OIC Dreams Greene County IV Inc v. Benison

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

OIC DREAMS GREENE COUNTY )

IV, INC. )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 7:23-cv-1297-ACA

)

SHERIFF JONATHAN BENISON )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gambling is illegal under Article IV, § 65 of the Alabama Constitution.

However, voters in Alabama may approve the operation of nonprofit bingo halls in

certain counties by constitutional amendment as an exception to the general

prohibition on gambling. In 2003, voters in Alabama approved such an amendment

to allow nonprofit bingo operations in Greene County.

The local amendment to the Alabama Constitution empowers Defendant

Sheriff Jonathan Benison to regulate licenses, permits, and operations of the bingo

halls in Greene County. Pursuant to this authority, Sheriff Benison promulgated

rules and regulations. Under one rule, nonprofit bingo halls must pay an assessment

fee to the Sheriff’s Department. The funds collected from these monthly assessments

are used to pay the Sheriff Department’s legal fees in other bingo-related litigation.

Plaintiff OIC Dreams Greene County IV, Inc. operates a bingo hall in Greene

County and contends that these monthly assessments violate the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See doc. 18). After OIC Dreams

moved for leave to file a second amended complaint (doc. 20), Sheriff Benison

opposed the amendment and moved to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting that

he is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that OIC Dreams has

failed to state a claim (docs. 22, 24).

The court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART both motions. (Docs.

20, 22). To the extent OIC Dreams contends that Sheriff Benison lacks authority

under the amendment to Alabama’s Constitution to impose monthly assessments,

Sheriff Benison is immune from suit. The court therefore GRANTS Sheriff

Benison’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES OIC Dreams’s claim of substantive

due process based on that theory WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Because any claims based on this theory are subject to dismissal

and therefore futile, the court DENIES OIC Dreams’s motion to amend to the extent

it intends to continue to pursue this theory as to the three claims in the proposed

second amended complaint.

But Sheriff Benison is not immune from claims challenging his rules and

regulations as a violation of Equal Protection Clause and the substantive component

of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Accordingly, the court DENIES Sheriff Benison’s motion to dismiss

and GRANTS OIC Dreams leave to file a second amended complaint that complies

with this order on or before December 18, 2023.

I. BACKGROUND

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must

accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261,

1265 (11th Cir. 2012). The operative complaint and proposed second amended

complaint rely on the same factual allegations. (Compare doc. 18 ¶¶ 5–21, with doc.

20-1 ¶¶ 5–21). Accordingly, the court cites to the facts in the operative complaint:

Article IV, § 65 of the Alabama Constitution generally prohibits “lotteries,”

“gift enterprises,” and “all other forms of gambling in Alabama.” Dream, Inc. v.

Samuels, ___ So.3d ___, No. SC-2022-0808, 2023 WL 4141638, at *2 (Ala. June

23, 2023) (quotation marks omitted); see also Ala. Const. art. IV, § 65. This

prohibition extends to bingo. Dream, Inc., 2023 WL 4141638, at *2.

“Notwithstanding § 65’s prohibition on lotteries, local constitutional amendments

have authorized bingo games in various counties” when bingo is played in its

“traditional[]” form. See id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Barber v.

Cornerstone Cmty. Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 78 (Ala. 2009) (“[T]he bingo

amendments are exceptions to the lottery prohibition . . . .”).

In 2003, voters approved a local constitutional amendment to allow nonprofit

organizations to operate bingo halls in Greene County, Alabama. See Ala. Const.

Amend. 743. The amendment empowers the county sheriff to “promulgate rules and

regulations for the licensing, permitting, and operation of bingo games within the

county.” Id. OIC Dreams is a bingo nonprofit that operates Frontier Charity Bingo,

a bingo hall in the County. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 3, 9–11). Sheriff Benison is the county

sheriff. (Id. ¶ 4).

Sheriff Benison charges bingo nonprofits two types of fees. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8). First,

the bingo nonprofit must pay a one-time license fee that is due when the bingo

nonprofit applies to operate a bingo hall in the County. (Id. ¶ 7). Second, the bingo

nonprofit pays a monthly “assessment” or “box fee[]” that is calculated by

multiplying 500 (representing the minimum number of machines operating at a

facility) by an amount Sheriff Benison selects arbitrarily. (Doc. 18 ¶ 8) (quotation

marks omitted). The bingo nonprofits initially paid these monthly assessments to

governmental entities and nonprofits that do not operate bingo halls and were

selected by Sheriff Benison. (Id. ¶ 12; see also, e.g., doc. 18-1).

On May 26, 2023, Sheriff Benison notified various nonprofits that the

Sherriff’s Department would no longer direct the bingo nonprofits to pay the

monthly assessments to nonprofits. (See doc. 18-5 at 2–3). Sherriff Benison

informed the nonprofits that because “the Attorney General has been waging a

campaign against the conduct of bingo in Greene County,” the Sheriff’s Department

would use the monthly assessments to pay its own legal fees in defense of bingo

operations in the county. (Id.).

Starting in June 2023, Sherriff Benison directed the bingo nonprofits,

including OIC Dreams, to pay all monthly assessments directly to the Greene County

Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. 18 ¶ 13; see also docs. 18-2, 18-3, 18-4, 18-8). OIC

Dreams initially refused to pay the monthly assessments once Sheriff Benison

directed all bingo nonprofits to pay the assessments exclusively to the Sheriff’s

Department. (See doc. 18 ¶¶ 15–16; see also doc. 18-6). After Sheriff Benison

threatened to revoke OIC Dreams’s bingo license, OIC Dreams resumed paying the

monthly assessments. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 17–20; see also doc. 18-6 at 2; doc. 18-7). The

monthly assessments for June through September 2023 totaled $344,986.50. (Doc.

18 ¶ 13).

The first amended complaint asserts only one cause of action: violation of

substantive due process, under the Fourteenth Amendment, because Sheriff

Benison’s monthly assessments are arbitrary and capricious and occur without

statutory or legislative authority. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 22–26). The proposed second amended

complaint retains that claim and further asserts that the monthly assessments violate

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause

of the Fifth Amendment. (See doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 22–37).

OIC Dreams pleads all claims against Sheriff Benison in his official capacity.

(Doc. 18 ¶ 4; see also id. at 7–8; accord doc. 20-1 ¶ 4). OIC Dreams seeks only

prospective relief from the due process and equal protection claims and seeks both

prospective relief and monetary damages from the takings claim. (See doc. 18; doc.

20-1).

II. DISCUSSION

A party gets one opportunity to amend “as a matter of course” and then may

amend its pleading “only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s

leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Although the “court should freely give leave when

justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a district court may deny leave to amend

as futile when the proposed claims would be subject to dismissal, see Almanza v.

United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1074 (11th Cir. 2017).

Because the first amended complaint and the proposed second amended

complaint both assert the same substantive due process claim, the court begins with

Sheriff Benison’s arguments for dismissal of that claim. The court then considers

whether OIC Dreams’s proposed equal protection and unlawful taking claims are

futile.

a. OIC Dreams’s Substantive Due Process Claim

OIC Dreams asserts that Sheriff Benison’s monthly assessments violate the

substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

because these assessments are arbitrary and capricious and occur without statutory

or legislative authority. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 22–26; accord doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 22–26). Sheriff

Benison contends that OIC Dreams cannot state a substantive due process claim for

depriving an entity of a state-created property right and that he is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. (See doc. 22 at 4–11).

Sheriff Benison does not challenge OIC Dreams’s assertion that the monthly

assessments are arbitrary and capricious until the reply brief. (See doc. 28 at 4–9;

but see doc. 22; doc. 24 at 4–5). But this argument came too late; a party cannot raise

an argument for the first time in a reply brief. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.

Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the court will not consider

this argument.

Because Eleventh Amendment immunity implicates the power of the court to

hear this case, see Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., 69 F.4th 1277, 1294 (11th Cir. 2023), the

court will consider that issue first.

i. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar OIC Dreams’s claim.

“The Eleventh Amendment ordinarily bars a state’s citizens from suing the

state” and certain state officials in federal court. See Dream Defs. v. Governor of the

State of Fla., 57 F.4th 879, 889 n.5 (11th Cir. 2023). “In Ex parte Young, the

Supreme Court recognized an exception to sovereign immunity in lawsuits against

state officials for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief to stop ongoing

violations of federal law.” Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th

Cir. 2015). But Ex parte Young does not apply to violations of state law; in such a

case, the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit in federal court. See Pennhurst State

Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).

Sherriff Benison contends that OIC Dreams does not seek relief for alleged

violations of federal law, but rather, for alleged violations of state law. (See doc. 22

at 9–11). The complaint is not clear on this issue.

At times, OIC Dreams contends that Sheriff Benison imposed the monthly

assessments without authority from the local amendment to the Alabama

Constitution, an issue of state law. (See doc. 18 ¶¶ 15, 21, 23, 26; accord doc. 20-1

¶¶ 15, 21, 23, 26). To the extent that OIC Dreams challenges Sheriff Benison’s

authority to issue monthly assessments, the court agrees with Sheriff Benison that

the Eleventh Amendment precludes this court from exercising jurisdiction over that

aspect of OIC Dreams’s claim. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 106.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Sheriff Benison’s motion on that ground and

DISMISSES that aspect of OIC Dreams’s claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.

OIC Dreams alleges in the alterative that Sheriff Benison does have the

authority to regulate bingo operations but that he arbitrarily and capriciously

exercises this authority in violation of federal law. (See doc. 18 ¶¶ 5–9, 24–25;

accord doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 5–9, 24–25). The standard to invoke Ex parte Young is a low

one: “[a]n allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law where the requested relief

is prospective is ordinarily sufficient.” PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d at 1288

(quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, to the extent OIC Dreams challenges

Sheriff Benison’s conduct as a violation of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment

does not bar this claim, and the court DENIES Sheriff Benison’s motion to dismiss.

ii. OIC Dreams has adequately alleged a claim for relief.

A substantive due process claim has two elements: (1) deprivation of a federal

constitutionally protected interest and (2) the deprivation was caused by an abuse of

governmental power. Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir.

2016). Sheriff Benison focuses exclusively on the first element of this claim and

contends that OIC Dreams has not adequately alleged these elements because OIC

Dreams has not alleged a violation of a state-created property right rather than a

constitutionally protected right. (Doc. 22 at 4–7). In response, OIC Dreams concedes

that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause does not ordinarily protect

state-created property rights and invokes a limited exception to this rule for

infringement on those rights by a “legislative act.” (See doc. 25 at 6–7) (quotation

marks omitted). In reply, Sheriff Benison

The Due Process Clause protects the fundamental rights created by the United

States Constitution. See Greenbriar Vill., LLC v. Mountain Brook, 345 F.3d 1258,

1262 (11th Cir. 2003). Property rights however derive from “independent source[s]

such as state law” and are not created by the Constitution. See id. (quotation marks

omitted). Accordingly, to the extent OIC Dreams bases its claim on the right to

operate a bingo hall license or retain any funds associated with those operations, the

court agrees with Sheriff Benison that ordinarily no substantive due process claim

would be viable. See id.

But “[t]here is at least one exception to this rule[:] where a person’s state-

created rights are infringed by a legislative act, the substantive component of the

Due Process Clause generally protects that person from arbitrary and irrational

governmental action.” PBT Real Est., LLC v. Town of Palm Beach, 988 F.3d 1274,

1284 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). OIC Dreams concedes that Sheriff

Benison “is generally considered part of the executive branch” (see doc. 25 at 8), but

that is not the end of the inquiry “because local governing bodies often” engage in

both executive and legislative acts, Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d 1274, 1280

(11th Cir. 2014); see also Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2005)

(“While the actions of some government officials can easily be categorized as

legislative or executive, for other[ government officials], . . . sorting out which hat

they were wearing when they made a decision can be difficult.”).

Instead, the court considers the type of conduct alleged, the scope of those

affected by it, and the type of challenge to that conduct. See Lewis, 409 F.3d at 1273;

Kentner, 750 F.3d at 1280; PBT Real Est., LLC, 988 F.3d at 1284; McKinney v. Pate,

20 F.3d 1550, 1557 n.9 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also, e.g, Reyes v. N. Tex.

Tollway Auth., (NTTA), 861 F.3d 558, 562–63 (5th Cir. 2017) (describing the

“legislative/executive dichotomy” and holding that a state-agency’s imposition of

fees for toll roads was a legislative act because “[t]he fees [we]re broadly imposed”

and “[t]he lawsuit s[ought] to invalidate the fees across the board, not just a particular

application of the fees that had an egregious impact”).1

“[E]xecutive acts typically arise from the ministerial or administrative

activities of members of the executive branch” and “characteristically apply to a

limited number of persons (and often only one person).” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557

n.9. For example, “employment terminations or individual acts of zoning

enforcement” are executive acts. Kentner, 750 F.3d at 1280; see, e.g., Lewis, 409

F.3d at 1273 (“[A]n administrative decision by [the county commissioner] to enforce

the current property designation to the economic detriment of the [homeowners] . . .

is a textbook ‘executive act.’”). An as applied challenge to governmental conduct

“always” challenges an executive act and cannot support a substantive due process

claim. PBT Real Est., LLC, 988 F.3d at 1284 n.20 (quotation marks omitted).

1 Decisions of the Fifth Circuit are not binding on this court, but such decisions may be cited

as persuasive authority. See Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1062 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e

consider decisions from other circuits as persuasive authority”); see also Generali v. D’Amico, 766

F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1985). The court finds the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit persuasive.

“Legislative acts, on the other hand, generally apply to a larger segment of—

if not all of—society; laws and broad-ranging executive regulations are the most

common examples.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557 n.9. A plaintiff therefore challenges

the entire law or executive regulation as constitutionally infirm. E.g., PBT Real Est.,

LLC, 988 F.3d at 1284. And to prevail on that challenge at this stage in the case, OIC

Dreams must plead that Sheriff Benison’s conduct “on its face, [i]s arbitrary and

irrational and not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Cf. id.

OIC Dreams challenges Sheriff Benison’s promulgated rules and regulations

on their face and as applied. (Doc. 18 ¶ 25; accord doc. 20-1 ¶ 25). To the extent

OIC Dreams presents an as applied challenge, the court agrees with Sheriff Benison

that no substantive due process claim is viable. See PBT Real Est., LLC, 988 F.3d at

1284 n.20. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Sheriff Benison’s motion to dismiss

any as applied substantive due process challenge.

But OIC Dreams also makes a facial substantive due process challenge. (See

doc. 18 ¶ 25; accord doc. 20-1 ¶ 25). OIC Dreams alleges that the procedure by

which Sheriff Benison orders the monthly assessments is arbitrary and capricious

because he bases the assessment on “an arbitrary amount” and uses these fees to pay

the Department’s legal fees. (See doc. 18 ¶¶ 8, 14, 24; accord doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 8, 14,

24). The court is satisfied that at this stage in the case, OIC Dreams has adequately

alleged a substantive due process violation. Accordingly, the court DENIES Sheriff

Benison’s motion to dismiss to the extent OIC Dreams presents a facial challenge to

Sheriff Benison’s rules and regulations. (Doc. 22).

Although the court agrees that this claim is not futile and therefore GRANTS

OIC Dreams’s motion for leave to amend, OIC Dreams cannot plead its claim as

proposed. (See doc. 20-1). In the proposed second amended complaint, OIC Dreams

again challenges Sheriff Benison’s rules and regulations on their face and as applied.

(See id. ¶ 25). Because an as applied challenge would be futile, OIC Dreams cannot

continue with this challenge, and the court DENIES leave to amend on that basis.

Regarding OIC Dreams’s facial challenge, OIC Dreams appears to proceed

under two legal theories: (1) that Sheriff Benison lacks authority under the local

amendment to the Alabama Constitution to impose the monthly assessments (see id.

¶¶ 15, 21, 23, 26) and (2) that Sheriff Benison has exercised that authority arbitrarily

and capriciously (see id. ¶¶ 8, 14, 24). To the extent OIC Dreams intends to continue

to pursue the first theory, the Eleventh Amendment precludes the court from

exercising jurisdiction over it, and the court therefore DENIES OIC Dreams’s

motion. The court GRANTS OIC Dreams leave to amend its complaint to pursue its

theory that Sheriff Benison has violated its substantive due process rights by

arbitrarily and capriciously exercising his authority to impose assessments on bingo

nonprofits.

b. OIC Dreams’s Equal Protection Claim

In OIC Dreams’s proposed second amended complaint, OIC Dreams alleges

an equal protection claim. (See doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 27–32). “[T]he Equal Protection Clause

requires government entities to treat similarly situated” people or businesses alike.

See Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006); Alamo Rent-

A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir. 1987).

Because OIC Dreams does not allege that it belongs to a suspect class or that Sheriff

Benison has infringed upon a fundamental right, this proposed claim is subject to

rational basis review. (See doc. 24 at 6); see also, e.g., Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty.

Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009).

“The rational basis test asks (1) whether the government has the power or

authority to regulate the particular area in question, and (2) whether there is a rational

relationship between the government’s objective and the means it has chosen to

achieve it.” Leib, 558 F.3d at 1306. The local amendment to the Alabama

Constitution expressly gives Sheriff Benison the power to regulate nonprofit bingo

halls in the county. See Ala. Const. Amend. 743. Accordingly, the court’s analysis

proceeds directly to the second inquiry: “whether there is a rational relationship

between [Sheriff Benison’s] objective and the means [he] has chosen to achieve it.”

Leib, 558 F.3d at 1306.

Before the court examines OIC Dreams’s proposed claim, the court discards

as conclusory paragraphs 28, 31, and 32. (See doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 28, 31–32). The Eleventh

Circuit has held that similar allegations “carry no weight” because they are legal

conclusions. Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013). Accordingly,

these proposed allegations are not entitled to the presumption of truth. See id.; see

also Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A

proposed amendment may be denied for futility when the complaint as amended

would still be properly dismissed.”) (quotation marks omitted).

After discarding the conclusory allegations, OIC Dreams has alleged: (1) OIC

Dreams is a nonprofit; (2) OIC Dreams is similarly situated to other nonprofits in

Greene County; (3) Sheriff Benison does not require nonprofits in Greene County

that do not operate bingo halls to pay a monthly assessment to remain in operation;

and (4) when Sheriff Benison requires OIC Dreams and other nonprofit bingo halls

to pay a monthly assessment, he has treated bingo nonprofits different from other

nonprofits in Greene County. (Doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 29–30).

Sheriff Benison asserts that this claim is futile because there is a rational basis

for treating bingo nonprofits and other nonprofits differently. (Doc. 24 at 7). OIC

Dreams contends that Sheriff Benison’s asserted reason is procedurally improper

because of the lack of evidentiary record before the court and irrational in any event.

(Doc. 26 at 4–7). The court considers each argument in turn.

First, a court can conduct rational basis review without the benefit of an

evidentiary record. E.g., Leib, 558 F.3d at 1306 (concluding that a challenged

ordinance “easily” survives rational basis review based at the motion to dismiss

stage). Indeed, “under rational basis review, [Sheriff Benison] has no obligation to

produce evidence to sustain the rationality of” his conduct because constitutionality

“is presumed.” Id. (quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

However, OIC Dreams has adequately alleged that Sheriff Benison’s

treatment of bingo nonprofits lacks a rational basis. Sheriff Benison contends that

the assessments he imposes are used to regulate bingo and prevent nonprofit bingo

halls “from economically draining Greene County.” (Doc. 24 at 7) (quotation marks

omitted). OIC Dreams responds that this reason “is not a conceivable rational basis”

because Sheriff Benison already collects a license fee and does not use the

assessment funds to benefit Greene County but rather, to pay the Sheriff’s

Department’s legal fees. (Doc. 26 at 6). The court is satisfied that at this stage in the

case, OIC Dreams has adequately alleged an equal protection violation.

Accordingly, the court GRANTS OIC Dreams’s motion because the court

finds that the proposed equal protection claim is not futile.

c. OIC Dreams’s Taking Clause Claim

In OIC Dreams’s proposed second amended complaint, OIC Dreams alleges

that the monthly assessments constitute an unlawful taking. (Doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 33–37).

Sheriff Benison asserts that this claim is futile because a claim under the Takings

Clause must allege a taking of property for public use and OIC Dreams intends to

plead that Sheriff Benison takes the monthly assessments “not for a public purpose.”

(Doc. 24 at 13–14; see doc. 20-1 ¶ 36); see also U.S. Const. amend. V (“[P]rivate

property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). In reply,

OIC Dreams explains that it inserted the “not” in error. (Doc. 26 at 8).

But even if OIC Dreams corrects this error, the claim remains subject to

dismissal. OIC Dreams expressly asserts that the monthly assessments are an

unlawful taking because Sheriff Benison lacks authority under the local amendment

to the Alabama Constitution to impose these fees. (See doc. 20-1 ¶ 36). But as

described above, the Eleventh Amendment precludes the court from exercising

jurisdiction over this theory. See McClendon v. Georgia Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261

F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a federal court “can raise an

Eleventh Amendment issue on [its] own motion”).

Accordingly, the court finds that permitting OIC Dreams to pursue this claim

in this court would be futile and DENIES leave to plead the Takings Clause claim

as proposed.

Hl, CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the pending motions.

(Docs. 20, 22). The court DIRECTS OIC Dreams to file its second amended

complaint, as amended by this order, on or before December 18, 2023.

DONE and ORDERED this December 13, 2023.

ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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