discrimination. Mr. Martin worked as a trainman and conductor for

the defendants from May of 1979 until the defendants removed him from service in

January of 2021. Mr. Martin alleges that the defendants discriminated against him

based on his age and a perceived disability by removing him from service and then

failing to reinstate him after his physician and the defendants’ medical department

cleared him to return to work.

In his initial complaint, which he filed on February 9, 2023, Mr. Martin

asserted claims against the defendants for age discrimination and retaliation under

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (Doc. 1). On

April 14, 2023, Mr. Martin filed an amended complaint in which he reasserted his

ADEA claims and added a claim for disability discrimination under the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Doc. 18). The defendants argue

that Mr. Martin’s ADA claim is untimely, and they have asked the Court to dismiss

that claim. (Doc. 25).

The question the defendants pose is whether the ADA claim in Mr. Martin’s

amended complaint, which “fall[s] outside the statute of limitations, . . . relates back

to the date of filing of the original complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c).” Iriele v.

Griffin, 65 F.4th 1280, 1287 (11th Cir. 2023). If the ADA claim “relates back,” then

the statute of limitations does not prevent Mr. Martin from pursuing his ADA claim.1

Under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an amendment to a

pleading relates back to the filing date of the original pleading and saves an

otherwise untimely claim when the amendment adds “a claim or defense that arose

out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—

in the original pleading.” Caron v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th

Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B)). “[R]elation back depends on the

existence of a common ‘core of operative facts’ uniting the original and newly

1 Mr. Martin administratively exhausted his ADA claim and his ADEA claims in one EEOC

charge. (Doc. 18-1). Mr. Martin filed his ADEA claim within the time allotted after he received

his EEOC right-to-sue letter.

asserted claims.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005). Claims added in an

amended complaint will not relate back when the new claims “‘involve separate and

distinct conduct,’ such that the plaintiff would have to prove ‘completely different

facts’ than required to recover on the claims in the original complaint.” Iriele, 65

F.4th at 1287 (alteration adopted) (quoting Caron, 910 F.3d at 1368).

As the Court explained during oral argument on the defendants’ motion to

dismiss, the factual allegations concerning Mr. Martin’s ADA claim are almost

verbatim of the factual allegations Mr. Martin asserted in his original complaint. Mr.

Martin’s new ADA discrimination claim and his ADEA discrimination claim

concern the circumstances surrounding the defendants’ decision to remove him from

service and the defendants’ failure to reinstate him after he was cleared to return to

work. The ADA claim in the amended complaint arose from conduct virtually

identical to the conduct Mr. Martin described in his original complaint such that the

amendment relates back to the filing date of the original complaint under Rule

15(c)(1)(B). Cf. Iriele, 65 F.4th at 1287 (new claims in amended complaint related

back to the filing date of the original complaint where new claims were based on

conduct “virtually identical” to the conduct the plaintiff alleged in the original

complaint).

The defendants’ argument that Mr. Martin’s amended complaint does not

relate back under Rule 15(c) because the “original complaint does not assert an ADA

claim” is not persuasive. (Doc. 25, p. 9). Rule 15(c) does not require the legal

theories in an amended pleading to match those asserted in the original pleading; if

a new claim in an amended complaint arises “out of the conduct, transaction, or

occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading,” that is

enough to satisfy Rule 15(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); see also 6A Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1497

(3d ed. 2023) (“The fact that an amendment changes the legal theory on which the

action initially was brought is of no consequence if the factual situation upon which

the action depends remains the same and has been brought to defendant’s attention

by the original pleading.”); Watkins v. Lujan, 922 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1991)

(“[T]he relation-back doctrine is controlled not by the caption given a particular

cause of action, but by the underlying facts upon which the cause of action is

based.”). “Indeed, an amendment that states an entirely new claim for relief will

relate back as long as it satisfies the test embodied in Rule 15(c)(1)(B).” 6A Wright,

Miller, & Kane § 1497.2

The defendants’ argument that the amended complaint “does not rely on the

factual allegations set forth in the original [c]omplaint” because the original

2 Rule 15(c)’s focus on the similarities between the factual underpinnings for a plaintiff’s original

claims and the claims a plaintiff adds through an amendment makes sense. The scope of discovery

is not likely to change significantly when a plaintiff adds a new legal theory to a complaint, and a

plaintiff may have only one recovery for a single harm, so an alternative legal theory does not

expand a defendant’s exposure to damages.

complaint “makes no mention of [Mr. Martin] having any disability” fares no better.

(Doc. 25, pp. 13–14). The original complaint and amended complaint include

allegations about the medical evaluations that the defendants required Mr. Martin to

have. In both pleadings, Mr. Martin alleges that the defendants “refused to show

[him] the results of the work evaluations and . . . never told him what impairment

they believe he has.” (Compare Doc. 1, ¶¶ 23–26, 28, 30, 33–36, 39; with Doc. 18,

¶¶ 24–27, 32, 34–38, 41). Mr. Martin’s allegation that the defendants believed he

had an impairment is synonymous with an allegation that the defendants regarded

him as disabled. Mr. Martin did not have to use the term “disability” to have his

ADA claim relate back to his ADEA claim for purposes of Rule 15(c).3

Finally, the opinions to which the defendants point as grounds for dismissal

are distinguishable. For example, the defendants cite this Court’s holding in Stewart

v. T-Mobile, USA, 2015 WL 1345662 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 23, 2015). Stewart is

distinguishable because Ms. Stewart attempted to plead an ADA failure-to-

accommodate claim in an amended complaint based on facts that she did not allege

3 Mr. Martin’s ADA discrimination claim is not a failure to accommodate claim, so he did not have

to allege facts relating to efforts to obtain an accommodation. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C.,

492 F.3d 1247, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a plaintiff may prove discrimination

under the ADA through either a disparate treatment theory or failure-to-accommodate theory);

Brown v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Atlanta, 2021 WL 2471054, at *5 (N.D. Ga. May 4, 2021) (plaintiff’s

amended complaint adding claims under the ADA, including a failure-to-accommodate claim, did

not relate back to the original complaint asserting FMLA claims absent factual allegations in the

original complaint that the plaintiff requested and was denied a reasonable accommodation).

in her original complaint. Ms. Stewart’s original complaint concerned her

termination for absenteeism after her employer denied her requests for FMLA leave.

Stewart, 2:11-cv-03655-MHH (N.D. Ala.) (Compare Doc. 1, with Doc. 26). This

Court concluded that the ADA failure-to-accommodate claim did not relate back

“because the original complaint did not put [the defendant] on notice that it would

have to defend against an ADA claim.” 2015 WL 1345662, at *5.4 Here, Mr.

Martin’s new ADA claim is based on the factual allegations in his original

complaint. Thus, his amended complaint meets the criteria under Rule 15(c), and

his ADA discrimination claim relates back to his ADEA discrimination claim such

that his ADA claim is timely.

For these reasons, the Court denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc.

25). No later than January 24, 2024, the parties shall comply with their Rule 26

obligations as set forth in the Court’s initial order. (Doc. 15).

4 Cf. Brown v. Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 2013 WL 1163427, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2013)

(amended complaint adding ADA claim did not relate back where original complaint was

“restrict[ed] . . . to facts indicating retaliatory treatment by her employer” and did not suggest that

the plaintiff was discriminated against due to a disability); Leonard v. Am. Color Graphics, Inc.,

2005 WL 8158436, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 8, 2005) (amended complaint asserting new ADA claim

“list[ed] multiple new factual allegations regarding the Plaintiff’s disability” and thus did not arise

out of the same operative facts set out in the original complaint asserting claims for racial and age

discrimination).

DONE and ORDERED this January 17, 2024.

i DELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE