The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
CHRISTY A. HENDRICKS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No.: 6:22-cv-01008-JHE
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL )
SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Christy A. Hendricks (“Hendricks”) seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
and § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (“Commissioner”), denying her application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 1). Hendricks timely pursued and exhausted her
administrative remedies. This case is therefore ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
undersigned has carefully considered the record and, for the reasons stated below, the
Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED, and this action is REMANDED for further
proceedings.
Factual and Procedural History
Hendricks filed an application for a period of disability and DIB on September 17, 2019,
alleging she became disabled on April 25, 2019. (Tr. 222). Hendricks’ claim was initially denied
on February 14, 2020. (Tr. 145). On March 18, 2020, she filed a Request for Reconsideration,
1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73, the parties in this case have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate
Judge conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 11).
which was subsequently denied on August 4, 2020. (Tr. 151, 154). After Hendricks requested a
hearing, on October 14, 2021, a hearing was held before Judge Cynthia Brown, an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 32). On November 3, 2021, the ALJ issued an unfavorable opinion,
finding Hendricks “not disabled.” (Tr. 12, 26). Hendricks filed a Request for Review of Hearing
Decision on December 15, 2021. (Tr. 219). On June 15, 2021, the Appeals Council denied
Hendricks’ request. (Tr. 1). On that date, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. On August 9, 2022, Hendricks initiated this action. (Doc. 1).
Born on December 3, 1980, Hendricks was 40 years old on her alleged onset date. (Tr.
25). Hendricks has at least a high school education and has past relevant work as an office manager
(a skilled job with a sedentary exertional level) and a security guard (a semi-skilled job with a light
exertional level). (Tr. 24-25, 50).
Standard of Review2
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. The
function of this Court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 390, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1422 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir.
2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239
(11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
2 In general, the legal standards applied are the same whether a claimant seeks Social
Security Income or DIB. However, separate, parallel statutes and regulations exist for DIB and
SSI claims. Therefore, citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to the appropriate
parallel provision as context dictates. The same applies to citations for statutes or regulations found
in quoted court decisions.
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accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Id.
This Court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence.
However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity
attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala,
985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law,
or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal
analysis has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d
1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of
disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations
promulgated thereunder.3 The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability to do any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish entitlement to
disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or mental impairment” which
“must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
3 The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. Parts
400 to 499, revised as of April 1, 2020
3
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;
(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed
by the [Commissioner];
(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and
(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national
economy.
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R.
section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999);
accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “Once the claimant has
satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed
impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the
burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job.” Pope,
998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner
must further show such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Id.
Findings of the Administrative Law Judge
After consideration of the entire record and application of the sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ made the following findings:
At Step One, the ALJ found Hendricks had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
during the period from her alleged onset date of April 25, 2019, through her date last insured
(“DLI”), September 30, 2021. (Tr. 17). At Step Two, the ALJ found Hendricks has the following
severe impairments: seizure disorder, lumbar and cervical degenerative disc disease, migraine
headaches, osteoarthritis, attention deficit disorder, and panic disorder. (Tr. 17). At Step Three,
the ALJ found Hendricks did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
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or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(Tr. 18-19).
Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined Hendricks’ residual functioning
capacity (“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determined that, through her DLI, Hendricks had the RFC
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a), except she can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs but never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds.
She should avoid concentrated exposure to noise, vibration and any exposure
to hazards such as commercial driving, large bodies of water, unprotected
heights and hazardous machinery. She would need the option to change
position from standing or walking to a seated position or vice versa as
frequently as every 30 minutes while remaining at her workstation and on task.
She can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions and maintain
attention for two-hour periods. She should have no interaction with the general
public. She can tolerate occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors.
Changes in the work setting should be gradual and occur no more than
occasionally.
(Tr. 19-24). At Step Four, the ALJ determined Hendricks was unable to perform any of her past
relevant work. (Tr. 24). At Step Five, the ALJ determined, based on Hendricks’ age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy Hendricks could perform. (Tr. 25-26). Therefore, the ALJ determined
Hendricks had not been under a disability and denied her claim. (Tr. 26).
Analysis
Although the court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported
by substantial evidence or because improper legal standards were applied, “[t]his does not relieve
the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial
evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838
(11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Williams, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court,
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however, “abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).
Hendricks contends the ALJ’s finding that she can perform a reduced range of light work
is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 12 at 17). Specifically, Hendricks contends (1)
the ALJ failed to account for her migraine headaches in her RFC (id. at 18-20); and (2) the ALJ
failed to properly evaluate her credibility (id. at 21-28). Because the first of these reasons
necessitates reversal and requires remand, the undersigned does not discuss Hendricks’ second
argument, which is based on credibility.
A. Consideration of Hendricks’ Migraine Impairment
Hendricks alleges that, while the ALJ found her migraine headaches to be a severe
impairment, the ALJ failed to account for them in her RFC finding. (Doc. 12 at 18). The
Commissioner contends that this characterization is inaccurate. (Doc. 13 at 14). Specifically, the
Commissioner points to the fact that the ALJ limited Hendricks to avoiding any exposure to
hazards and concentrated exposure to noise and vibrations; understanding, remembering, and
carrying out simple instructions; maintaining attention for 2-hour periods; and tolerating limited
social interactions and changes, but did not include further functional limitations. (Doc. 13 at 14)
(citing tr. 19-24). It is unclear how this limitation would help with Hendricks’ condition.
Medical records from September 2018 (seven months prior to Hendricks’ alleged onset
date) indicate that Hendricks reported she was experiencing 10 debilitating migraines a month.
(Doc. 12 at 20) (citing tr. 549). The Commissioner contends these records do not support
Hendricks’ argument. (Doc. 13 at 14). However, the medical records do indicate that Topamax4
4 According to WebMD, Topamax “is used alone or with other medications to prevent and
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was not able to control Hendricks’ symptoms, so she used Fioricet5 (butalbital) occasionally. (Tr.
549). The records provide that Hendricks reported she would need 10 or more Fioricet some
months and that, although she took this medicine, “[s]he had not had a change in the individual
character of her headaches.” (Id.).
There is other record evidence that Hendricks continued to experience migraines even with
medication. Treatment records from Alabama Neurology and Sleep Medicine dated January 30,
2020, indicate Hendricks had been dealing with migraines and, despite medication, the migraines
had “been about the same.” (Tr. 682). The medical records note that Hendricks treated her
migraines with Topamax, but continued to use “an occasional Fioricet[,] which work[ed] well.”
(Tr. 682-84).
Additionally, Hendricks completed a Headache Questionnaire on June 20, 2020, detailing
the severity of her migraines. (Tr. 324). Hendricks stated her migraines occurred “at random[,]”
and she could “never really tell when one is going to attack,” (Tr. 322). The migraines ranged in
severity and duration, with some of the migraines lasting “4-6 hours” and others lasting “24-72
hours.” (Tr. 322). Hendricks stated that during these migraines she cannot tolerate light;
experiences blurry vision; sees flashes of light; experiences dizziness or lightheadedness; cannot
tolerate sounds; and “frequently” vomits. (Tr. 322). Hendricks also explained that these migraines
affect her ability to concentrate to the extent that she “cannot concentrate on anything at all as
simple as fixing [herself] a microwave dinner or reading a page or two in [a] newspaper.” (Tr.
control seizures (epilepsy). This medication is also used to prevent migraine headaches and
decrease how often you get them.” https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-14494-6019/topamax-
oral/topiramate-oral/details (last visited June 28, 2023) (emphasis added).
5 Fioricet is used, in combination with other medications, to treat tension headaches. See
https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-15869/fioricet-oral/details (last visited June 28, 2023).
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322). Hendricks testified that she experiences these migraines “anywhere from one to three,
sometimes four [times] a week.” (Tr. 39).
Hendricks asserts that, due to her migraine headaches alone she would miss multiple days
of work per month. (Doc. 12 at 19). At the hearing the vocational expert testified that all work
would be eliminated if Hendricks were to miss three or more days of work per month. (Tr. 53).
In response, the Commissioner contends that while her migraine symptoms were not fully
controlled by Topamax, Hendricks was able to manage her migraines by also using Fioricet. (Doc.
13 at 14). Additionally, the Commissioner explains that the ALJ considered Hendricks’ migraines
and limited her RFC to avoiding any exposure to noise and vibration; understanding, remembering,
and carrying out simple instructions; maintaining attention for two-hour periods; and tolerating
limited social interactions and changes but did not have further functional limitations. (Doc. 13 at
14) (citing 19-24). This is not a complete picture of the records.
The Commissioner argues that Hendricks is simply asking the Court to “play the role of
ALJ” and reweigh the record evidence. (Doc. 13 at 16-17). Specifically, the Commissioner
contends that, to find reversible error, the Court would have to credit Hendricks’ evidence despite
contradictory evidence in the record. (Id. at 16). This Court understands that it may not decide
the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). Instead, upon reviewing the
record as a whole, the undersigned finds the ALJ has not supported her findings with substantial
evidence. The only evidence the ALJ points to when concluding that Hendricks’ migraines were
fully considered are the medical records revealing that Hendricks was using Topamax and Fioricet
to help control her symptoms. (Doc. 13 at 15). However, those records plainly show that
Hendricks was continuing to experience these ailments, and it is unclear how Hendricks would be
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able to work while experiencing headaches/migraines at the level reflected in the treatment notes
(or while taking this medication). The ALJ’s conclusion that Hendricks’ symptoms were fully or
largely controlled is undermined by the treatment records (as well as Hendricks’ consistent
reporting) outlined above. Simply, it is unclear what “conflicting evidence” the Commissioner 1s
relying on when the records cited show Hendricks’ migraines were not drastically reduced, but
“controlled” or retained at a high frequency.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the administrative record
and memoranda of the parties, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying
Hendricks’ claim for Social Security Disability benefits is REVERSED, and this action is
REMANDED.
DONE this 27th day of September, 2023.
JOHN H. ENGLAND, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE