Cockrell v. Pickens County Commission

U.S. DISTRICT

N.D. OF AL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

YOLANDA COCKRELL, )

Plaintiff,

v. ) 7:20-cv-01922-LSC

PICKENS COUNTY

COMMISSION, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Yolanda Cockrell (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against the Pickens County

Commission (“Defendant”), asserting claims of race and gender discrimination

under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 25.) For the

reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is due to bb GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND!

The facts set out in this opinion are gleaned from the parties’ submissions of facts claimed

to be undisputed, their respective responses to those submissions, and the Court’s own examination

of the evidentiary record. These are the “facts” for summary judgment purposes only. They may

not be the actual facts. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400

(11th Cir. 1994). The Court is not required to identify unreferenced evidence supporting a party’s

position. As such, review is limited to exhibits and specific portions of the exhibits specifically

cited by the parties. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011)

(“[D]istrict court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive

record....”).

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Plaintiff, an African American female, was employed by Defendant as the

Assistant County Administrator from 2001 until the end of 2021. (Docs. 22 4§ BC),

C(2); 29 1.) Plaintiff's duties were clerical in nature, and included data-entry,

bookkeeping, managing County finances, and recording the minutes for meetings of

the County Commission. (Doc. 30 4 I(11).) Defendant also employed a white male

named Marlin McCool, who was promoted to Buildings and Grounds Maintenance

Supervisor in 2015. (Docs. 29 § 12; 26 § 3; 26-1 § 6.) McCool was responsible for

supervising maintenance staff and performing a wide range of maintenance duties.

(Doc. 26-1 § 6.)

Pickens County is a small county with a relatively high poverty rate. (Doc.

26-1 4 3.) Although Defendant cannot afford to give its employees annual raises, it

gave several raises in the fiscal years 2015 to 2020. (Doc. 26 § 18.) During that

period, Plaintiff received either the highest or the second highest raise in every year

except 2015. (Doc. 26-4.)

In 2019, Plaintiff requested a 9.6% pay raise—from $36,500 to $40,000—for

fiscal year 2020. (Docs. 29 4 14; 26-4.) That request was denied. (Doc. 29 ¥ 14.)

Instead, Plaintiff received the same $1,040 raise approved for all employees that

year, which increased her salary to $37,540. (Docs. 26-4; 29 § 15.) However, Marlin

2 Plaintiff received the third highest raise in fiscal year 2015. In fiscal year 2020, Plaintiff

received the same raise as every other employee except Marlin McCool. (Doc. 26-4.)

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McCool successfully negotiated a 21.2% raise that same year, increasing his salary

to $36,400. (Docs. 22 § B(10); 26-4; 29 § 12.) When Plaintiff learned of McCool’s

raise, she filed a complaint with the EEOC. (Doc. 29 § 17.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if “the record taken as a

whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Hickson

Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). A genuine

dispute as to a material fact exists “if the nonmoving party has produced evidence

such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Greenberg v.

BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waddell

v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)). The trial

judge should not weigh the evidence but should determine whether there are any

genuine issues of fact that should be resolved at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give

deference to the non-moving party by “view[ing] the materials presented and all

factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Animal Legal

Def: Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing

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Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). However, “unsubstantiated

assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”

Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). Likewise,

conclusory allegations and “mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving

party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Melton v.

Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Young v. City

of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004)). In making a motion for

summary judgment, “the moving party has the burden of either negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s case or showing that there is no evidence to prove

a fact necessary to the nonmoving party’s case.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs.,

LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the trial courts must use

caution when granting motions for summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment

procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as

an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 327 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer

“to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—2(a)(1); Alvarez v. Royal Atl.

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Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Because Plaintiff has no direct

evidence of discrimination,’ she may prove her claims circumstantially under the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See id.; McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). Plaintiffs Title VII and § 1981 claims are “subject to

the same standards of proof and employ the same analytical framework.” Bryant v.

Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 n.20 (11th Cir. 2009).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff must first establish a

prima facie case of discrimination by showing that “(1) she was a qualified member

of a protected class and (2) was subjected to an adverse employment action (3) in

contrast to similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Alvarez, 610

F.3d at 1264 (enumerations added). The prima facie case creates a rebuttable

presumption that the employer has acted illegally. Jd. Defendant can rebut that

presumption by “articulating one or more legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for

its action.” Jd. Doing so shifts the burden back to Plaintiff to “produce evidence that

[Defendant’s] proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that she suffered an unlawful adverse employment action

when she, an African American female, was denied the substantial raise she sought

3 “Direct evidence of discrimination would be evidence which, if believed, would prove the

existence of a fact without inference or presumption.” Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581—

82 (11th Cir. 1989).

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for fiscal year 2020 while McCool, a white male, was given a substantial raise that

same year. There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a qualified member of a protected

class under Title VII. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs claims fail under McDonnell Douglas

because her proffered comparator, McCool, is not a “similarly situated employee.”

To establish her claims under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiff must demonstrate

that she and McCool were “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis v. City

of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). To meet

this standard, “a plaintiff and her comparators must be sufficiently similar, in an

objective sense, that they cannot reasonably be distinguished.” Jd. at 1228

(quotations omitted). Although “minor differences in job function [will not]

disqualify a would-be comparator,” id. at 1227, “comparators must perform jobs

similar to the plaintiffs; thus, the plaintiff must show that, in her job, she shared the

same type of tasks as the comparators.” Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 734-35

(11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S.

454, 457 (2006) (quotations omitted). Because McCool’s responsibilities as the

Building and Grounds Maintenance Supervisor are so inherently different from

Plaintiff's responsibilities as the Assistant Administrator for Pickens County, the

two cannot reasonably be considered “similarly situated in all material respects.” See

Vinson v. Tedders, 844 Fed. Appx. 211, 213-14 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Because Brown

and Bass had different work experience, different job duties, and different job titles,

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they were not ‘similarly situated in all material respects.’”) (quoting Lewis, 918 F.3d

at 1226).

Plaintiff's argument that her “performance of administrative/clerical [duties]

was just as vital if not more important to the functioning of the County than

McCool’s [performance of his duties] misses the mark. (Doc. 30 at 16.) It is not for

the Court to decide the relative importance of employees’ job functions. See Furnco

Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (“Courts are generally less

competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to

do so by Congress they should not attempt it.”). The inquiry is whether Defendant

treated similarly situated employees differently, not whether Defendant wisely

compensated differently situated employees. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1222-23.

“Undoubtedly, [Plaintiffs and McCool’s] job duties and responsibilities were

different.” (Doc. 30 at 17.) “Treating different cases differently is not discriminatory,

let alone intentionally so.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1222—23. Because Plaintiffs proffered

comparator is not “similarly situated in all material respects,” Plaintiff has failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. Lewis, 918

F.3d at 1226.

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, she has failed

to show that Defendant’s justification for giving McCool a relatively larger raise was

pretextual. “[A] reason is not pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that

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the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Springer v.

Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007)

(emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). Defendant states that the Commission

has had to offer higher salaries to fill open positions, which resulted in McCool being

paid significantly less than Dillan McDaniel, an employee who performed similar

duties but had less experience. (Doc. 26 at 17.) Thus, McCool was able to negotiate

a raise that equalized his salary with McDaniel’s. (Docs. 22 § B(10); 26-4.)

Defendant also notes that “[a]ll employees would generally prefer to be paid more,

but that just isn’t realistic for [Pickens] County.” (Doc. 26-1 4 9.) Plaintiff's only

rebuttal to Defendant’s explanation is to argue that she was underpaid relative to

administrators in neighboring counties. (See doc. 30 at 17.) This argument fails to

undermine Defendant’s explanation that (1) it operates with a limited budget and (2)

it decided to raise McCool’s salary to match that of a similarly situated employee

who works for Pickens County. Because Plaintiff has shown neither that Defendant’s

reasons for giving McCool a substantial raise were false nor that discrimination was

the real reason, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that Defendant’s reasons

are pretextual. Springer, 509 F.3d at 1349.

Meeting her burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework is not the only

way for Plaintiff to survive summary judgment. See Smith v. Lockheed—Martin

Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff may also survive summary

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judgment if she presents “‘a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would

allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. A

convincing mosaic may be shown by evidence of (1) suspicious timing; (2)

ambiguous statements; (3) systematically better treatment of similarly situated

employees; (4) that the employer’s justification is pretextual; and (5) “other bits and

pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn.” Lewis v.

City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff does not present “a mosaic of circumstantial evidence” capable of

allowing a reasonable jury to infer that Defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

There are no allegations of suspicious timing. Plaintiff offers neither ambiguous

statements nor inflammatory statements of any kind that could support an inference

of racial or gender animus, let alone discriminatory intent. As discussed above,

Plaintiff has failed to show that any similarly situated employee received better

treatment than her. And even if McCool was a proper comparator, his receiving a

larger raise than Plaintiff on one occasion would not show “systematically better

treatment.” Plaintiff also fails to show that Defendant’s justification is pretextual.

Thus, at best, Plaintiff's mosaic consists solely of “bits and pieces from which

an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn.” Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185.

Plaintiff's “bits and pieces” are as follows: (1) Plaintiff was being paid less than

assistant administrators in other counties; (2) Defendant gave her a smaller raise than

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she requested for fiscal year 2020; (3) McCool was given a substantial raise for fiscal

year 2020; (4) another white employee received a significant raise in fiscal year

2016; (5) “the only person denied a substantial increase was [Plaintiff], the black

woman’; and (6) the “same decision makers” “[w]ho denied [Plaintiff] and approved

of the other pay raises” were all white males. (Doc. 30 at 20.)

Plaintiffs claim that she was “the only person denied a substantial increase”

is unavailing because it is unsupported by the record. See Rollins, 833 F.2d at 1529

(“[U]nsubstantiated assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion for

summary judgment.’’). To the contrary, every employee except McCool received the

same $1,040 raise for fiscal year 2020. (Docs. 26 4 16; 26-4.) Moreover, Plaintiff

regularly received larger raises than many of her coworkers. (See doc. 26-4.) And

despite McCool’s substantial pay raise in 2020, Plaintiff was paid more than McCool

at all times during her employment. (/d.) Indeed, Plaintiff remained the second-

highest paid employee in the Pickens County Commission Office since McCool was

hired. (/d.) These undisputed facts do not show that Plaintiff has been discriminated

against. See Daneshpajouh v. Sage Dental Grp. of Fla., PLLC, No. 21-13202, 2023

WL 334574, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023) (“To create an inference of intentional

discrimination, comparator evidence, even under a convincing mosaic theory, has to

be ‘similarly situated.’”’) (citing Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185).

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Plaintiff's remaining arguments, taken as true,* “amount to mere conclusory

allegations of discrimination, which, without more, cannot save [her] discrimination

... claims from summary judgment.” Sanz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 21-13868,

2022 WL 4397718, at *4 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Fulcron

v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016)). Plaintiff cites no

cases allowing similar allegations of discrimination to survive summary judgment

under the “convincing mosaic” framework. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

is due to be GRANTED. An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered

contemporaneously herewith.

DONE and ORDERED on September 26, 2023.

L. Scott G

United States DistWét Judge

215647

4 Defendant disputes Plaintiff's claim that the same commissioners—Bain, Elmore, and

Gray—denied Plaintiff's request for a substantial raise and approved McCool for such a raise. As

Defendant points out, the minutes for the meeting in which McCool’s raise was approved and

Plaintiff's raise was denied indicate that Commissioner Gray uniformly opposed all pay raises.

(Doc. 26-3.) And the parties agree that Plaintiff “recorded the minutes for meetings of the County

Commission.” (Doc. 29 § 11.) Yet, Plaintiff maintains—without any explanation—that

Commissioner “Gray voted against [her] receiving the requested pay raise, but approved McCool’s

pay raise.” (Doc. 29 4 18.) Nevertheless, because it is not for the Court to weigh the evidence,

Plaintiff's assertions are taken as true.

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