Chandler v. Tuscaloosa County, Alabama

U.S. DISTRICT.

N.D. OF AL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

TAWANDA CHANDLER, inher __)

capacity as the Personal )

Representative of the Estate of )

CHRISTOPHER LEE, )

) 7:23-cv-01174-LSC

Plaintiff, )

)

V. )

)

TUSCALOOSA COUNTY, )

ALABAMA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Before the Court is Defendant Tuscaloosa County, Alabama’s (“The

County”) Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff Tawanda Chandler (“Plaintiff”),

in her capacity as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher Lee,

brings this action for wrongful death and civil rights violations against a host of

defendants. (Doc. 15.) Only Plaintiff’s claims against The County are relevant here.

For the reasons stated below, The County’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 20) is due to

be GRANTED.

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I. Background!

On July 23, 2021, Christopher Lee reported to the Tuscaloosa County Jail to

serve a thirty (30) day sentence for a misdemeanor offense. (Doc. 15 J 23.) According

to Plaintiff, the jail was overcrowded, and instances of inmate-on-inmate violence

were frequent. (/d. J 24.) On the morning of August 3, Lee was attacked by another

inmate while resting in bed. (/d. J 25.) Plaintiff contends that even though a deputy

witnessed the attack, that deputy failed to intervene. (/d. J 26.) Instead, the deputy

reported the attack to several coworkers and supervisors, none of whom stopped the

attack. (Id. JJ 27, 28.)

According to Plaintiff, the attack caused Lee to enter cardiac arrest. (Id. J 29.)

Medical staff at the Tuscaloosa County Jail had access to a defibrillator that Plaintiff

contends had not been properly maintained and so was inoperable at the time of

Lee’s cardiac arrest. (Jd. J 30.) Lee lost his life later that same day. (/d. J 31.)

II. Standard of Review

In general, a pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, to

1 At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept the plaintiffs version of the facts as

true, and “[construe] the reasonable inferences therefrom . . . in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). The following facts

are, therefore, taken from Plaintiff’s allegations in her complaint, and the Court makes no ruling

on their veracity.

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withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint

“must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ray

vy. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Stated another way, the factual

allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). A

complaint that “succeeds in identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render

[the necessary elements of a claim] plausible” will survive a motion to dismiss. Watts

vy. Fla. Int?l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first “identiflies|

pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then “assume[s] the[]

veracity” of the complaint’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine[s|

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Jd Review of the

complaint is “‘a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial

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experience and common sense.” Jd. If the pleading “contain[s] enough information

regarding the material elements of a cause of action to support recovery under some

‘viable legal theory,’” it satisfies the notice pleading standard. Am. Fed’n of Labor &

Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Mzami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683-84 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Ill. Discussion

Plaintiff’ s complaint asserts six counts against various individuals, all of whom

are alleged to have committed actionable conduct within the scope of their

employment with The County. On that basis, five counts are also asserted against

The County under a theory of vicarious liability. The County moves to dismiss all

claims against it, arguing that it cannot be held vicariously liable for the conduct of

the individually named defendants.

A. An Alabama County may not be held vicariously liable for the conduct of

a sheriff or his employees (Counts I, III, IV, V, and VI).

‘‘Alabama counties are not charged with the duty of operating jails; instead, it

is the county sheriffs who are vested with that responsibility.” Ex parte Sumter Cnty.,

953 So.2d 1235, 1238 (Ala. 2006); Turquitt v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 137 F.3d 1285,

1289 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Under the Alabama Code, the sheriff has control over the

inmates of the jail, the employees of the jail, and the jail itself.”). The Alabama

Supreme Court, construing the Alabama Constitution, has concluded that “a sheriff

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is an executive officer of the State,” and, therefore, “is not an employee of a county

for the purposes of imposing liability on the county.” Ex parte Sumter Cnty., 953

So.2d at 1239 (citing Parker yv. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 442-43 (Ala. 1987)). Thus,

Alabama “counties cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of

the sheriff or his deputies in operating a county jail.” Jd. at 1238 (citing Keng ». Colbert

County, 620 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1993)). Instead, “‘any liability of a county resulting

from an incident at a county jail must be based on a failure of county officials to

provide an adequate facility.” Jd. at 1239.

All claims that Plaintiff asserts against The County are premised on a theory

of vicarious liability; she does not allege that county officials failed to provide an

adequate facility. (See doc 15 | 38, 55, 61, 69, 78.) “Because [Plaintiff] does not

allege that |The] County breached a duty to furnish and maintain a jail facility, [s]he

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Ex parte Sumter Cnty., 953

So.2d at 1239. Accordingly, The County’s motion to dismiss all claims against it 1s

due to be GRANTED.

B. A local government may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for

the conduct of its employees (Counts IV, V, and VI).

Independent but similar grounds further support dismissal of Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claims against The County.

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local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted

solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To impose § 1983 liability on a [local government], a

plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the [local

government] had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that

constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” 7. W. ex

rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 603 (11th Cir. 2010)

(quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). “This liability is

premised on a constitutional violation carried out by the County itself and cannot be

based on theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Knight through Kerr v.

Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 819 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Czty of Canton, Ohio v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).

Plaintiff claims that The County, a local government, is vicariously liable for

injuries inflicted solely by its employees or agents. (See doc. 15 [ 61, 69, 78.) Plaintiff

does not allege that The County had any “custom or policy” that caused a violation

of a constitutional right. (Doc. 15 73); T.-W. ex rel. Wilson, 610 F.3d at 603. Thus,

Plaintiff fails to state an actionable § 1983 claim against The County. Knight through

Kerr, 856 F.3d at 819; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, The County’s Motion

to Dismiss is due to be GRANTED as to Counts IV, V, and VI.

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, The County’s Motion to Dismiss is due to

be GRANTED. The Court will enter an Order consistent with this Memorandum

of Opinion.

DONE anp ORDERED ON NOVEMBER 27, 2023.

L. SCOTT Ce

UNITED STATES DIS¥RICT JUDGE

215647

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