The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
LAYTULAR MEANS, )
)
Claimant, )
)
vs. ) Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-1287-CLS
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting )
Commissioner, Social Security )
Administration, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Claimant, Laytular Means, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration, affirming the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”), and thereby denying her claim for supplemental security income
benefits. For the reasons stated herein, the court finds that the Commissioner’s ruling
is due to be affirmed.
The court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is
a narrow one. The scope of review is limited to determining whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Lamb v.
Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253
(11th Cir. 1983). The court may not “decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence,
or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Winschel v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (alteration supplied).
Claimant contends that the Commissioner’s decision is neither supported by
substantial evidence, nor in accordance with applicable legal standards. Specifically,
claimant asserts: (1) the ALJ failed to fulfill her duty to fully and fairly develop the
record regarding the claimant’s education and vocational history; (2) substantial
evidence did not support the ALJ’s finding that claimant failed to satisfy the criteria
of Listing 12.05B; and (3) substantial evidence did not support the residual
functional capacity assigned by the ALJ. Upon review of the record, the court
concludes that these contentions are without merit.
A. Failure to Develop the Record
Claimant asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to fully and fairly develop the
record as to her educational and vocational history. The ALJ has a “basic obligation
to develop a full and fair record.” Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1423 (11th Cir.
1997). However, claimant must show prejudice as a result of evidentiary gaps in the
record in order to justify remand to the Commissioner. See id. (citing Brown v.
Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934-35 (11th Cir. 1995)). Claimant argues only that the ALJ
should not have found that she had at least a high school education in the face of
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conflicting evidence in the record. Even so, the ALJ found that plaintiff was limited
to “unskilled work with infrequent changes,” based upon the consultative
psychological evaluation of Donald Blanton, Ph.D.1 Further development of
claimant’s educational record would not have changed the ALJ’s determination that
she could only perform unskilled work.
Likewise, claimant has not shown prejudice because of the ALJ’s failure to
develop the vocational record beyond the evidence presented. Claimant contends that
the ALJ erroneously found that operating a sewing machine was one of the duties of
claimant’s composite job.2 Regardless of that finding, the ALJ concluded that
claimant could not perform her past relevant work. Accordingly, claimant’s argument
must fail.
B. Listing 12.05B
Claimant contends that, despite the ALJ’s contrary finding, she meets the
requirements of Listing 12.05B. That listing requires, in relevant part:
1. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning evidenced
by a or b:
a. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 70 or below on
an individually administered standardized test of general
intelligence; or
1 Tr. 23 (emphasis supplied).
2 Notably, the job of “sewing machine operator” is semi-skilled work, but the ALJ
determined, based upon all of the record evidence, that plaintiff could only perform unskilled work.
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b. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 71-75
accompanied by a verbal performance score (or comparable
part score) of 70 or below on an individually administered
standardized test of general intelligence; and
2. Significant deficits in adaptive function currently manifested
by extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the
following areas of mental functioning.
a. Understand, remember, or apply information
(see12.00E1); or
b. Interact with others (see 12.00E2); or
c. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 12.00E3);
or
d. Adapt or manage oneself (see 12.00E4); and
3. The evidence about your current intellectual and adaptive
functioning and about the history of your disorder demonstrates
or supports the conclusion that the disorder began prior to your
attainment of the age 22.
20 C.F.R. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05B (2021).
Dr. Blanton examined claimant on two occasions. He initially evaluated her
on November 23, 2021, and assessed her as having moderate limitations in her ability
to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, and to make judgments
on simple work-related decisions.3 He also found that she had a marked restriction
in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions, and to
3 Tr. at 406.
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make judgments on complex work-related decisions.4 Claimant was evaluated again
on March 15, 2022. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV was administered, and
claimant obtained a full-scale IQ score of 61, placing her in the mild range of mental
retardation.5 Dr. Blanton opined that claimant “has marked limitations that seriously
interfere with her ability to perform work-related activities on a day-to-day basis in
a regular work setting in the following areas: understand detailed or complex
instructions, carry out detailed or complex instructions, using judgment in detailed
or complex work-related decisions.”6
The ALJ considered Dr. Blanton’s opinions, noting that the claimant had
performed semi-skilled work in the past, but finding that his opinions were supported
by claimant’s test scores and were thus persuasive.7 Claimant argues that the ALJ’s
finding that the opinions were persuasive, combined with the ALJ’s finding that
claimant had the severe impairment of mild intellectual disability, mandated a finding
that claimant met Listing 12.05B, and a corresponding finding of disability.
Claimant’s argument only amounts to a disagreement with the ALJ’s conclusion.
This court’s task is not to decide whether it agrees with the ALJ, or whether the ALJ
4 Id.
5 Tr. at 413.
6 Id.
7 Tr. at 24.
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made the best decision, but simply to determine whether the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence.
Based upon all of the evidence of record, the ALJ found that claimant’s full-
scale IQ of 61 satisfied subsection one of the listing.8 She further found that claimant
had a moderate limitation on understanding, remembering, or applying information
and a mild limitation on her ability to interact with others.9 Additionally, she found
that claimant had a moderate limitation with regard to concentrating, persisting or
maintaining pace, and a moderate limitation on adapting or managing herself.10 The
ALJ, examining the record as a whole, determined that claimant’s work history was
inconsistent with a marked limitation in adaptive functioning. Accordingly, she
concluded that claimant did not satisfy the requirements of Listing 12.05B.
The court finds that the ALJ adequately justified her reasons for evaluating the
listing’s criteria as she did, and that her conclusion is supported by substantial
evidence.
C. Residual Functional Capacity
The ALJ found that claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform
work at the medium exertional level,
8 Tr. at 19.
9 Id. at 19-20.
10 Id. at 21.
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except that she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and
crawl; have occasional exposure to unprotected heights and hazardous
machinery; understand and remember simple instructions; and maintain
attention and concentration to carry out simple instructions in at least
two-hour intervals over an eight-hour workday with customary work
breaks. Changes in work environment would need to be gradually and
infrequently introduced.
Tr. at 21. In determining claimant’s physical residual functional capacity, the ALJ
considered evidence from the claimant’s medical records, multiple medical
consultations, x-rays, and the claimant’s subjective complaints.11 The ALJ, relying
on Dr. Blanton’s psychological assessment, determined that claimant had the mental
residual capacity to undertake unskilled work with limited changes.12
Claimant contends that the ALJ failed to link sufficiently the evidence to the
residual functional capacity. To the contrary, the ALJ considered all of the medical
evidence of record, and adequately justified her finding that claimant could perform
medium work with physical and mental limitations. Further, in arriving at claimant’s
residual functional capacity, the ALJ specifically noted that she also accounted for
claimant’s subjective complaints and the exacerbating effects of her obesity. As such,
the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination of claimant’s residual functional
capacity is supported by substantial evidence.
11 Doc. 9-3 at 23.
12 Doc. 9-3 at 24 (citing Doc. 9-8 at 140-41, 150-51).
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Accordingly, the ALJ’s conclusion that claimant was not disabled was
supported by substantial evidence, in accordance with applicable law, and the
decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. A judgment consistent with this
memorandum opinion will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
DONE this 20th day of July, 2023.
ys United States District Judge