Brown v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 4:22-cv-01485-LSC

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

The Plaintiff, Timothy Brown (“Brown” or “Plaintiff”) appeals from the

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“Commissioner”) denying his applications for Child’s Insurance Benefits (“CIB”)

and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Brown timely pursued and exhausted

his administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for judicial

review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§405(g), 1383(c)(3).

Brown was twenty-one when he applied for CIB and SSI benefits, and twenty-

three years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision.

(Tr. 12.) He claims he became disabled on March 8th, 2018, at the age of nineteen

(Tr. at 239-47.) According to the ALJ, Brown has completed high school.1 (Tr. at

19, 263.) His only past work experience is as a spot-welder, which is a job he had

for one month. (Tr. 415.) He is 5’8” and has a BMI of 45.77.2 (Tr. at 383-84.) Brown

attributes his disability to piriformis syndrome, scoliosis, uneven hips, numbness,

Asperger’s Syndrome, social anxiety, and obesity. (Tr. at 31-32, 82, 84, 262, 305,

316.)

To be eligible for CIB, a claimant who is over age eighteen and not a full-time

student must prove he became disabled prior to age twenty-two. See 42 U.S.C. §

402(d)(1)(B)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a)(5). The Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an

individual is disabled and thus eligible for CIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The

evaluator will follow the steps sequentially until making a finding of either disabled

or not disabled; if no finding is made, the analysis will proceed to the next step. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the plaintiff is

engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),

1 In other documentation, the Plaintiff asserts (and the ALJ acknowledges) that he has only

completed 10th or 11th grade. See Tr. at 14, 35-36, 73, 415.

2 There are varying heights, weights, and BMIs attributed to the Plaintiff in the record. These

range from 5’8” to 6’1”, 200 to 301 pounds, and 40.32 to 45.77 on the BMI scale. See Tr. at 18,

83, 89, 383-84, 479.

416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator moves on to

the next step.

The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of

the plaintiff’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of

impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational

requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding

of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The decision

depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440

F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical evidence in

the record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff was not disabled).

Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the

plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal to

the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed

impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and

416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

If the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or

medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See id.

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine

whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of her past relevant

work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff’s impairment

or combination of impairments does not prevent him from performing his past

relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.

The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff’s RFC,

age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the plaintiff can

make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).

If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find him not disabled. Id.;

see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff cannot perform other

work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).

In this case, the ALJ first found that Brown had not attained the age of 22 as

of March 8, 2018, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 12.) The ALJ also determined that

Brown had not engaged in SGA since the alleged onset of his disability. (Id.) At step

two, the ALJ determined that Brown had the following severe impairments prior to

reaching age twenty-two: scoliosis, piriformis syndrome, obesity, anxiety, and

somatic symptom disorder. (Tr. 13; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).) At step three,

the ALJ found that the combination of impairments did not meet or equal a listed

impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 13.)

The ALJ then, based on the entire record, determined that Brown had the RFC

to perform medium work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), 416.967(c):

[H]e can frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He can frequently

climb ramps and stairs and occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and

scaffolds. He can have occasional exposure to extreme temperatures

and vibration. He should avoid unprotected heights and hazardous

machinery. He can understand, remember, and carry out simple

instructions. He can have infrequent contact with the public such that

public contact is not required by the duties of the job. He can engage in

occasional decision-making and have occasional interaction with

coworkers and supervisors. If provided midmorning, lunch, and

midafternoon breaks, he can sustain these tasks over an eight-hour day.

(Tr. 15.)

The ALJ relied on testimony from the Vocational Expert (VE) indicating that

the plaintiff could perform work as a kitchen helper, food service worker, and dry

clean helper. (Tr. at 19-20; 73-74.) As a result, the ALJ found that Brown was not

disabled from March 8th, 2018 through March 28, 2022, the date of the decision.

(Tr. 20.) The Appeals Council denied Brown’s request for review. (Tr. 1.)

II. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there

is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives

deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are

supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions.

See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).

Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210

(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir.

2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers

to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding

from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177,

1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar.

Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof

preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the decision is

supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin v. Sullivan,

894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard [for

review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its entirety

to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815

F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th

Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for

reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).

III. Discussion

Brown alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded

because the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, particularly

as to his piriformis syndrome and scoliosis, and the ALJ did not properly consider

the Plaintiff’s obesity in combination with his scoliosis and piriformis syndrome.

(Doc. 10 at 11-18.) For the reasons detailed below, these arguments are without

merit.

A. Substantial Evidence

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints alone are insufficient to establish a disability.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.926(a); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584

(11th Cir. 1991). Subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms may establish the

presence of a disabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. See Foote

v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). The Eleventh Circuit applies a two-

part pain standard when a plaintiff claims disability due to pain or other subjective

symptoms. The plaintiff must show evidence of the underlying medical condition

and either (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged

symptoms arising from the condition, or (2) that the objectively determined medical

condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the

alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), (b), 416.929(a), (b); Social

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029; Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d

1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002).

If the first part of the pain standard is satisfied, the ALJ then evaluates the

intensity and persistence of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and their effect on his

ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); Wilson, 284 F.3d at

1225−26. In evaluating the extent to which the Plaintiff’s symptoms, such as pain,

affect his capacity to perform basic work activities, the ALJ will consider (1)

objective medical evidence, (2) the nature of Plaintiff’s symptoms, (3) the Plaintiff’s

daily activities, (4) precipitating and aggravating factors, (5) the effectiveness of

medication, (6) treatment sought for relief of symptoms, (7) any measures the

Plaintiff takes to relieve symptoms, and (8) any conflicts between a Plaintiff’s

statements and the rest of evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), (4),

416.929(c)(3), (4); SSR 16-3p. In order to discredit Plaintiff’s statements, the ALJ

must clearly “articulate explicit and adequate reasons.” See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210.

A credibility determination is a question of fact subject only to limited review in the

courts to ensure the finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Hand v.

Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1548−49 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated for rehearing en banc,

774 F.2d 428 (11th Cir. 1985), reinstated sub nom., Hand v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 275

(11th Cir. 1986). Courts in the Eleventh Circuit will not disturb a clearly articulated

finding supported by substantial evidence. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771

F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). However, a reversal is warranted if the decision

contains no indication of the proper application of the pain standard. “The question

is not ... whether [the] ALJ could have reasonably credited [Plaintiff’s] testimony,

but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.” Werner v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011).

Here, the ALJ noted that the impairments underlying Plaintiff’s medical

conditions “could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” thus

satisfying the first part of the pain standard. (Tr. 16.) However, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of

these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence in the record.” (Id.) The ALJ covered a variety of evidence to support his

conclusion, including objective medical evidence and Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints. (Tr. at 16-19.)

In his opinion, the ALJ discussed several of Brown’s medical visits and

pointed to several instances in which the Plaintiff’ subjective symptoms did not align

with the evidence. (See Tr. at 16-19.) First, the ALJ pointed to Brown’s treatment by

Quality of Life Health Services (“QOL”). (Tr. 16.) According to the medical records

from QOL, his “physical examination was unremarkable, particularly his

musculoskeletal exam and straight leg raise test were negative.” (Tr. at 16, 384.)

Second, Plaintiff had a lumbar spine x-ray performed on February 4, 2021 at

Gadsden Regional Medical Center. (Tr. at 17, 461.) This x-ray showed “mild

apparent disc space narrowing at L4-5 and L5-S1.” (Id.) Nonetheless, his physical

exam conducted on the same day showed normal range of motion. (Tr. at 17, 464.)

Third, on March 3, 2021, the plaintiff went for an orthopedic evaluation. (Tr. at 18,

422.) At this visit, Brown informed the doctor that he believed he had piriformis

syndrome and that he believed his left hip sticks out. However, the bilateral hip x-

ray showed “[t]he sacroiliac joints and pubic symphysis are unremarkable. No acute

fracture or malalignment of the pelvis.” (Tr. 425.) The doctor then conducted a

scoliosis study and determined he had “dextroscoliosis centered at the mid thoracic

spine, disc space heights are maintained, and no acute compression deformity.” (Tr.

at 18, 425.) Lastly, the ALJ points to a visit to the University of Alabama at

Birmingham. Brown “reported some recent exercising for piriformis syndrome with

some benefit.” (Tr. at 18, 484.) Further, the imaging “failed to reveal any evidence

of discogenic changes along L5-S1 or any other instability.” (Tr. at 18, 486.) All of

these findings by medical professionals combined allowed the ALJ to properly reach

the determination that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence

and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical

evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. 16.) The ALJ concluded the

determination by stating that Brown may:

[R]easonably experience periodic episodes of pain, discomfort, other

symptoms and some physical limitations; however, the records do not

support a finding that his ability to exert himself physically is seriously

reduced such that he could not engage in work activity at the level set

forth in his residual functional capacity.

(Tr. 19.)

Throughout the ALJ opinion, he also points to several actions by the Plaintiff

that contradict some of his subjective complaints. (See Tr. 15.) For example, he is

able to sit for several hours to play his games and stream online content.3 (Id.)

Further, he also helps with “laundry, washing dishes, cooking, cleaning, and paying

bills.” (Id.)

For the reasons detailed above, this Court finds there was substantial evidence

for the ALJ to find that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence

and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical

evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. 16.) Thus, this Court will not disturb

the decision of the ALJ.

B. Obesity Consideration

Brown also alleges the ALJ did not properly consider his obesity in

conformity with his scoliosis and piriformis syndrome. (Tr. at 16-19.) In support of

this contention, the Plaintiff cites the Social Security Ruling 02-1p, 2002 (Sept 12,

3 The Court notes there are inconsistencies regarding his time spent playing video games in the

record. The ALJ relied on a psychological evaluation the Plaintiff had on January 13, 2021 in

which the physician noted the Plaintiff spent “time on the computer (6 hours a day).” (Tr. 415.)

To the contrary, Brown stated at his hearing in front of the ALJ that he only games for “10, 20

minutes” a day. (Tr. 69.)

2002), which states that “[o]besity can cause limitation of function.” SSR 02-1p

states other aspects of how obesity affects work functionality, and notes in particular

that the “combined effects of obesity may be greater than might be expected without

obesity.” SSR 02-1p. Further, Brown cites an unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion,

Wyatt v. Bowen, for the proposition that an ALJ’s “duty of explanation will be

satisfied when the ALJ presents ‘us with findings and determinations sufficiently

articulated to permit meaningful judicial review,’ which must include specific

reference to the evidence producing his conclusion.” WL 117940, at *4 (4th Cir.

1989).

The Plaintiff’s claims are unpersuasive. Obesity may have various

corresponding risk factors which this Court does not dispute, but a diagnosis does

not necessarily establish a corresponding limitation. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405

F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff’s diagnosis of varus

leg instability and shoulder separation did not reveal the extent to which they limited

her ability to work). As such, Brown’s diagnosis of obesity does not within itself

establish that he is limited in his ability to work or that it exacerbates existing

conditions.4

Additionally, the ALJ did consider obesity. Although he determined his

4 In fact, the language of SSR 02-1p itself says obesity may have effects for individuals that

would not occur without obesity.

conditions did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment, the ALJ listed

obesity as one of Brown’s severe impairments. (Tr. 13.) He stated that he had

“evaluated the claimant’s obesity and accompanying impairments in accordance

with SSR 19-2p.” (Tr. 18.) Further, he noted:

[T]here is no substantial evidence that the claimant’s obesity precludes

him from work at the medium level of exertion with the additional

limitations. Taking into consideration the objective evidence in the

record, the undersigned is of the opinion that the claimant’s obesity does

not significantly interfere with his ability to perform physical activities

or routine movement consistent with the exertional requirements of the

above-stated residual functional capacity.

(Id.)

Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit does have a requirement that is parallel to the

Fourth Circuit’s for ALJs cited by the Plaintiff, and it was satisfied here. The

Eleventh Circuit has stated that “it is the duty of the . . . [ALJ] to make specific and

well-articulated findings as to the effect of the combination of impairments and to

decide whether the combined impairments cause the claimant to be disabled.”

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987). Specifically what is required

of the ALJ to satisfy this duty has been established by subsequent cases. For

example, in Coleman ex rel. J.K.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., the court held that the

ALJ had properly considered the cumulative effect of the plaintiff’s impairments by

finding he had no impairment or combination of impairments meeting or equaling a

listed impairment. 454 F. App’x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2011). The court specified that

an ALJ’s reference to a claimant’s “combination of impairments” demonstrates

consideration of their cumulative effect. Id. at 753 (citing Jones v. Dept’ of Health

and Human Services, 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284

F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Similar to Coleman, the ALJ clearly indicated he had considered Brown’s

obesity in concert with his other limitations with reference to the “accompanying

impairments” and “additional limitations.” (See Tr. 18.) The ALJ stated “there are

no opinions in the record from medical experts or any other type of medical or

psychological consultants, who have been designated by the Commissioner, which

indicate that the claimant’s impairments alone or in combination equal a listing.”

(Tr. 13.) (emphasis added).

The Court also acknowledges that the argument put forth by the

Commissioner is persuasive: although several medical professionals made note of

his obesity, his “treatment notes frequently showed unremarkable physical exam

findings and few complaints related to this condition.” (Doc. 11 at 10.)5

For the reasons detailed above, this Court finds that the ALJ’s consideration

of obesity in conjunction with Brown’s other impairments satisfies what is required

by the Eleventh Circuit.

5 The Commissioner points to six examples of this in the record. The only comment from doctors in regards to

Brown’s obesity were recommendations of a better diet and exercise. (See Tr. 384, 423, 460, 464, 479, 486.)

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering Brown’s argument,

this Court finds the Commissioner’s decision 1s supported by substantial evidence

and is AFFIRMED. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED on September 27, 2023.

L. Scott G

United States DistWét Judge

215708

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