Watkins v. McKinney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHELIA WATKINS, et al., ]

]

Plaintiffs, ]

]

v. ] 2:23-cv-00192-ACA

]

DANIEL McKINNEY, et al., ]

]

Defendants. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Shelia Watkins and her minor son, J.M.S.,1 filed this lawsuit against

Defendants Community Health Systems, Inc.; CSHPSC LLC; Grandview Medical

Center; Daniel McKinney; Jeri Wink; Jane Northcutt; Cynthia L. Jones; Dr. Nazia

Kabani; Jessica Hogue; Kendall Morgan Stricklin; Ashlee B. Quick; Kala M.

Skinner; Natalie Reddington; Arpan Patel; Kimberly Connell; Jacqueline Singleton;

JohnMichael Adam Grinfield; and Latasha Shunta Thomas Grady. (Doc. 1 at 1–2).

All of the individual defendants except Ms. Grady are employed in various

capacities at Grandview. (Id. at 3–4). Ms. Grady is a social worker for the “Jefferson

1 The complaint states that Wellington Smith brings this suit on J.M.S.’s behalf as his next

friend. (Doc. 11 at 1). An unrepresented minor “may sue by a next friend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2).

But each party must sign each pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). Mr. Smith has not signed the

complaint. (See doc. 11 at 57). As such, J.M.S. has not properly brought any of the claims asserted

in the amended complaint. Even if Mr. Smith had signed the pleading, the same analysis set out

below would apply to J.M.S.’s claims.

County Department of Human Resources.” (Id. at 10 ¶ 22). Ms. Watkins asserts

twenty-five claims against all of the defendants relating to her experience giving

birth to J.M.S. at Grandview. (See generally doc. 1 at 6–56).

Because Ms. Watkins is proceeding in forma pauperis (doc. 4), the court must

review her complaint for whether it states a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as a dismissal

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,

1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Under that standard, the court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir.

2012). The court must dismiss the case if the plaintiff fails to plead “a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[A] plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

As an initial matter, the court notes that the precise facts alleged in the second

amended complaint can be difficult to follow. The court has considered whether it

rises to the level of a shotgun pleading, see Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's

Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015), but concludes that, although it may

technically be considered a shotgun pleading, given Ms. Watkins’ status as a pro se

litigant, it is not egregious enough to warrant dismissal on that ground.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Watkins gave birth to her first son at a hospital in Florida in September

2021. (Doc. 11 at 6 ¶¶ 2–3). He had a “nuchal cord,” which is when the umbilical

cord wraps around the neck of a fetus, but she successfully delivered him vaginally

with an epidural. (Id. at 6 ¶ 3, 21 ¶ 62); see Nuchal Cord, Stedmans Med. Dictionary

(2014 ed.).

While Ms. Watkins was pregnant with her second son, J.M.S., she had an

ultrasound that showed no nuchal cord. (Doc. 11 at 14 ¶ 33). A month and a half

later, Ms. Watkins, accompanied by her partner, Wellington Smith, went to

Grandview to give birth to her second son, J.M.S. (Id. at 7 ¶¶ 10–12). Ms. Watkins

was already in labor (id. at 14 ¶ 34), and planned to have a vaginal birth (id. at 7

¶ 10). But the epidural did not work. (Doc. 11 at 7 ¶ 12). Staff informed Ms. Watkins

and Mr. Smith that the fetus had a nuchal cord. (Id. at 21 ¶ 63). Ms. Watkins and

Mr. Smith repeatedly asked for an ultrasound to prove the presence of a nuchal cord,

but the staff never did one. (Id. at 15–16 ¶ 39, 21 ¶ 63). As a result, Ms. Watkins

does not believe J.M.S. had a nuchal cord. (Id. at 21 ¶ 63).

Because of the failed epidural, Ms. Watkins remained in pain for several

hours. (Doc. 11 at 19 ¶ 53). Eventually medical staff gave Ms. Watkins an

unnecessary Caesarian-section (“C-section”). (See id. at 13 ¶ 30, 16 ¶ 45). One of

the defendants told Ms. Watkins after the procedure that when the procedure started,

Ms. Watkins flinched, causing a doctor to yell out that “She can still feel!” (Id. at 13

¶ 30).

After Ms. Watkins delivered J.M.S., staff took him to the nursery without the

family’s permission and kept him there, away from Ms. Watkins and Mr. Smith, for

one or two hours. (Id. at 17–18 ¶¶ 47–48). During this time, someone at Grandview

gave Ms. Watkins and J.M.S. drug tests without her consent. (Doc. 11 at 15 ¶ 35, 17

¶ 47, 18 ¶ 49, 54 ¶ 131). Someone at the hospital also gave J.M.S. a COVID-19

vaccine, a Hepatitis B vaccine, or both, without Ms. Watkins’ or Mr. Smith’s

permission. (Id. at 18 ¶ 52, 48–49 ¶ 119–22).

The day after J.M.S. was born, Ms. Watkins was staying in a maternity suite.

(Id. at 11 ¶ 22). Ms. Grady, a social worker with the Jefferson County Department

of Human Resources, entered the suit and took a picture of J.M.S. without

Ms. Watkins’ consent. (Id. at 11 ¶ 22, 23 ¶ 69). Although J.M.S. was medically

cleared to leave the hospital at 1:30 p.m. on December 21, a Grandview social

worker would not let J.M.S. leave for another four hours, meaning that Ms. Watkins

and Mr. Smith also had to stay. (Doc. 11 at 35–36 ¶ 98, 38–39 ¶ 103).

After she left Grandview, Ms. Watkins requested her medical records. (Id. at

8 ¶ 16). The records are hundreds of pages long and contain multiple falsehoods,

including stating that Ms. Watkins was admitted for induction of labor, stating that

J.M.S. had a nuchal cord, giving a false time for J.M.S.’s birth, stating that

Ms. Watkins gave birth to her first son at home, stating that Ms. Watkins was

homeless, and expressing concern that Ms. Watkins and Mr. Smith might be

involved in sex trafficking. (Id. at 7–8 ¶ 13–14, 11–12 ¶¶ 24–25, 12 ¶ 27, 14 ¶ 34,

15 ¶ 36, 19–20 ¶ 56, 21 ¶ 63). In March 2023, Ms. Watkins received notification that

J.M.S.’s medical data had been disclosed in a data breach. (Id. at 22 ¶ 68).

II. DISCUSSION

Based on these facts, Ms. Watkins asserts twenty-five claims against all of the

defendants. (Doc. 11 at 22–56). The court will begin with Ms. Watkins’ federal

claims before turning to her state law claims. Ms. Watkins’ federal claims are:

(1) violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

(“HIPAA”) “Security Rule” (“Count One”)

(2) violation of the HIPAA “Privacy Rule” (“Count Two”)

(3) invasion of privacy, in violation of 49 C.F.R. § 801.56 (“Count Six”)

(4) violations of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments

(“Count Sixteen”)

(5) conspiracy, under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (“Count Twenty-Two”)

(6) fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (“Count Twenty-Three”)

(7) illegal search and seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment (“Count

Twenty-Four”); and

(8) deprivation of rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242

(“Count Twenty-Five”).

(Id. at 22–24, 26–27, 42–43, 48–56).

Ms. Watkins has not stated a federal claim. Counts One and Two attempt to

assert private causes of action for violations of HIPAA. (Id. at 22–24). But HIPAA

does not create a private cause of action for violations. Laster v. CareConnect Health

Inc., 852 F. App’x 476, 478 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[E]very circuit to have considered

the issue has also held that no private right of action exists under HIPAA.”).2

Accordingly, Counts One and Two do not state claims and the court must dismiss

them.

Count Six attempts to assert a federal claim of invasion of privacy, under a

National Transportation Safety Board regulation exempting certain “personal,

medical, or similar file[s]” from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act

(“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. 49 C.F.R. § 801.506; (doc. 11 at 26–27). Even assuming

this regulation or FOIA itself created a cause of action for invasion of privacy, the

claim would fail because none of the defendants named are agencies subject to

FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (applying to agencies); id. § 551(1) (defining “agency”

2 Although Laster is an unpublished opinion, the court finds it persuasive. See McNamara

v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060 (11th Cir. 2022). The same is true for the other

unpublished or out-of-circuit cases cited in this opinion.

to mean “each authority of the Government of the United States,” with some

exceptions).

Counts Sixteen and Twenty-Four assert violations of the First, Third, Fourth,

Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. (Doc. 11 at 42–43, 53–55). These claims must be

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits a plaintiff to seek redress for

deprivations “of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.” Patrick

v. Floyd Med. Ctr., 201 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Johnson v. City

of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (holding that a plaintiff does not need to cite § 1983

in her complaint to state a claim). But only one of the named defendants is a state

actor; the rest are private entities or individuals. (See doc. 11 at 2–4 ¶¶ 1–13). The

private entities and individuals named here as defendants cannot be viewed as state

actors against which a civil rights action can be brought under § 1983. See Rayburn

ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing the rare

circumstances under which a private individual can be considered a state actor).

As for the only state actor named in the complaint, Ms. Watkins’ allegation

against Ms. Grady appears to be that Ms. Grady entered Ms. Watkins’ maternity

suite at some point and took a picture of J.M.S. (Doc. 11 at 11 ¶ 22, 23 ¶ 69). This

allegation is insufficient to state a claim for violation of any of the constitutional

amendments on which Ms. Watkins relies. See U.S. Const. amend. I (protecting

freedom of religion, free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the

press, freedom of assembly, and the right to petition the government for redress of

grievances); id. amend. III (prohibiting the government from quartering troops in

private homes); id. amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable searches and

seizures); id. amend. V (requiring due process and protecting against double

jeopardy and compelled self-incrimination); id. amend. IX (providing that

enumeration of rights in the Constitution is not exhaustive). Accordingly, Counts

Sixteen and Twenty-Four fail to state a claim and the court must dismiss them.

Ms. Watkins’ final three federal claims assert violations of federal criminal

statutes: Count Twenty-Two asserts a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, Count Twenty-

Three asserts a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and Count Twenty-Five asserts a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. (Doc. 11 at 48–56). A federal statute does not create a

private cause of action unless there is “clear evidence of Congress’s intent to create

a cause of action.” McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau & Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718, 723

(11th Cir. 2002). There is no such evidence for the criminal statutes on which

Ms. Watkins relies. See Collins v. Bates, No. 17-14559-G, 2018 WL 5090845, at *7

(11th Cir. May 10, 2018) (§§ 241 and 242 do not create a private cause of action);

Lichtenberg v. Sec’y of the Navy, 627 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2015) (§ 1001

does not create a private cause of action). Accordingly, Counts Twenty-Two, Count

Twenty-Three, and Count Twenty-Five do not state claims and the court must

dismiss them.

Ms. Watkins’ remaining claims arise under state law. (See doc. 11 at 24–42,

44–48). The court had jurisdiction over the state law claims based on its

supplemental jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But, as the court has

explained, the court must dismiss all of Ms. Watkins’ federal claims for failure to

state a claim. And where the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction,” the court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction”

over any remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Eleventh Circuit

encourages district courts to do so if all federal claims are dismissed before trial.

Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004). This court therefore

will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Watkins’ state law

claims.

III. CONCLUSION

The court WILL DISMISS Ms. Watkins’ federal claims (Counts One, Two,

Six, Sixteen, Twenty-Two, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Four, and Twenty-Five) WITH

PREJUDICE. The court WILL DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining claims, which all arise under state law, and WILL DISMISS

those claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The court will enter a separate final order consistent with this opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this June 30, 2023.

ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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