The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
Johnnie S. Lee, pro se )
)
Plaintiff,
)
v. ) 7:23-cv-00409-LSC
)
Tuscaloosa City Schools, et
al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Before the Court is Defendant’s Tuscaloosa City Board of Education
(“TCB”)1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Johnnie S. Lee’s Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 15) and Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint (Doc. 16). Also
before the Court is Defendants’ Paulette Cobb, Deron Cameron, Lucile Prewitt,
and Michael J. Daria (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 18) and Joinder of TCB’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 17). For the reasons
provided below, the Motions to Dismiss are due to be granted. (Doc. 15, 18.) The
Motions to Strike are mooted. (Doc. 16, 17.)
I. BACKGROUND
1 While Plaintiff identified “Tuscaloosa City Schools” as a defendant in her Complaint,
Tuscaloosa City Board of Education has appeared and identified itself as the proper defendant.
Plaintiff filed her first Complaint on March 30, 2023. (Doc. 1.) She then filed,
without leave or direction of the Court, her first Amended Complaint on April 20,
2023 (Doc. 3.) On May 16, 2023, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint,
contending that it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Doc. 4,
6.) On May 17, 2023, the Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff to respond to the
Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 4, 6.) within twenty-one days. (Doc. 7.) Twenty-six days
later, on June 12, 2023, the Plaintiff filed an affidavit. (Doc. 9.) The Defendants filed
a Joint Motion to Strike and Respond to Plaintiff’s Affidavit (Doc. 11) and an
Amended Joint Motion to Strike and Respond to Plaintiff’s Affidavit (Doc. 12). The
Court considered Plaintiff’s affidavit as an effort from the Plaintiff to provide facts
missing in the Complaint.
On July 21, 2023, the Court then issued an Order stating that it had reviewed
the Plaintiff’s Complaint and the parties’ filings, and that it was dismissing Counts
1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11 because those counts were based on statutes that either lack
a civil cause of action or were obviously inapplicable in this context. (Doc. 13.) The
Court further dismissed Count 12 for failure to state a claim because it merely
requested a trial by jury. (Id.) As to the remaining claims, the Court noted that the
Complaint as drafted did not indicate that the Defendants were liable for any legally
actionable conduct. (Id.) But given that the Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court
allowed the Plaintiff to file another amended complaint and instructed her to file her
amended complaint within twenty-one days of the Order. (Id.)
Plaintiff then filed her Second Amended Complaint on August 14, 2023.
(Doc. 14.) On August 25, 2023, the Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 15,
18) and Motions to Strike the Complaint as untimely (Doc. 16, 17). On August 28,
2023, the Court issued an Order stating that the Second Amended Complaint closely
resembled the deficient First Amended Complaint, and as currently drafted, it did
not indicate that Defendants are liable for any legally actionable misconduct. (Doc.
19.) But given that Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court allowed Plaintiff to appear in
writing within fifteen days and show how the Second Amended Complaint
demonstrated that she was entitled to relief. (Doc. 19.)
The parties have responded to the Court’s Show Cause Order. (Doc. 20, 21,
22, 23, 24.) In her Reply to the Individual Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Show
Cause, Plaintiff asks the Court for a third amendment to her complaint if the Court
finds the Second Amended Complaint is still not sufficient. (Doc. 24 ¶ 2.) As the
Court has already allowed Plaintiff to file two amendments to her original
Complaint, it is clear to the Court that Plaintiff will be unable to state a cause of
action. The Court therefore denies this request and renders judgment on the Second
Amended Complaint.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, a pleading must include “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, to
withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint “must
plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ray v. Spirit
Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Stated another way, the factual
allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). A
complaint that “succeeds in identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render
[the necessary elements of a claim] plausible” will survive a motion to dismiss. Watts
v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, this Court first “identif[ies]
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This Court then “assume[s] the[]
veracity” of the complaint’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” and “determine[s]
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. Review of the
complaint is “a context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. If the pleading “contain[s] enough information
regarding the material elements of a cause of action to support recovery under some
‘viable legal theory,’” it satisfies the notice pleading standard. Am. Fed’n of Labor
& Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683–84 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
III. ANALYSIS
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts four causes of action: 1)
a violation of 42 USC § 1983 due to defendants violating the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1964; 2) a violation of 18 USC § 1985; 3) wrongful termination;
and 4) injunctive relief. None of these causes of action state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Plaintiff’s first cause of action is clearly deficient. 42 USC § 1983 provides a
civil cause of action for a plaintiff who is deprived of a right secured under the
Constitution or federal law when that deprivation occurs under the color of law. See
Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). At the outset, the
Court cannot identify “the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964.” The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 is a statute that amended Title VII, and Title
VII was originally enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Therefore, because
Plaintiff has not pointed to any other constitutional or statutory right she was
deprived of, the Court assumes that Plaintiff intended to state a claim under Title
VII.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. In her original Complaint,
Plaintiff argues that she was terminated because of her race. (Doc. 1 at 18 ¶ 22.) In
her affidavit, she further states that she was “discriminated, retaliated, defamed, and
harassed against for reporting a problem in the workplace which involved 3
Caucasian teachers” (Doc. 9 ¶ 12) and she states that the school was a “hostile work
environment.” (Doc. 9 ¶ 4). In support of these arguments, Plaintiff has merely stated
1) the race of various defendants and 2) the race of the teachers who Plaintiff
complained about, in a group chat, for placing students on the wrong buses. She has
not even asserted her own race, much less alleged any other facts that would give
rise to a Title VII claim. As a result, Plaintiff’s first cause of action is due to be
dismissed.
Plaintiff’s second cause of action is also deficient. First, 18 USC § 1985 is not
a statute. 45 USC § 1985 is a statute, and it prohibits “conspiracy to interfere with
civil rights.” Regardless, even assuming Plaintiff intended to state a cause of action
under 45 USC § 1985, she has failed to do so. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that
would suggest a conspiracy. Therefore, Plaintiff’s second cause of action is due to
be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s third cause of action is also deficient. Plaintiff has not stated a legal
basis for this wrongful termination claim. If Plaintiff intended to state a claim under
Title VII, as explained above, she has failed to do so. If Plaintiff intended to state a
claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act, that cause of action only protects
federal employees. The Court can think of no other federal causes of action under
which the Plaintiff could have intended to assert a claim for “wrongful termination.”
If Plaintiff intended to assert a state law claim for wrongful termination, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, if there is a supplemental claim. See
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
third cause of action is also due to be dismissed.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is also deficient. Plaintiff requests an
injunction “to prohibit respondents from further participating in activities listed in
the summary and specified relief section such as slandering the petitioner to potential
employers.” (Doc. 14 at 4–5) But Plaintiff has not made any specific factual
allegations regarding this alleged “slander.” Plaintiff has only made the conclusory
remark that Defendants have slandered her and stated that she cannot find
employment due to Tuscaloosa City Schools being listed as her last place of
employment. (Id. at 5–6.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is also due to
be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are
granted. (Doc. 15, 18.) The Motions to Strike are mooted. (Doc. 16, 17.) This
action is dismissed without prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED on September 28, 2023.
L. Scott G
United States DistWét Judge
215755